

Political Conflict, Violence and Zambian Youth

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Abstract

Youths remain central to political conflict and violence within the Zambian polity. This article discusses the nature, extent, causes and effects of politically motivated conflict and violence among Zambian youths. As part of a doctoral project, the study was conducted in Kalulushi constituency, one of the conflict hotspots in Zambia's Copperbelt region during the 2016 general elections. Using a convenience sampling method, 395 young people were surveyed, together with eight senior political leaders and 32 young party supporters purposely recruited from the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD), Patriotic Front (PF) and United Party for National Development (UPND). The study highlighted increased political and electoral violence in 2019, with senior political leaders and young PF and UPND party supporters culpable in keeping the inter-party belligerence afloat. The research illustrates how Zambian youths' poor socioeconomic status predisposes them to being co-opted into political and electoral violence. More specifically, the disruptive effects of violence on communities, voters, ordinary citizens and its overall impediment to consolidating democracy are identified.

Keywords: political conflict; political violence; youth; political participation; democracy; Zambia

Introduction

Participation in community initiatives, according to Nkomo and Du Plooy (2015), is a crucial indicator of whether or not youths are engaged in decision-making that directly affects their welfare. Their analysis of youth participation in community meetings in nine different countries¹ with comparatively long histories of multiparty democracy speaks to this marker. For example, the study revealed that on average 14% of youths were active members and/or leaders of community organisations. Although Zambia stood at 15% active members, with 2% serving as official leaders in community organisations (Nkomo and Du Plooy 2015, 6), the majority of youth are still not fully part of the polity. This huge youth cohort is seen by some, argue Özerdem and Podder (2015, 4), as an accumulative factor in a country's predisposition to political violence and crime. As a conceptual category, youths are "othered" in discussions on conflict, conceived of as "dangerous subjects" and regarded as "a problem" in policy approaches.

Describing youth conjures up social, cultural, political, as well as age factors. Social and cultural lenses associate young people with experiences shaped by gender, ethnicity, social distinctions and material resources at a given time and during a period of transition. The latter may be prolonged due to delayed or denied access to social indicators of adulthood such as earning a living, being independent, establishing families and providing for their offspring (Honwana 2015; Mac-Ikemenjima 2017; Oinas, Onodera, and Suurpää 2018). However, it is the age and political definitions of youths that enjoy considerable utility in literature and scholarly works. For example, the United Nations places youth between the ages of 15 and 24 while the African Charter uses 15 and 35 years; Zambia's Ministry of Youth and Sports follows the latter range (Mac-Ikemenjima 2017; Ministry of Youth and Sport 2015; Musinguzi 2014).

Africa is experiencing an unprecedented increase in the population of young people in these age brackets. Zambia's population of young people aged between 15 and 35 years,² for example, has been estimated at around 6.3 million, representing 35.2% of the national population in 2020 (Central Statistical Office 2013). With such a sizeable share of the country's population, youths carry abilities that could have a positive bearing on the political landscape, while the exclusion of young people from democratic processes could have unfavourable effects. Nkomo and Du Plooy (2015, 10), for example, claim that "if not engaged in democratic processes, a youth bulge could be a potential threat to political stability and national security." This is against the backdrop of poverty, lack of education and unemployment.

¹ Botswana, Ghana, Lesotho, Malawi, Namibia, Nigeria, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

² Consistent with Zambia's Ministry of Youth and Sport, youth is defined in this article as youths between the ages of 15 and 35, and the terms "youth" and "young people" are used interchangeably.

Other studies have also shown that youth bulges are associated with increased risks of political violence globally (Bricker and Foley 2013). Since 2011, Zambia has witnessed unparalleled levels of political and election-related violence, allegedly by young people (Yezi Consulting and Associates 2013; ZEIC 2016). A crucial component in the political conflict and violence configuration in Africa, and Zambia in particular, is the participation of young people. Thus, it is imperative to appreciate youth involvement in party politics. This study sought to establish the nature, extent, causes and consequences of politically motivated conflict and violence among young people in Kalulushi constituency, Zambia.

Political Conflict and Violence

Conflict is a normal functional part of human society and relationships (Allan 2014), and may oscillate around a range of issues including values, scarce resources, status and power. Earlier writers on conflict, such as Hocker and Wilmot (1995, 21), add that conflict is an expressed struggle between at least two independent parties who perceive incompatible goals, scarce resources and interference from others in achieving their goals. Similarly, Pruitt and Hee Kim (2004) define conflict as perceived divergence of interests, incompatibility of parties' aspirations, and the belief that if one party gets what it wants, the other (or others) will not do so. A significant characteristic of conflict that is not illuminated in these descriptions concerns perception. In other words, if parties in a conflict see their differences as mutually exclusive then it may well take a destructive trajectory.

