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IN SEARCH OF DEVELOPMENT: ZIMBABWE EXEMPLAR FROM 2000 TO 2015

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ABSTRACT

The period 2000 to 2015 epitomised Zimbabwe's relentless search for development as patronised by major policies that were meant to spur socio-economic development. Using a synthesis of qualitative collection methods – such as key informant interviews, in depth interviews and documentary analysis, the article interrogates and evaluate the impact of the Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP), Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) quasi-fiscal activities, Indigenization and Economic Empowerment drive, as well as the Zimbabwe Agenda for Sustainable Socio-Economic Transformation (ZIMASSET) on the trajectory of development. This period portrayed Zimbabwe as a country of contradictions, ambivalence and contestations. The article unequivocally argues that development policies in Zimbabwe were formulated by government as a reaction to political threats – and that for Zimbabwe to achieve its development goals, policies should not be a reaction to political threats; but genuine action by government to improve the living conditions of the people.

Keywords: development; Fast Track Land Reform Programme; quasi-fiscal activities; ZIMASSET; Zimbabwe

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INTRODUCTION

Zimbabwe has proved to be a country of contradictions, ambivalence and contestations – from fast track land reform to fast track poverty, from an attempt to create two million jobs through the Zimbabwe Agenda for Sustainable Socio-Economic Transformation (ZIMASSET) to more than two million job losses – this has been an impeccable description of the Zimbabwe development trajectory since 2000. Since independence, Zimbabwe has been inexorably in search of development; evidenced by multifarious policies. The period 2000 to 2015 saw the government promulgating development-oriented policies, which were meant to spur development; especially against the backdrop of structural adjustment programmes that brought social and economic challenges in the 1990s.

The genesis of the new millennium generally demarcates the onset of what has been unequivocally referred to as the "Zimbabwean Crisis." The crescendo of the Zimbabwean Crisis has been the economic meltdown of unimaginable proportion, caused by the mismanagement of the economy by authorities; as well as structural constraints within the local economy and international economic system (Murisa 2010). Between 2000 and 2010, the already weak and desultory economy had shrunk by 30 per cent (Moyo and Yeros 2007). According to Murisa (2010), inflation rate between 2007 and 2008 reached 231 million per cent. Moreover, prices of commodities were increasing at an alarming rate; at more than 50 per cent (Scones, Marongwe, Mavengedze, Murimbarimba, Mahenehene and Sukume 2010). Although there are no official statistics detailing unemployment figures in Zimbabwe, available literature suggests that the rate of unemployment peaked to about 80 per cent between 2000 and 2008.

This article is therefore, a conspicuous interrogation of Zimbabwe's search for development through the land and agrarian reforms, Reverse Bank of Zimbabwe quasi-fiscal activities, indigenisation of foreign-owned companies and ZIMASSET. The article critically interrogates implications of the policies on the trajectory of development in Zimbabwe. Few scholars have attempted to consolidate the Zimbabwean search for development between 2000 and 2015. Hitherto, attempts at interrogating Zimbabwe's search for development between 2000 and 2015 are rather weak and disjointed.

METHODOLOGY

The article is heavily reliant on a synthesis of qualitative data collection methods. Documentary analysis of major development policies shows positive and negative impacts of these policies on development. The starting point was the critical analysis of texts and narratives on development policies, which include land and agrarian reforms, ZIMASSET, RBZ quasi-fiscal programmes, as well as indigenisation programmes. Yin (1995) notes that documentary analysis involves rigorous and systematic review of both primary and secondary documents. Therefore, documentary analysis in this instance enabled researchers to arrive at credible findings on Zimbabwe's search for development between 2000 and 2015. The researchers consulted book chapters, journal articles, research papers and electronic sources. Pundits on Zimbabwe's development trajectory were interviewed as key informants, and were asked to interrogate the impact of major policies on development. The researchers ethnographically witnessed the impacts of policies such as ZIMASSET, RBZ quasi-fiscal programmes and the indigenisation policy on development. The researchers used their lived experience as development was unfolding to buttress documentary analysis and key informant interviews.

