

Displacement and Livelihoods through the Construction of Small Dams: Legacies of Magunje Dam in Hurungwe District, Mashonaland West Province, Zimbabwe

Joshua Chakawa

<https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3380-6820>

National University of Lesotho

j.chakawa@nul.ls

Midlands State University, Zimbabwe

chakawaj@staff.msu.ac.zw

Tawanda Valentine Chambwe

<https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7285-3801>

Midlands State University, Zimbabwe

chambwet@staff.msu.ac.zw

Abstract

This article examines the experiences of people in rural areas who are displaced by the construction of small dams. Scholarship on dam construction has generally focused on the impact of big dams on communities. Yet, this study argues, small dam construction projects also impact those living on the site and vicinity of small dams. Using Magunje Dam in Hurungwe District of Zimbabwe as a lens, the study traces the experiences of the changed livelihoods of communities that resisted being moved and those who were relocated to other places. By taking this approach, the study establishes the complex impact of the Magunje Dam project on the evicted people and argues that those who are affected by small dam projects sometimes suffer unwanted consequences and their challenges are difficult to remedy because they occupy the fringes of society. Their challenges go unnoticed, especially after receiving paltry compensation. The study shows that displacement and involuntary resettlement destabilise the family fabric. Through the lenses of the Impoverishment Risks and Reconstruction model (IRR), the effects of dam construction on rural people are unpacked. Data was obtained through qualitative research methodologies.

Keywords: displacement and resettlement; compensation; impact studies; ecology; livelihoods

Introduction

The construction of small dams has generally eclipsed the World Commission on Dams, which only covers major dam projects often funded by the World Bank (Schulz and Adams 2019). As such, impact studies on how small dam projects affect communities have remained a grey area as far as research is concerned. The construction of small dams was a major preoccupation of the government of Zimbabwe following the attainment of independence in 1980. Dams were seen as key to community development in rural areas, which had been neglected under colonial rule. After the attainment of independence, Magunje became a Growth Point that was expected to drive rural development (Munro 1998). The paper also adds to our understanding of resettlement in post-colonial Zimbabwe. The story of the resettlement of the Magunje community following their displacement by the army barrack and then by the construction of the dam straddles two land reforms in Zimbabwe. The 1980s to 1990s resettlement programme and the fast-track land reform programme of the start of the 21st century. As such, this paper is also in dialogue with the literature on land reform in Zimbabwe.

The article starts by providing background information on the study followed by an appraisal of the Impoverishment Risks and Reconstruction model. A prelude to the construction of dams in Hurungwe, which comes next, puts us in the picture of dam construction in Hurungwe. A general exposition of Hurungwe's geography is explored in order to understand justifications for dam construction in the area chosen. Generally, water shortage was found to be the major reason for building the dam. This is followed by a discussion of how communities were prepared for relocation and finally how they moved to areas chosen for them. The paper concludes with the impact of the project on different communities that were affected both directly and indirectly.

Methodology

Fieldwork was conducted first at Magunje Dam and Magunje Irrigation Project. This was followed by visits to Nyangawe, Chiyambi, Mushpark, Chidzuwi and Chiufe where people in the area chosen for the dam had been resettled. Fieldwork was conducted between August 2018 and January 2019. It consisted of participant observation and semi-structured interviews with people who were affected directly or indirectly by the construction of the dam. Interviews were undertaken in order to understand the peopling of the area, dam construction and its short- and long-term impact. Further, interviews also sought to come to terms with the lived experiences of displaced people. Critical reading of secondary literature on dam construction, displacement by dam projects and resettlement was done. Snowball sampling was the main method of identifying respondents.

Ethical issues were seriously considered in the collection and use of data. The effects of displacement on communities that were resettled did not constitute a threat to the respondents or for that matter to the government. As such, the interviewees voluntarily agreed on the use of their actual names. Those in the Magunje gardening project,

however, had to remain anonymous for their own security. As such, pseudonyms were used. The official from Hurungwe District Council agreed to the use of his actual name. The names of those who moved back to the dam site were however changed for their own security.