Political conflicts can assume many forms ranging from inter-political party violence over election results to mismanagement and discrimination in the allocation of national resources (Yirenyi-Boateng 2016, 105). Others see political conflicts as driven by the need to alter the political, economic or cultural structures that govern life (Barber 2013, 338). Some political conflicts move into violence. Political violence is explained as the use of force by a group with a political purpose or motivation or influenced by political matters. It encompasses violence against civilians or political rivals as well as violent demonstrations (Paalo 2017, 4). It has been defined as "the intentional use of physical force or power, threatened or actual, against oneself, another person, or against a group or community, that either results in or has a high likelihood of resulting in injury, death, psychological harm, maldevelopment or deprivation" (Krug et al. 2002, 5).

A crucial and foundational view of violence is that it is threefold—direct, structural or cultural. Direct violence, often called physical violence, is overt and visible, while structural violence is covert and often embedded in society's systems and structures; cultural violence entails a line of thought that justifies the application of both direct and structural forms of violence. Direct violence may have branches that Fox and Hoelscher (2012, 433) refer to as interpersonal or social violence, defined as acts committed by individuals or groups. Electoral violence is a subset of political violence linked to a time of elections. It is distinct, according to Burchard (2015a), given its participants work within existing electoral frameworks to achieve their ends. They seek to effect change

by working within the current and established timelines and their potential targets of violence are voters rather than the elite. Raleigh, Dowd and Coughlan (2013, 7) identify four features of electoral violence from other forms of violence—motive, timing, actors or perpetrators and activities.

Accounts of Africa's pre-independence struggles are incomplete without a mention of the valuable contributions by young people. From the 1945 landmark Manchester conference to university student protests in support of the re-introduction of multiparty politics in Southern Africa in the 1990s, radical and fearless youths played a leading role (Dodo, Nsenduluka, and Kasanda 2016; Resnick and Casale 2014, 1175; Sesay 2014, 21). That said, youth involvement in politics ranges from energetic and at times aggressive participation to complete disengagement. It is important to briefly consider this dichotomy.

First, youths have not only participated in sensitising villages on issues associated with chieftdom, development and basic human rights, but have also been part of the broad movement against one-party rule (Simutanyi 2013; Tom 2017, 186). Further, as units within political parties, their active involvement in political violence has been a hallmark of Africa's political landscape. The research literature shows that youth electoral violence has been an overwhelmingly male activity and ranges from simply disregarding the law, forcefully occupying public spaces such as markets and bus terminals to sheer thuggery against individuals and groups who are perceived as opponents. This has a bearing on the development, stability and consolidation of democracy and political institutions (Adigwe 2013; Paalo 2017, 11). Democratisation, in Tom's (2017, 75) view, ought to create "political space that results in the establishment of politically significant groups that have diverse interests and sometimes different ideologies." However, the immortalising of violence adulterates this ideal.

Second, for some youths, complete disengagement is seen as a suitable option. Some studies show that there are structural and institutional barriers that discourage youths from contributing towards decision- and policy-making and the electoral process. A failure to acculturate young people into party politics and political structures not being inclusive or youth friendly may be important impediments (Chamisa and Shava 2016; Musarurwa 2018; Resnick and Casale 2014). In addition, there may be a fear of violence. Mac-Ikemenjima's (2017, 221) analysis of 20 sub-Saharan African countries is insightful. His assessment of fear of violence and voter turnout among youth revealed that Zimbabwe had the highest proportion at 93.9%, with Kenya, Uganda and Nigeria at 82.3%; 73% and 72.6% respectively. Zambia stood at 59.7%.

Youth and Political Conflict in Zambia

Zambian youths have been associated with political and electoral violence since the United National Independence Party's (UNIP) formation. In the 1960s, for example, leaders and supporters of opposition parties such as the United Party and the Zambian African National Congress were occasionally attacked by UNIP youths (Kashimani

1995, 36; Larmer and Macola 2007, 476). Whereas violent political tactics set off with post-independence parties such as UNIP, today's party politics is not devoid of violence-immersed young party stalwarts. From the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) administration to the former ruling Patriotic Front (PF) and then leading opposition and now ruling United Party for National Development (UPND), engagement in violent conflict by party youth leagues has continued. What predisposes youths to engage in violence when handling political conflicts? Four aspects are evident.