DISCUSSION OF THE FINDINGS

Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP) to fast track poverty and agricultural failure

It is the uncontested truth that land in Zimbabwe had to be redistributed; especially given the historical dispossession and imbalances in land ownership (Sadomba 2013). It is noteworthy that the ZANU-PF government had never taken a deliberate action to address the land issue since independence. Thus, (Sadomba 2013) concludes that the FTLRP was rolled out as a result of the pressure that the war veterans put on the Mugabe regime; and that the Mugabe regime only agreed to distribute land as part of truce to pacify them. Sadomba (2013) attributes the chaotic state of the FTLRP to the frustrations that the war veterans' organisation experienced due to the dithering approach regarding the land policy. The authors posit that the Mugabe regime never took deliberate action prior to 2000, because their stranglehold on power was hitherto unchallenged. Pressure from the war veterans movement (Sadomba 2013) and the emerging Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) opposition party forced the Mugabe regime to take action. The year 2000 marked the beginning of a serious threat to ZANU-PF's power – hence the ZANU-PF had to initiate the FTLRP in order to hold on to this power. This narrative is supported by Moyo (2013) and Sadomba (2013), who conspicuously reflect on the isolated attempts at land redistribution, such as the short-lived resettlements from 1980 to 1984, as well as resettlements that favoured state elites and functionaries towards 1990. It is important to note that before 2000 the ZANU-PF government actually unleashed the country's security apparatus on farm invaders (Sadomba 2013) – it is against this backdrop that we aver that the FTLRP was not a development policy but a strategy for ZANU-PF to hold on to power.

The process of redistributing land was rapid, chaotic and short circuiting legal procedures. The FTLRP was a two-pronged approach – consisting of the Model A1 and Model A2 approaches (Zikhali 2008). Model A1 was intended to decongest communal areas and was targeted at constrained farmers in communal areas. The model was based on existing communal area organisation, where peasants produce mainly for subsistence. The A2 Model on the other hand, was a commercial settlement scheme, comprising the small to medium and large-scale commercial settlements intended to create a cadre of black farmers. The result was that the "chefs" got all the prime commercial farms while the war veterans and the general peasants were given A1 model farms. However, Moyo and Nyoni (2013) heavily dispute the fact that the "chefs" got all the prime land, and that the FTLRP was riddled with corruption:

> "Media-based reports highlighted corruption and patronage in favour of ZANU-PF-aligned elites based on populist perspectives which ground all state action and social agency in the ruling political party (ZANU-PF). The state is narrowly conceptualised as being intrinsically neopatrimonialism, allegedly driven by unproductive 'rent seeking' and consumptive distributional behaviour."

As alluded to earlier, the ZANU-PF government initiated the FTLRP to hold on to power – and to achieve this, they offered leases to beneficiaries, instead of title deeds. This led to a client-patron relationship as beneficiaries would not dare oppose or criticise the government, for fear of losing the land.

Macro evidence points to the fact that the programme has been accompanied by a contraction of the economy (Zikhali 2008). Zimbabwe's economy is largely agrarian, and to this effect, Richardson (2004) points out that agricultural production has plummeted since the programme was rolled out in 2000. By 2004 agricultural production had dropped by 30 per cent. The inadequacies of the FTLRP were attributed to the lack of state support to develop the social capabilities of small holder farmers (Moyo and Chambati 2013). While accepting the negative impact of the FTLRP on agricultural productivity, Moyo and Nyoni (2013) blame the sanctions that were meted on Zimbabwe by the West, as well as three occurrences of droughts between 2001 and 2011 for the inadequacies of the programme. However, key informants attributed the failure of the FTLRP to the chaotic manner in which the programme was rolled out, as well as the impact of the droughts. The manufacturing sector also experienced a contraction, owing to the failure of the FTLRP, with the whole economy shrinking by 15 per cent by 2003. This is worrisome, especially given the fact that before the FTLRP was rolled out the agricultural sector employed more than 70 per cent of the labour force, and accounted for between nine and 15 per cent of the GDP, and between 20 and 33 per cent of export earnings (Chitiga and Mabungu 2008). Basically, instead of eradicating poverty, the FTLRP exacerbated it. Without disputing the initial failures of the FTLRP, like any other agrarian reforms, Moyo and Nyoni (2013) challenge the dominant narratives that myopically concludes that the FTLRP has failed to bring agrarian reforms as "empirically and analytically weak." Furthermore, (Murisa 2013) also laments the fact that the debates around the FTLRP tended to concentrate on declining agricultural productivity; without noticing a recovery in the production of certain crops.

On the other hand, by taking land from private owners and transferring it to newly resettled farmers, and by offering them leases instead of title deeds, the programme has undermined the quest to have the land redistributed equitably (Zikhali 2008). Richardson (2005) also posits that commercial farmland lost three quarters of its aggregate value from 2000 to 2001 as a result of lost title deeds. On the same note the FTLRP caused tenure insecurity among its beneficiaries by giving them leases and not title deeds; a move that has translated to low land investments (Zikhali 2008). This in turn made the private sector; especially financial institutions less willing to bear the risk of accepting land as collateral against financial loans.