Background to the Study

Magunje Dam, commissioned in 2005, is found in Hurungwe District in Mashonaland West Province of Zimbabwe. Hurungwe shares its borders with Makonde and Kariba districts. Generally, the district is divided into Hurungwe East, West and North for purposes of political administration. Hurungwe West has four communal lands, namely, Rengwe, Hurungwe, Nyaodza and Piriviri, while Hurungwe East has Chundu and Kazangarare communal lands. It is the former that is the focus of this study because that is where the Magunje Dam project was undertaken. The small town of Karoi, which serves the district under study, also forms part of the latter. Up to 1944, when Hurungwe was created as a separate district, it was part of Lomagundi district.

Rutherford demonstrates that until the postwar ex-soldiers' resettlement scheme was mooted by the colonial administration, the district was not of importance to the government. Otherwise, it was only known for hunting expeditions and tsetse fly. The ex-soldiers' scheme transformed the district into a tobacco-growing area for white commercial farms (Rutherford 2001, 18). Unlike other districts, especially in Masvingo province of Zimbabwe, Hurungwe provides a general picture of backwardness. Therefore, it is not surprising that for so long the district was neglected. Development in Hurungwe was hampered by the absence of minerals and the ravages of the tsetse fly. Until the 1970s when the liberation war started, most areas were not accessible even by gravel roads. With the coming of independence, Magunje was declared a Growth Point. It is against this background that the idea of constructing the dam in order to decentralise development ought to be understood.

Conceptual Framework

The study used the Impoverishment Risks and Reconstruction Model (IRR) advanced by Cernea (2000). It focuses on social and economic consequences of forced displacement and re-establishment. Its core concepts are risk, impoverishment and reconstruction. Dimensions or variables of impoverishment or reconstruction that the model deals with include joblessness, homelessness, food insecurity, landlessness, marginalisation, morbidity, social disarticulation and loss of access to common property or resources (Cernea 2000, 3662). Since these risks are perceptible and measurable, steps can be put in place during the planning stages in order to arrest dire consequences. This can be done by providing land-based resettlement, creating employment for the unemployed, constructing houses, ensuring inclusivity, offering improved healthcare and restoration of community assets and services. Such actions naturally fall on the shoulders of the government and project planners. The whole idea is to ensure that displacement is not punctuated by a litany of challenges. Generally, the model deals

with risks to be prevented and reconstruction strategies to be implemented. Problems for those to be displaced should be predicted, diagnosed and solutions proffered through research.

Despite the improvements documented by Michael M. Cernea and Christopher McDowell in *Risks and Reconstruction* (2000), decision-makers persist in underestimating the human and financial costs of resettlement and rehabilitation (Feeney 2001). The model is also punctuated by its own problems. For small dam projects, those on the lower course of the river are not displaced but at the same time are affected by radical changes in the flow of the river. Dam construction impacts agricultural activities, particularly gardening. For those who remain, there is a need to examine whether they benefit or not.

Another equally important term which the research grapples with is internal displacement. It is a condition where persons or a group of persons are forced or obliged to leave their homes or places of residence but still remain within the borders of their own country (Kaushal 2009, 77). Research has shown that in most cases, it is the poor who are displaced by development projects (Mashingaidze 2013). A study by Mashingaidze shows that the Tonga of Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) were a riverine people, on the fringes of society, marginalised by the colonial regime and living in poverty. Their situation was worsened by the construction of the Kariba Dam in 1955.

Generally, there is no universally accepted meaning of the term “small dam.” According to the French Committee on Large Dams, a “large dam” is frequently considered as being more than 20 metres high. The International Commission on Large Dams defines large dams as being more than 15 metres high or in some cases between 10 and 15 metres high (Degoutte 2002, 14). Put another way, a 20-metre-high dam will be the largest of the small dams category for some, while others see it as the smallest large dam. According to oral interviews with Zimbabwe National Water Authority (ZINWA) officials, Magunje Dam is 20 metres high and has a water supply capacity of 300 cubic metres per hour (Interview, ZINWA official, Magunje Dam, 29 August 2018). Against this background, Magunje has all the characteristics that qualify it as a small dam, and in fact, judged by its height, it is the biggest of small dams.