First, unfavourable socioeconomic conditions have a bearing on youths' propensity for political violence. Youth susceptibility to crime and violence, including political violence, is strongly associated with high rates of unemployment (Namaiko and Etyang 2017, 28; Twambo and Mbetwa 2017, 4). Second, the failure to appreciate the complexity of politics by young party members heightens their proclivity to violent interactions. For some youths from political parties, politics, especially during a time of elections, evokes "taking the law in their own hands." For example, observers of Zambia's 2016 general elections witnessed incidences involving young party cadres from the opposition party UPND intercepting a vehicle transporting ballots and other electoral materials, and harassing and beating Electoral Commission of Zambia (ECZ) officials in three towns—Chingola, Ndola and Lusaka (European Union Election Observation Mission 2016, 36; Phiri and Hamauswa 2017, 4).

Third, the trend of violent youth wings, which was originally synonymous with UNIP and MMD, is perhaps now institutionalised within the PF and UPND. While their youth stalwarts invariably remain indispensable in so far as electoral canvassing, the violent outlook is unconcealed. It is evident, for example, that young party cadres carry crude weapons, including guns, publicly (Namaiko and Etyang 2017; Phiri and Hamauswa 2017). This militarisation of politics is evidenced by the intensity of election-related skirmishes, for example those between PF and UPND during one of the ward by-elections held in Chilanga, Lusaka Province in 2018 (Namaiko and Etyang 2017).

Last, clientelism that characterises politics, especially during electoral cycles, may also be responsible for the penchant for violent engagement on the part of youth. Material rewards to individuals and groups as "donations" during electoral cycles have become common, notes Bwalya (2017, 1556), and young people are eager to be incentivised. This increases their susceptibility to manipulation by those who are not averse to violence in their quest for political gain.

Research Methods

The research reported here was part of a participatory action research (PAR) carried out in Kalulushi constituency of Zambia's Copperbelt region from June to November 2019. It combined a survey, formal interviews and focus groups discussions to study the causes, nature, extent and effects of political conflicts among young people. The initial data was drawn from a survey of young people drawn from seven administration locations (wards) of Kalulushi constituency. A convenience sample of 395 youths was

recruited from across all the wards, based on their daily pursuits. For example, unemployed young people were met during church meetings and informal gatherings in the communities, while the self-employed were sought at their trading places (shops and market stores). Those in more or less formal employment recruited included primary school teachers, bus and taxi drivers and bus station helpers commonly known as “call boys” from private schools and public transport stations respectively.

Convenience sampling is characterised by respondents’ accessibility, geographical proximity, availability at a given time and willingness to participate. This made administering a survey questionnaires to young people in Kalulushi fairly easy and boosted the response rate. Table 1 shows survey respondents’ demographic data.

Table 1: Demographic Data

Variable	Attribute	<i>n</i>	%
Sex	Female	154	39.0
	Male	241	61.0
Age	15–24 years	127	32.2
	25–34 years	216	54.7
	> 35 years	52	13.2
Level of education	Primary (Grade 9)	94	23.8
	Secondary (Grade 12)	140	35.4
	College (Cert. /Diploma)	114	28.9
	University	47	11.9
Employment status	Unemployed	173	43.8
	Employed	124	31.4
	Self-Employed	98	24.8
Political affiliation	Yes	109	27.6
	No	286	72.4
Length of residence	< 12 months	18	4.6
	1–2 years	45	11.4
	3–5 years	78	19.7
	> 5 years	254	64.3

Source: Survey, 2019

The PF and UPND, as leading political parties, are engrossed in political conflicts, and some of their senior leaders and young members have first-hand experience with political and electoral violence. Therefore, additional evidence was collected from eight senior political leaders, comprising two male ward councillors from the PF, three from UPND—a ward councillor, constituency coordinator and a female chairperson—and, from MMD, three male officials—a constituency chair, secretary and district committee member. Seven focus group discussions (FGD) provided the final evidence. Young party supporters drawn from the PF and UPND averaged four to seven participants per group in each ward. The total numbers were 13 (7 males and 6 females) from PF and 19 (10 males and 9 females) from UPND.