Another drawback of the FTLRP was that it replaced experienced farmers with the less experienced ones, who are geared towards subsistence production (Zikhali 2008). It is important to note that Zimbabwe has consequently become the basket case of the world – for instance, the levels of poverty have been rising each year, since the FTLRP was rolled out.

Zimbabwe's economy is dependent on the agricultural sector – therefore any instability or adverse change in the sector would naturally have a ripple effect on the entire economy. This is what happened in Zimbabwe as industries closed downs, rendering workers jobless. The FTLRP also led to the decongestion of the communal areas as villagers were allocated plots under the A1 Model. In the same vein, it is important to note that human and property rights were violated during this exercise (Richardson 2004).

It is beyond doubt that the land reform process in Zimbabwe was long overdue – however, the manner in which it was carried out leaves much to be desired. Land reform is supposed to alleviate poverty and lead to the development of the country as a whole; however when land is used as a tool of exclusion or inclusion, as was the case in Zimbabwe, realising the promise of development will remain a pipe dream. Land is naturally a politicised issue, but to use it to safeguard the interests of a select group of individuals at the expense of the general populace will hinder development.

The Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe Quasi-fiscal programmes and spiralling inflation

Superfluous evidence shows that the adoption of quasi-fiscal activities is not peculiar to Zimbabwe, but has been practised by leading world economies time and again, depending on prevailing conditions. Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (2008) notes that in the aftermath of hurricanes Katrina and Rita in 2005, that decimated the Gulf Coast of United States, leaving unprecedented damage, a whopping US$16.7 billion in Federal Funds was provided to rebuild the damaged houses and infrastructure – at the instigation of President Bush. The Federal Reserve was also actively involved after the 11 September attacks in order to prop lending and improve liquidity in the economy (Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe 2008).

A considerable number of factors occasioned the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe to adopt extraordinary interventions that also encompassed the quasi-fiscal interventions. According to the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (2008), the Zimbabwean economy has been facing multi-layered extraordinary challenges since 2000, following the inception of the Land Reform Programme, which was aimed at remedying the historical land imbalances – these include the illegal sanctions imposed on the country, suspension of the balance of payments support, withdrawal of life line projects funding, credit and humanitarian assistance, droughts, as well as rising international oil prices. Against the background of these ignominy challenges, the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe was left with no option but to put extraordinary and innovative steps or measures from 2004 in order to curtail the plummeting economy, stabilise energy supplies, stimulate economic growth and ensure self-sufficiency.

The Productive Sector Facility (PSF) was introduced in December 2003 to assist struggling companies from all sectors of the economy, with the aim of spearheading and boosting production. Evidence in superfluity shows that the PSF succeeded in improving production in most sectors of the economy – however, its gains were reversed by the deleterious developments such as drought, sanctions and lack of the balance of payments support. The Agriculture Sector Productive Enhancement Facility (ASPEF) was introduced in mid-June 2005, with the aim of resuscitating the ailing agricultural sector that has been hit hard by the banks' dithering approach to lending; following the implementation of the land reform. A conjecture to the ASPEF was the Farm Mechanisation Programme, which was geared towards sedimenting the gains of the Land Reform Programme, through the provision of agricultural equipment; to replace dwindling and unreliable stock of equipment. Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (2008) unequivocally avers that the Farm Mechanisation Programme cascaded to small holder farmers in a quasi-fiscal activity called the Support to Small Holder Farmers that provided animal-drawn implements to small holder farmers. Consequently, 100 000 ox-drawn ploughs, 100 000 ox-drawn planters, 100 000 ox-drawn harrows, 100 000 scotch carts, 100 000 cultivators and 100 000 portable fumigator tanks were distributed to small holder farmers. In 2007, insanity was witnessed in the retailing and wholesaling sector, where prices were increased almost on a daily basis; despite the existence of the social contract. In response, the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe imposed price controls – and this resulted in the disappearance of goods from shops. Paradoxically, these goods resurfaced on the black market. At the same time, manufacturers were confronted by huge production costs. This prompted the Reserve Bank to put in place the Basic Commodities Supply-Side Intervention Facility (BACOSSI), under which primary, secondary and tertiary producers and suppliers in targeted key sectors had access to concessional production-linked financial support for working capital requirements, specifically dedicated to evoking positive supply responses (Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe 2008). In the same vein, the Critical Skill Retention Programme sought to countermand unrivalled loss of critical skills, through the provision of motor vehicles, ambulances and construction of garden flats for medical practitioners. In pursuant of quasi-fiscal activities, the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe promulgated the Transport Sector Resuscitation Programme that procured 110 maxi buses and 140 minibuses for the ailing Zimbabwe United Passenger Company, in order to resuscitate the passenger transport system. This article will by no means try to exhaust the RBZ quasi-fiscal activities, but a run-down of RBZ quasi-fiscal activities would include Operation Maguta, Maize Delivery Bonus Scheme, Troubled