Prelude to the Construction of Small Dams in Hurungwe

According to Dear and McCool (2010), many of the world’s most biologically diverse places are also home to some of the world’s poorest, most politically marginalised, and most directly natural capital-dependent people. Judged by its history, Hurungwe fits well into this description. Here, dam construction was considered a solution to poverty, but for some sections it actually increased their state of helplessness. The poor suffer from the disadvantage of lacking a voice. As a result, often they have no choice but to accept unpopular decisions that will in the long run impoverish them. For the people of Hurungwe, forced migration was not something new. Marowa (2015) has provided an extensive exploration regarding the manner in which groups of people who later came

to occupy the district under study were forced to migrate to pave the way for the construction of the Kariba Dam in the 1950s. The result was that they were uprooted from their close source of water, fields, relatives, game and fish. Some chiefs such as Mudzimu further suffered when their chieftainship was reduced to headmanship. A general survey indicates that a number of traditional leaders in Hurungwe such as Mzliawempi, Chanetsa, Matau, Mudzimu, Nyamhunga and Chundu are products of forced migration. Some of their people also chose to stay in the Magunje area. People under Chiefs Dendera, Mudzimu and Mujinga were to suffer further during the Second Chimurenga when they were forced into “protected villages” usually located at townships. Officially, therefore, the construction of Magunje Dam marked a third wave of forced relocation. The dam is located in an area that is under the traditional jurisdiction of Chief Dendera.

Magunje Dam falls under Sanyati Catchment area whose offices are in Gweru, the provincial capital of Midlands province. According to Mr and Mrs Musakanda, plans for the construction of Magunje Dam as well as the Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA) barrack had already been made by Rhodesians (Interview, Mr and Mrs Musakanda, Nyangawe, 12 October 2018). The former asserted that his father used to tell his children that a dam was going to be constructed at the confluence of Chisape and Murereshi Rivers where their home and fields were located. In addition, he also knew about an impending barrack, which he referred to as Rest Camp. As such, the first displacement was linked to this barrack. During the ceasefire period at the end of 1979, Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army (ZPRA) former guerrillas went to Chivakanenyama as a gathering/assembly point. The area was a little remote and without adequate supply of water. By 1986, plans were underway to move the former assembly point, which was now a military camp, to Magunje. For that, massive construction of a new barrack had to take place and people residing in the general area of the barrack were supposed to give way.

This project displaced about 30 families who were resident in the general area that became the camp. Some of the villages that were displaced included Nziramasanga, Chitemerere, Kavande (village head), Kasenga, and Madzindiko. Hurungwe Rural District Council paid them compensation and told them that they were to be relocated to Mauya, which had been set aside for them. All of them, with the exception of Muzimba who was an agricultural extension officer, refused to go. They argued that the area was remote and far away from town. Despite receiving compensation funds, they stayed on. Around 1986, construction of the barrack started. Those who had refused to go simply retreated to areas outside the barrack. Some went to surrounding areas such as Nhari, Kebvunde, Katenhe and Chisape. Others went some 50 km away to Jinga. It was no longer possible for them to be relocated to Mauya because that land had been taken up by others. Compensation indicates the commitment of the government of Zimbabwe to the welfare of the people who were being relocated soon after independence. However, the whole project was not participatory enough as evidenced by the use of a top-down approach. Those who were to be relocated were not consulted

for their opinions in relation to the dam project. The government's approach was patrimonial in the sense that the would-be-displaced were not given the opportunity to choose where they wanted to settle and how. Besides that, the break-up of the family institution was not considered in the planning phase, and neither was monetary value attached to it. For example, Mr Musakanda's elder brother who was moved by the camp construction had to return to his parents' home only to be moved again by the Magunje dam construction project. Equally important, the displacement of these people represented the continuation of state practice carried over from the colonial period.

Development projects in Africa have generally ignored the plight of the displaced. In Uganda, Angola and Kenya such projects have equally led to several displacements. For example, in early 2000, the Ugandan government displaced about 2 041 persons (401 peasant families) without adequate compensation for the Kaweri Coffee Plantation (Adeola 2016, 85). Adeola gives examples from various African countries in relation to compensating the displaced. In Angola, for example, between 2002 and 2006 an estimated 20 000 to 30 000 persons were reportedly displaced by government authorities for the purpose of development. In Kenya, between 1 000 and 2 000 persons were displaced in Raila village in Kibera in 2004 for a road bypass; 10 were not given prior notice, compensation, resettlement or legal remedies (Adeola 2016, 85). Aiken and Leigh again show the communities to be displaced forfeit their homes, customary lands, common property resources and vacate places of historical significance (Aiken and Leigh 2015, 69). Similarly, as a result of the Three Gorges Dam Project in China those in the general area of dam construction were to move to urban areas (Wilmsen and Van Hulten 2017, 94–105). Again, they were not consulted. Such forced displacements lead to stressors as people struggle and fail to adjust to new places. Generally, the impact on communities to be moved is not considered.