Data was analysed statistically and thematically. The statistical analysis of survey results was done with the help of Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) software, version 26, to provide descriptive and inferential statistics. The survey questionnaire explored the driving factors, agency and occurrences of political conflicts involving young people. Data from interviews and FGDs was analysed thematically. Thematic analysis, contends McGuirk and O'Neill (2016, 3353), is a "process of identifying patterns of themes within qualitative data." The purpose is to identify themes concerning crucial or interesting patterns in the data and utilising these to address research questions or to say something about a phenomenon.

Research Findings

Significant pointers in the respondents' demographic data presented in Table 1 include that more young males ($n = 241$) than females answered the questionnaires, with most falling in the 24 to 35 years age group. A majority have only secondary school as the highest level of education, and close to half are unemployed. Last, although most of the respondents have no formal political affiliation, they have lived in Kalulushi for over five years and witnessed at least one general election and several local government elections.

Besides demographic questions, respondents were also asked to answer a series of five-point Likert-scale statements (see Table 2). The six statements were intended to assess respondents' perceptions of political conflicts/violence vis-à-vis political opponents and voter intimidation, the extension of political conflicts/violence to markets and bus stations, young people's engagement with the police, destruction of public properties, rioting and violent protests, involvement of young people from two political parties (PF and UPND), and the increased incidences of political violence over the past decade.

Table 2: Respondents' perceptions of various aspects of political conflict/violence

Aspects	Strongly Disagree		Mostly Disagree		Neither Agree nor Disagree		Mostly Agree		Strongly Agree	
	Count	%	Count	%	Count	%	Count	%	Count	%
Political conflicts— Intimidation	25	6.3%	17	4.3%	21	5.3%	181	45.8%	151	38.2%
Political conflicts— Areas	5	1.3%	19	4.8%	27	6.8%	164	41.5%	180	45.6%
Young people and police	10	2.5%	19	4.8%	39	9.9%	151	38.2%	176	44.6%
Political conflicts— Public property	11	2.8%	16	4.1%	43	10.9%	142	35.9%	183	46.3%
Actors— PF/UPND	22	5.6%	15	3.8%	33	8.4%	116	29.4%	209	52.9%
More violence now than in 2011	21	5.3%	16	4.1%	28	7.1%	93	23.5%	237	60.0%

Source: Survey, 2019

Of the six statements, two suggest that there was more violence in 2019 than in 2011, with 60% of the respondents strongly agreeing. Further, 53% of the respondents strongly agreed that the PF and UPND young party stalwarts are the key perpetrators of political violence. Evidence from interviews and FGDs confirmed this point. A five-point Likert-scale sought respondents' views on how often the four factors drove young people to participate in violence connected to political parties. The attributes include "unemployment or lack of means of livelihood," "exclusion from community leadership and governance," "the understanding that politics is a source of livelihood," and "a desire to serve other youths."

The survey data revealed that unemployment is seen as the prime driver of young people's politically motivated violence. This is augmented by the perception that politics is a means of livelihood, which, according to respondents, typically invariably pushes young party supporters to take part in violence (see Table 3). In addition to their socioeconomic condition, it was evident from interviews and FGDs that intimidation and retaliatory attacks by and against political opponents kept violence afloat. Survey comments further showed that fake news and the abuse of social media, especially during electoral campaigns, contributed to violent political engagements among young

party loyalists. It was claimed, for example, that tribal remarks by some senior political leaders fuelled hatred on the part of party supporters.

Table 3: Driving factors for political violence

Factors	Never	Rarely	Often	Not sure
Unemployment	3.5%	9.9%	79.5%	7.1%
Exclusion from leadership/governance	8.4%	37.5%	41.0%	13.2%
Politics as a means of livelihood	8.1%	22.0%	56.7%	13.2%
Desire to serve other youths	16.5%	49.9%	19.2%	14.4%

Source: Survey, 2019

To ascertain possible aids to political violence by young people, respondents were asked to choose from a spectrum of six probable agents: college union leaders, parents or guardians, peers or friends, police officers, senior political leaders or youth political leaders. The data from multiple responses revealed that both youth and senior political leaders are seen as the leading agents in the involvement of young people in political violence (see Table 4). The survey respondents indicated that parents or guardians are least involved in steering young people into violence; interviews and FGD findings upheld senior political leaders, peer pressure and political and family socialisation.