Bank Fund, Maize Imports, Wheat Imports, Electricity Imports, Fuel Imports, critical drugs importation and Bio-Diesel Project.

The overall result of the RBZ multifarious quasi-fiscal activities has been to fuel money growth and inflation. It came out during the 2005 IV Consultations that the view of the IMF is that the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) needed to focus on its core function of ensuring price stability and rapidly phasing out many quasi-fiscal activities that fuel money growth and inflation. It is estimated that the Fiscal Budget deficit encompassing quasi-fiscal activities exceeded 80 per cent of the Gross Domestic Products. The IMF board, which convened on 9 September 2005; reached a conclusion that the unprecedented high rates of money growth that caused the triple digit inflation was mainly due to the sharp increase in the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe quasi-fiscal activities – which resulted in higher losses on the RBZ balance sheet. Zimbabwe's Central Bank has also been accused of driving up inflation in the country by pumping out money to fund a range of Government initiatives not accounted for in the budget. The quasi-fiscal losses of the central bank have been financed through money creation or issuance of central bank securities, pushing inflation to 2 200 per cent in March 2007.

The Indigenization and Economic Empowerment Act (Chapter 14:33) and the economic malaise

Indigenisation and economic empowerment between 2000 and 2015 is informed by the Indigenization and Economic Empowerment Act (Chapter 14:33); which was endorsed by parliament in December 2007, and gained momentum in 2009. The intentions and the process to achieve indigenisation and economic empowerment are impeccably captured in the ZANU-PF's manifesto that relentlessly declared that:

> Only the Indigenisation and People's Empowerment reform programme can meet the goals of the people. There's no other alternative. Therefore, ZANU PF will unapologetically intensify the implementation of this programme over the next five years in order to meet the goals of the people… The main objective of this law as enshrined in Section 3 of the Act is "to endeavour to secure at least 51 percent of the shares (ownership) of every public company and any other business shall be owned by indigenous Zimbabweans. For the avoidance of any real or mischievous doubt, this law is very clear in its application, and thus does not exempt any public company or any other business for any reason whatsoever – and therefore, applies equally to all the 14 key sectors of the economy … Consequently, and going forward, there is a need to review, tighten and strengthen the law to, among other things, clarify the fact that the indigenous Zimbabweans cannot be expected or required to buy back their God-given natural or economic resources. (ZANU-PF Manifesto, 32)

Concisely, the Indigenization and Economic Empowerment Act (Chapter 14:33) sought to ensure that all foreign-owned companies and entities are 51 per cent owned by the indigenous people of Zimbabwe. The only achievement that the Indigenization and Economic Empowerment Act achieved was to serve as grand strategy by ZANU-PF officialdom to win 2013 general elections. The ZANU-PF manifesto was crafted around the indigenisation pomposity, such that indigenisation is mentioned about 180 times in a 108 page document (Derek Matzyzak Research and Advocacy Unit 2014). ZANU-PF relished the opportunity to be pompous and peremptory to its immediate constituent in that it could force the mighty western-owned companies; especially mines to shed control to indigenous people of Zimbabwe. Evidence in superfluity shows how ZANU-PF grandiloquence to the nation, and claimed to have forced western-owned companies to comply with indigenisation laws. A symbiotic relationship developed between the Ministry and companies, where the Ministry claimed to have compelled companies to indigenise, and companies claimed to have been compelled to do so too. To facilitate this illusion, details of the indigenisation proposals made and accepted were kept under wraps by the Ministry (Derek Matzayzk Research Unit 2014). The proposals that were made known to the public were highly preposterous. Impeccable examples are the proposals by Old Mutual and ZIMPLATS.