Dam Construction and Resettlement of Communities

Magunje Dam was constructed specifically to serve four purposes. First, it was expected to provide the barrack with water. Second, the dam was supposed to provide water to Magunje Growth Point, which was fast growing in line with government rhetoric of decentralisation. Third, it was intended to supply water to an irrigation scheme that was to be started close by to the east across the tarred road. Last, Magunje Dam was generally intended for purposes of development through recreation and various other business entities that could be attracted to the site. The dam wall was constructed at the confluence of Murereshi and Chisape Rivers. Those within the basin of the two rivers were to be moved right up to Katenhe School, some 10 km away. The dam construction project itself was overseen by the Zimbabwe National Water Authority (ZINWA). The dam was built by civil contractor China Metallurgical Construction Company assisted by Hydro Utility Construction Engineers. According to Mr Matsiga, the dam building project started around 1992, and was on halt for about five years. It then resumed in 1998. By 2004, the dam, irrigation scheme and ZINWA water supply project were all complete (Interview, Mr Matsiga, villager, Magunje Dam site, 6 August 2018).

There were a number of families who were on the site that were to be displaced by this project. These had to be removed. Further, there were also families on the area chosen for the Magunje Irrigation Scheme along the tarred road to the Growth Point. Again, these were supposed to be relocated. More families on the upper course of Murereshi River to Katenhe School were also to be relocated. What is clear is that the whole programme of identifying families to be relocated as well as compensated was not consultative. All the people interviewed vividly recalled that Hurungwe District Council officials held meetings with residents telling them about the impending dam project. Their message was that families in the general area to be covered by the dam were to move; the council was to compensate them for immovable property and was also to provide transport to designated areas. It was again the responsibility of the council to get them to new areas for resettlement. Other than following the laid-down guidelines, there was no other room to manoeuvre. The affected families could not negotiate where they were supposed to go. According to Mr Gombami, what often happened was that when a new place to relocate a specific number of families was found, people were invited for a meeting. Cards with YES or NO were put in a basket. Those who picked the YES cards had to move to the assigned area. Those who got the NO response had to wait until a new area was found for them (Interview, Mr Gombami [Kapere], Chiufe resettlement area, Kariba District, 8 August 2018). By the time the project was completed, some households still had no land. Wilmsen and Van Hulten have defined this as a managerialist approach (Wilmsen and Van Hulten 2017, 94–105). It excludes the voice of the poor. No serious effort is put towards finding appropriate alternative land for the poor, and sometimes resettlement officials misappropriate funds meant for those to be moved or they may spend it unwisely. Interestingly, the relocation efforts occurred at a time when the country's land tenure was being disrupted by the controversial land reform programme. Indeed, some of the displaced families ended up on former white-owned farms.

From the data obtained from oral interviews, 15 households close to the confluence of the two rivers (Murereshi and Chisape) were relocated against their wishes to different destinations such as Nyangahwe, Mushpark, Chiufe, Chiyambi and Chidzuwi. Such relocations generally destroyed the communities' family fabric and traditional systems, places of worship, ancestral graves and above all, identity. Joseph Mujere, in a study of relocations in Gutu, also observed that resettlement created "not only new forms of livelihoods but also new and often contested forms of belonging as well as the intensification of boundary disputes" (Mujere 2011, 1124). Worse still, the government found itself unable to offer non-land benefits for the convenience of those who lost their land. The absence of post-relocation mechanisms explains why, as will be shown, some families ended up coming back and constructing their homes illegally around the dam area.

Moving people from Magunje to identified new places left scars that continue to haunt those who were affected. Families were scattered to different places; some graves were swallowed by the rising dam water and the irrigation scheme; there was resistance and

to this day, some families complained that they are yet to be compensated. In one case, a family was not resettled because it was too costly to compensate for developments done at the homestead. Those who were relocated found themselves trying to relate to an alien environment which had its own set of new problems. Of the displaced, 75 families went to Nyangawe alone and three villages were created for them. Each had an average of 25 families (Interview, Mr Musakanda, Nyangawe resettlement area, 12 October 2018).

Despite being given a new place to stay and also being compensated, there were families that simply refused to go. They argued that as a development project, they were supposed to benefit from the construction of Magunje Dam. One such family was headed by Nicolas Gundura (Interview, Clever Homora, Magunje Irrigation Scheme, 5 August 2018). The Gundura family remained unmoved a few metres from the tarred road and opposite Kemureza shopping centre, which overlooks the dam. However, the family lost the right to farming land and has had to subsist on renting land for farming from neighbouring villages. Another family head who refused to move was George Mubhonderi (Interview, Mr Gombami [Kapere], Chiufe resettlement area, Kariba District, 8 August 2018). This was despite being given a new area to settle with his sons. He argued that at his old age, he was not in a position to start a new home. It was only when he died that his sons moved to an area they had been allocated earlier. Both cases show that the local authority and the Ministry of National Housing and Public Construction were not prepared to use force to evict resisters. This is unlike the forced movement of the Tonga people from the Kariba Dam area.

In relocating people, the resettlement programmes did not consider relationships that people had cultivated over long periods of time that they had spent in Magunje. Formerly integrated families found themselves scattered far away from each other and unable to maintain close relationships that they had enjoyed for years. Such issues were not taken into consideration when working out the compensations. This disregard for the social cohesion which African families share is similar to the displacement of the Tonga people to make way for the Kariba Dam. According to one respondent cited by McGregor (2009), the Kariba evacuation was a rushed affair which gave the evictees no time to bid farewell to their relatives across the river (McGregor 2009, 114). The movement disintegrated some families and relationships permanently. Surprisingly, this aspect of splitting families continued four decades later. The Kapere family provides a good example of disintegration in light of this project. Some of its members were moved to Nyangahwe, and others to Chiufe, while part of the family remained under village head Kapere (Interview, Mapurani Chirewu, Magunje Irrigation Scheme, 5 August 2018). Mr Gombami (Kapere) indicated that at first it was very difficult to leave an area they had enjoyed for so long. Worst of all was to go without their relatives. Gombami was moved to Chiufe together with two other families from Kapere. They found Chiufe to be a dry and hilly area infested with elephants, lions, hyenas, baboons and other dangerous wild animals that were absent from Magunje. This was in addition to being harassed from time to time by game rangers on allegations of cutting game fences with

the intention of poaching. There was only one borehole to supply the resettled farmers with water. For the new migrants, Chiufe was a nightmare. They were now over 70 km away from Magunje Growth Point and along a dirt road where the only public transport was a single bus. If one missed it, the journey had to be called off for that particular day. During the rainy season, sometimes the road became impassable. The situation which these people found themselves in resonates well with the findings of Kaushal (2009). He indicated that the displaced find themselves marginalised when they lose economic power, move to areas of lower socio-economic status and feel lost (Kaushal 2009).

While there could have been many reasons to resist being relocated, the monetary compensation for being moved was to some too attractive, at least in the initial days. As stated by Carol Mutenga, who worked for Hurungwe Rural District Council (RDC), monetary compensation was determined by the developments one had made at his/her home. These included houses, the size of orchards, gardens, wells and so on. Such developments could not be carried to the new area (Interview, Carol Mutenga, Hurungwe RDC, Magunje, 5 August 2018). Gombami, for example, was given \$3000 as compensation. From what he said, a cow cost between \$150 and \$300 in 1994 (Interview, Mr Gombami [Kapere], Chiufe resettlement area, Kariba District, 8 August 2018). Given the offer to transport his belongings and the number of cattle he could buy to the new area, Gombami chose to go to Chiufe. Mutenga pointed out that some were compensated but eventually returned to Magunje where they now survive on casual work while others secured plots in the Magunje Irrigation Scheme. They simply found it impossible to survive in the new areas allocated to them. Within the category of those who *returned* are those who lost their land but were only given one-acre plots to do gardening. These are the greatest losers because by rural standards, they are considered landless. Those who had better homes were handsomely compensated and they clearly benefitted from the relocation exercise. The poor did not receive good compensation, and they continued to wallow in poverty. Others did, such as Musakanda who had a four-bedroomed house, two good kitchens, a granary and a big orchard and was given \$30 000 as compensation by the RDC in 1992. What this means is that big property owners were beneficiaries of the relocation while the poor found themselves worse off.