Development that was envisaged to accrue from the broad-based economic empowerment; and the indigenisation process failed to materialise; as few or no companies implemented the indigenisation mantra. Companies hysterically bemoaned that they were unable to comply with the requirements of the law as compliance was dependent on the willingness of the shareholders to comply with indigenisation – a process they had no control over. The Research Advocacy Unit (2014) opines that companies that were approached by the Ministry complied by submitting indigenisation plans only to please the Ministry. Many a times when companies were called to discuss their indigenisation plans, they would do whatever it takes to make sure that negotiations drag on for a long time; hoping that the terrain would be favourable after the elections. The debacle surrounding the indigenisation process colluded with the bad reputation regarding human rights that the country already had; and this did enough to scare investors and in the process, hampering the prospects of economic growth. It is a blatant truth that the indigenisation and economic empowerment policy, which had noble intentions of benefiting indigenous people; did little or nothing to empower them. The only experience that the indigenous people of Zimbabwe have of indigenisation and empowerment is that which they read about in newspapers, see on television news, and hear about on radio news. The policy tremendously failed and affected the already weak and disjointed economy.

Munzara (2015), predicting the negative effects of the indigenisation and empowerment policy, singled out investor flight risk as a cause thereof. In an era where domestic sources of private capital were limited, the government embarked on the indigenisation drive that had hallmarks of investor phobia. Thus, Binha, the economist, described the policy as a “millstone around neck of economy.” (Zimbabwe Independent 2016)

Community Share Ownership Trusts (CSTOs), a concomitant of the Indigenisation and Empowerment Drive

Community Share Ownership Trusts (CSTOs) are largely concomitant of the indigenisation and economic empowerment drive that is informed by the Indigenization and Empowerment Act (Chapter 14:33). CSOTs are motivated by the desire to achieve broad-based economic empowerment (Mabhena and Moyo 2014). CSOTs can be viewed as a plan by the government to accelerate and accentuate development by giving communities a 10 per cent stake in entities that exploit natural resources. Maodza (2012) opines that CSOTs ensure that communities participate in the development of their areas as well as fight the entrenched scenario that has seen multinational companies exploiting resources without attendant benefits to immediate communities. Under the community share ownership scheme, companies operating in a given area would cede a 10 per cent stake to the community; and the money generated from shareholding would be used to fund development projects such as the building of roads, schools, clinics and bridges (Musarurwa 2012). Consequently, as provided by section 14(b) of the Statutory Instrument 21, the following CSOTs were established:

- Zvishavane-Tongogara Trust in Midlands
- Gwanda Trust in Matabeleland South
- Mhondoro-Ngezi Trust in Mashonaland West and
- Zimunya Trust in Manicaland.

The main objective of the CSOTs was that the community in the district of a mining operation could reap some benefits from the exploitation of the natural resources in the area they inhabit (Mabhena and Moyo 2014). The Gwanda Trust spent a whopping US$1 million dollars on the construction and rehabilitation of the clinic. Evidence in superfluity shows that clinics such as Mapati, Silikwe and Sitezi were constructed; using funds from the CSOTs, while clinics such as Guyo and Chelesa were rehabilitated. Zvishavane-Shurugwi Trust bankrolled the construction of two classroom blocks and the rehabilitation of roads. Similarly, in Shurugwi four blocks of classrooms, three houses for teachers, as well as the drilling of a borehole were financed by the Zvishavane-Shurugwi Trust. The construction of schools, roads and clinics highlighted the achievements of the Mhondoro-Ngezi Trust. Aspersions have been heaped on CSTOs, that they have facilitated infrastructural developments in districts that have mines at the expense of districts where minerals could not be exploited. Some analysts argue that the empowerment drives of the CSTOs are only aimed at benefiting people in the mining areas at the expense of the entire populace. This has facilitated geographies of uneven development.

As argued above, the empowerment and indigenisation drive was part and parcel of a grand strategy to win the 2013 general elections. Therefore, the spasmodic social development/infrastructural development that was witnessed was discontinued after the 2013 general elections. The intermittent infrastructural development, prior to the 2013 general elections was not undertaken out of the sincerity of the multinational mining entities; but was rather undertaken to mollify the government in the wake of relentless threats by the government for corporates to comply with the indigenisation and empowerment requirements.

It is conspicuous that the CSOTs did not significantly empower and improve the standard of living for communities that supposedly benefitted from CSOTs. Poverty remained high in communities that had CSOTs. The standard of living did not show any significant changes; essentially, the standard of living remained unchanged. The CSOTs failed to tackle poverty and spur development; as funds were at times abused by superintendents of the trusts. Corrupt officials siphoned funds from CSTOs for their own benefit. An impeccable example is the Zimunya-Marange Trust, where chiefs from Zvishavane paid themselves US$5000, out of the funds meant for development, as sitting allowances for the whole year.