Another dilemma the council faced concerned graves in areas earmarked for the dam and the irrigation scheme. According to Clever Homora, reburials were undertaken in Ward 10 of Magunje (Chitemerere Village). It appears that most of the graves in Kapere village were beyond the area to be submerged in water. For members of the Johanne Marange Apostolic Church (JMAC), the story was altogether different. They used to congregate about a kilometre east of Murereshi River for their Passover feast. Many people, especially children, died during such feasts. Some of them had been brought from distant places in the hope that they might recover with the assistance of prophets. The church believes in healing through prayer. As such, those who were sick were not sent to the hospital. What this meant, then, is that many graves at Kemureza close to the river belonged largely to people from different parts of the district and beyond. None came to try and rebury their dead. There was apparently no one prepared to answer

questions concerning why there were so many graves for children. Furthermore, even the burial of adults was undertaken without clearance from the village heads or the local chief. What they were doing by burying their dead clandestinely was an abomination to the local traditional culture. Therefore, when the graves were buried under water, there was no complaint from anyone, and the matter ended just like that. Since the village heads and the local Chief Dendera do not see it as an issue, it is unlikely to resurface.

Hurungwe Rural District Council was, however, willing to support families who wanted to rebury their dead in new settlement areas. An example of this was provided by Mrs Musakanda. Her family was provided with two small coffins, and they had to dig up the remains of the late in-laws. These were taken to Chiyambi near Nyangoma where the eldest brother to Mr Musakanda had been allocated land after displacement from Magunje Dam. Rituals were undertaken and the remains were once more buried. That way, the closeness of the family to the spiritual realm was maintained. To leave the remains under water could have been easily interpreted as negligence and could, some believe, also result in misfortune.

Sometimes local authorities commit themselves half-heartedly to projects such as this one. While people did not resist being moved, their former areas have not remained vacant. From 2000, village heads started parceling out land to those areas on the upper course of the river vacated by some of the families mentioned above. According to Gombami, the whole area they left as a result of the dam project is once more occupied by people. The new population can even be greater than those moved in the 1990s. This means that if families were moved in order to avoid dam siltation, nothing was done to keep the promise. The re-peopling of the general area where households were initially moved from is taking place directly under the eyes of the council and is being facilitated by corrupt village heads. The need for votes by the ruling party and kickbacks by village heads explain the chaotic situation, which, regrettably, the local authority cannot rectify.

The Benefits of Magunje Dam

Generally, the benefits of constructing Magunje Dam include a supply of clean water to Magunje Growth Point and the army camp, the irrigation scheme, employment creation, fishing, recreation, and for the Johanne Marange Apostolic Church (JMAC), a supply of tap water. Benefits to those who were moved include access to fertile land for farming. This section analyses the benefits for those who remained in Magunje. Those who were moved appear largely to have been disadvantaged by the project.

During the construction of the dam itself, locals were employed as casual workers on the construction site. Their tasks included digging trenches for water pipes, laying pipes, bricklaying, doing stonework at the dam wall and operating machines at the site (Interview, Mapurani Chirewu, Magunje Irrigation Scheme, 5 August 2018). From that perspective, at least locals received some income. Since the dam was to be a permanent feature of the community, it was expected that some locals would in the end be employed on a permanent basis. ZINWA is said to have employed people from outside

the area both as casual workers and on permanent contracts. People around the dam therefore feel excluded by ZINWA. The fact that ZINWA is a parastatal that recruits from all over Zimbabwe was not appreciated even by community leaders. Before the construction of Magunje Dam, drinking water was obtained from boreholes. Washing of linen mainly took place in Murereshi River. There is no doubt that a guaranteed water supply became the engine to the development of Magunje Growth Point. It now houses the Grain Marketing Board, government offices, garages, several shops and supermarkets as well as a sprawling residential area. Local authority offices have since been moved to Magunje. Ministry of Education district offices are now at the Growth Point.

Oral interviews with locals in the Magunje Irrigation Scheme point to benefits of the project. They all claimed that their vegetable gardens enable them to earn some cash throughout the year. A survey of the area shows more challenges than opportunities. Most of the gardens had poor quality vegetables, which suggests failure of the gardening scheme. Some allocations had not been planted for a long time and they were being reclaimed by bushes. One garden had abandoned cabbages, which were literally drying because the water supply had become erratic. The project has only one pump, which can hardly meet their irrigation demands. At the time when interviews were undertaken, some gardens were planted with poor quality maize owing to a lack of fertilisers. In short, there was very low agricultural activity in the area concerned. Some of the gardens can be seen as fields that have to be rain fed. Put correctly, the irrigation scheme is facing serious viability challenges. Such failures are linked to planning challenges at the level of both the local and national government in terms of how to put projects such as these to use.

Further problems cited by those who are involved with gardening had to do with marketing. Irrigation farmers are supposed to take their vegetables to Magunje, Karoi, Chirundu, Kariba and sometimes Chinhoyi. Competition with other farmers was explained as the major challenge. Resettled farmers in other parts of the district also bring their products to the same market. Thus, sometimes Magunje Irrigation Scheme farmers run at a loss. Some reported that in times of scarcity, they reaped benefits because most of them were involved with full-time gardening. Buyers at times came directly to the project to place orders. What is clear is that the market is not guaranteed since none of the farmers are involved with contract farming and there is no agro-industry in the vicinity to partially process garden products.

Although members of the JMAC lost their traditional area for the Passover feast, they also derived benefits. They were moved only three kilometres away, close to the main tank that supplies water to Magunje. They were connected to piped and treated water. During Passover feasts, they no longer need to travel distances to get water. The added advantage is that they are now getting treated water. A small population that looks after the place also has a permanent supply of clean water. According to one resident of the Johanne Marange shrine, their current meeting place resembles a town. It is one of the

very few Johanne Marange shrines in Zimbabwe connected to running water (Interview, E. Seremwe, Magunje, 5 January 2019). Clearly, their meeting place cannot contaminate the dam.

Challenges Encountered by Resettled Households

Households that were moved in the 1990s were compensated but not those who were relocated after 2004. The state's resettlement programme during the 1980s and 1990s was measured by the legal and constitutional constraints created by the Lancaster House Agreement during the 1980s and later by the principle of market liberalism ushered in by the International Monetary Fund and World Bank-funded Structural Adjustment Programmes (Moyo 2011; Palmer 1990). By then, the government was facing economic challenges in the wake of the land reform programme. The donor community was shying away from Zimbabwe and economic sanctions were beginning to affect the country (Bond and Manyanya 2002). Those who were under village head Muguza were resettled in 2004. Their farming land had already been taken by the irrigation scheme. Such families were relocated without any compensation under clear threats that if they did not oblige, they would find themselves completely landless.

While some households were compensated, others were not. These include all who were moved to Mushpark in 2004, such as Muguza, Chamba, and Chidyamatamba. Similarly, Makore, who was moved to Chinyerere Farm in Chidzuwi, some 10 km away from Karoi along the Kariba Road, was also not compensated. These families were in the area where the irrigation scheme for community gardens was built. The movement of these people took place after 2000, and they were moving to land formerly owned by white commercial farmers. This had put the government on a collision course with the West and, reeling under economic sanctions, there was no money to compensate those who were to be relocated. One question that needs to be asked of development planners is: Development for whom? Relocated families were worried that neither the irrigation scheme nor the dam benefitted them. In fact, it caused their suffering. Those who were moved to Mushpark provide a clear testimony to that.

Muguza, who, prior to the relocation, was staying in the Kemureza area under Village Head Magunje, was one of those who fared worse as a result of the relocation. All those like him whose area was to be taken over by the irrigation scheme were told by the council that the government did not have any more money to give them let alone to decently resettle them because of economic sanctions. All that the Rural District Council did was to show them their new area and inform them to find their own means of moving there. The new area in question was Mushpark, formerly owned by a white commercial farmer. They were given the option of getting a one-acre plot per household or to move to Mushpark and receive a far bigger piece of land. Trying to stay behind was disadvantageous in the sense that one had to look for a new home and then commute to the garden. As asserted by Muguza, "we had no choice but to go to Mushpark Farm" (Interview, Muguza, Village Head, Mushpark Farm, 18 December 2018). The families

had to carry their property by scotch carts to new areas. In all, households that moved to Mushpark were headed by the following:

1. Mugusa Collen
2. Mutimuri Martin
3. Lloyd Chamba
4. Ronas Chidyamatamba
5. Blessing Makore
6. Lameck Makore
7. Timothy Chidyamatamba
8. Memory Mutimuri
9. Pickard Mubatapasango
10. Blessmore Ndunduri
11. Godfrey Mutimuri