ZIMASSET: A political gimmick by ZANU-PF

ZIMASSET is an acronym for Zimbabwe Agenda for Sustainable Socio-Economic Transformation, and was crafted by the ruling ZANU-PF government as part of its development and political campaign. It was implemented from October 2013 after the presidential elections. This is a cluster based-development policy with four key clusters that have been identified as key in unlocking Zimbabwe's potential. It is critical and of vital importance to view ZIMASSET as another of the ZANU- PF's policies, aimed at entrenching its grip on power, as it will be shown in the discussion that follows, that ZIMASSET is nothing but politicking by ZANU PF.

The most important step in addressing a problem is to accurately diagnose the cause(s); and as such, in addressing the challenges that Zimbabwe is facing, it is imperative for policymakers to correctly point out the cause of the challenges the nation is enmeshed in. In crafting ZIMASSET, the ZANU-PF government did not address the root cause of the socio-economic challenges Zimbabwe is grappling with. The introductory pages are full of baseless claims of the causes of the problems in Zimbabwe. (Robertson 2013). One cannot be lambasted for concluding that the hypothetical causes of the Zimbabwean problems were mere political statements to rationalise the maladministration of the economy by the ZANU-PF led government since 2000.

ZIMASSET claims that the socioeconomic challenges that Zimbabwe has been grappling with since 2000 were caused by illegal sanctions imposed on the country by western nations – however, the truth is that these challenges were caused by the forced closure of the country's biggest productive sector, the commercial agricultural sector, as well as the loss of its principal sources of export revenues (Robertson 2013). Among other false claims in the introductory pages of ZIMMASSET is the claim that the nation's debt is a result of its failure to access international capital and investment inflows, due to illegal sanctions – when in fact, the debt overhang was caused by the country's inability to pay back loans that were already provided – notwithstanding the fact that sanctions were imposed on certain individuals; and not the country, and as such, have nothing to do with the debt (Robertson 2013).

Robertson (2013) avers that the plans to "leverage resources" as envisaged in the ZIMASSET, will result in the loss of sovereignty that will make financial help expensive; further noting that party domination of diamond revenues must be removed; if the Sovereign Wealth Fund touted in ZIMASSET is to succeed.

The policy was crafted without consulting the relevant stakeholders and as such, cannot be expected to achieve anything as it is viewed as a ZANU-PF document (pindula.com). Companies have continued to close down; in fact retrenchments have become common since the landmark ZUVA petroleum case. The rate of unemployment and levels of poverty (especially among rural peasants); have been on the rise (Newsday 2013). The fact that ZANU-PF turned the election manifesto into a national policy on development is worrisome; especially in view of the fact that ZANU-PF has a long history of side-lining those who opposed the party's suggestions for implementing development programmes. ZANU-PF pompously declared to the nation that ZIMASSET was going to create more than 2 million jobs – however, since the ZUVA petroleum case, pundits claim that more than 2 million jobs have been lost.

Robertson (2013), posits that the policy turned a blind eye to proposals that might improve investor confidence by pledging respect for human and property rights, the rule of law as well as contractual obligations – and notes the solutions offered to the problem(s) besieging Zimbabwe, only dealt with the symptoms of the problems.

CONCLUSION

From fast tracking land reform to fast tracking poverty, from an attempt to create 2 million jobs through ZIMASSET, to more than 2 million job losses – this has been an impeccable description of Zimbabwe development trajectory since 2000. Since independence, Zimbabwe has been inexorably in search of development – evidenced by the formulation of multifarious policies. The period 2000 to 2015 saw the government promulgating development oriented policies, meant to spearhead development – especially against the backdrop of the structural adjustment programmes that brought about social and economic challenges in the 1990s. Some of the policies include the Indigenization and Economic Empowerment Drive, ZIMASSET and the RBZ quasi-fiscal activities. Consequently, the period 2000 to 2015 was marked by poverty and economic decline as it coincided with what is generally called the Zimbabwean Crisis – a shorthand of a very complex process of state failure. Development in Zimbabwe will remain a pipe dream until such a time that government reconsiders its stance of crafting and implementing development policies as a means to retain political power. As has been shown in the foregoing discussions, development policies in Zimbabwe, from 2000 have always been reactions on the part of government to a political threat – and for Zimbabwe to realise the promise of development, policies should be about a genuine action on the part of government to improve the living conditions of the people.

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