Going to the new area was a directive failure as a result of which one would lose the farm. Given that this was the era of the land reform programme in Zimbabwe, the chances of losing that land were quite clear. Mushpark is punctuated with a lot of problems previously absent from Magunje. For example, there is a critical shortage of water. People travel an average of seven kilometres to Nyaodza River to fetch drinking water. During the dry season, cattle have to be driven for more than 12 km to the nearest dam to get water. Sometimes they walk further to Tavoy, which is about 15 km away. Women, who are usually drawers of water, suffer most in these circumstances. The nearest source of water is a small dam called Mupata, but again this dries out quickly during the dry season. The roads are in some sections impassable. During our research, we had to leave the car behind and walk some four kilometres on foot to get to the villages. This is a challenge when it comes to the marketing of crops and vegetables. In short, relocation has generally led to increased suffering of the displaced communities. This is compounded by the fact that they no longer have security of tenure in their new area. As noted above, it was men who had to pick up pieces of paper indicating where they were supposed to go. This shows that consequences of displacement for women is one area which demands further inquiry. Bisht (2009, 301) has shown some of the results, which include physical violence, bad marriages, loss of property and increased labour demands. Women at Mushpark generally complained about negotiating long distances to fetch water, collect firewood and reach the market. All these challenges go unnoticed by the authorities.

The absence of proper infrastructure remained a problem to all households that were relocated to Nyangawe, Chiyambi, Nyangoma and Chiufe. Respondents from Nyangawe such as Katuruza and Charuma highlighted a litany of challenges that they

had to bear, especially in the early days of settlement. To start with there was a serious shortage of infrastructure. The area was not connected by road. Then, in no time, the boreholes which they found there broke down and suddenly there was a serious shortage of safe drinking water. Chiyambi was considered too remote, making it difficult to travel there and to market agricultural products. All the areas in question had no clinic. In Nyangawe, for almost 10 years after settlement, there was no school. Children had to walk long distances to Chitindiva, Huyo, Mashongwe and Karuru to attend school. Although Nyangawe served as a relocation area since 1994, a primary school was only established in 2005. By 2018, there was still no secondary school. This is a sorry contrast to Magunje, where there are many schools such as Katenhe (Primary and Secondary), Birimahwe Schools, Magunje Barracks Schools, Magunje Government High School and Charles Clack Primary and Secondary Schools. All these are within walking distance of each other. Nyangawe also received an uncontrollable influx of people who went on to invade grazing lands, leading to shortages. Further, the independence of the relocated people was compromised when they were compelled to fall under Chief Chundu as opposed to the original arrangement where they had no chief. During those years, the RDC was the responsible authority. In the same manner, in Chiyambi, the resettled people are now under Chief Kazangarare, while those in Mushpark are technically under Chief Dendera despite not being in communal areas that fall under the jurisdiction of a chief. Being under a chief implies following orders such as not attending to fields on Monday and Thursday. This compromises yields by reducing working time on land.

Conclusion

The construction of Magunje Dam started in 1992. It was completed in 2004 and officially opened in November 2005. The project displaced people to various areas within the district such as Nyangahwe, Chiyambi, Mushpark, Chidzuwi and Chiufe. The government's approach through the local authority was to get the affected people new places on which to settle, offer transport and compensate them for developments made in Magunje. They had to face challenges of settling down, developing new relations and being subjected to poverty. Some of them returned and settled illegally, which is in contrast to what can happen with big dam projects. The article has shown that there was very little resistance to the removals. The irrigation scheme was found to be struggling for survival, while recreation facilities around the dam are yet to start. Magunje Dam project has demonstrated that communities that are displaced by small dam projects suffer in silence. They lose their ancestral land; their families are scattered; they are not fairly compensated; they are moved to poor areas; they lose access to important resources, and, above all, they are completely forgotten or ignored by those who moved them. To avoid pauperisation of the displaced, it is critical to have a participatory post-relocation scheme. The paper has also added to our understanding of state resettlement schemes in post-colonial Zimbabwe. As demonstrated, the current literature on land reforms in Zimbabwe has focused on resettlement aimed at redressing the injustices of colonial land tenures. Using the Magunje community, this article argued that

displacement also continued into the post-colonial period, with people moved to pave way first for the army and then for the dam. Government plans to compensate the Magunje community fell into disarray as the country was consumed by the chaotic land reform programme of post 2000.

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