Table 4: Agents encouraging youth political violence

		Responses		Per cent of Cases
		N	Per cent	
Agents	Youth political leaders	322	30.4%	81.5%
	Parents and guardians	26	2.5%	6.6%
	Senior political leaders	341	32.2%	86.3%
	Peers or friends	197	18.6%	49.9%
	College union leaders	126	11.9%	31.9%
	Police officers	48	4.5%	12.2%
		1060	100.0%	268.4%

Source: Survey, 2019

Another aspect that the survey sought to determine through specific occurrences in the community was the types of political conflict and violence. The respondents were asked to indicate whether any of the following incidents have happened in their respective communities during the last 12 months: accusations of political leaders sponsoring armed/violent youths, allegations of political abductions, two political youth groups clashing physically, political youths harassing the public/media/journalists or political youths pledging to defend their leaders using force. As a multiple response measurement, respondents were free to select all that applied in their context. Two particular manifestations stood out—physical clashes between two political youth

groups mostly from the PF and UPND, and the same young people pledging to defend their leaders using force.

Table 5: Manifestations of political conflicts/violence

		Responses		Per cent of Cases
		N	Per cent	
Occurrences	Accusations of leaders sponsoring armed/violent youths	137	20.7%	47.6%
	Party member abductions	24	3.6%	8.3%
	Two political youth groups clashing	229	34.5%	79.5%
	Intimidation of public/journalists	57	8.6%	19.8%
	Defending party leaders using force	216	32.6%	75.0%
		663	100.0%	230.2%

Source: Survey, 2019

Despite repeated claims during interviews and FGDs that political conflicts and violence are infrequent in Kalulushi, there is also a growing trend of election-related violence. The responses are informed by participants' experience of electoral campaigns prior to and after the 2016 general elections and several ward by-elections. The violence not only takes the form of physical confrontation and fighting, but stone throwing, indiscriminate beating and the disruption of activities in trading places and bus stations. Such acts often involve hate speech, harassment of voters and destruction of both public and private properties. The lethality extends to the use of tasers, knives, screw drivers, pangas and bottles.

This violence, in the view of interviewees and FGD participants, infringes non-partisan citizens' freedom of movement and expression, ultimately instilling fear and depriving communities of peace. During FGDs, participants reported a perpetuation of fear and hatred in communities. They pointed to a sense of hopelessness evident among youths, with some shunning politics and others leaving as a result of losing confidence in some senior political leaders. In five of the seven FGDs, youths maintained that senior political leaders bear the ultimate culpability for steering violence.

Discussion

The membership of young political party supporters is fluid and they remain gullible within party hierarchies. While the propensity to foment political and electoral violence is led by some senior political players, the evidence from this study explains how this is actualised. Young people are given beer, money, food or simply incited to fight political opponents. In other words, political differences between the elites trickle down to their young party supporters who then turn physical against each other. This process is boosted by the presence of small gangs, which are upshots of peer pressure. Further, a lack of family guidance, discipline and morals including limited knowledge about what

multiparty politics entails add to the incentives to engage in youth politics in a violent way.

One of the key findings of the study is that violence by young party supporters is an intimidation tactic. As some leaders encourage their young “rank and file” to defend themselves whenever attacked, this behaviour is internalised and becomes a political norm. As one young man remarked during an FGD, “when you are alone and meet your political opponents, they will surely have a feel of your strength by beating you. Similarly, in retaliation, if we are many we would do the same to our opponents” (UPND Youth 2019). While young people should play a central role in consolidating democracy, they are instead co-opted into an ugly web of violence.

Unfavourable socioeconomic circumstances persist as a basic cause of young people’s immersion in political or election-related violence. This not only includes lack of economic empowerment, but the exposure to and abuse of drugs and alcohol. These, along with high poverty levels and absence of recreation facilities, draw young party supporters into violence (Akpan 2015; Mude 2014; Namaiko and Etyang 2017). Limited education combined with unfavourable socioeconomic conditions intensifies young people’s propensity to handle political conflicts violently.

Rather than serving as potential instruments for alleviating poverty, the lack of education disenfranchises young people and draws them into being pawns in the hands of the political elite (Akpan 2015; Umar 2016). Therefore, the need to transform negative socioeconomic conditions is great. Otherwise, as Ojok and Acol (2017) observe, political violence and electoral violence will continue as a feature of African politics. This is especially so if young party loyalists continue to be sidelined in the mainstream party politics. For instance, while young people are active during electoral campaigns, there is no corresponding involvement in national governance for the majority after elections (Guzura, Dube, and Madziwanzira 2017). In short, candidates use youths to win elections, but thereafter offer them nothing.

The growing trend of election-related violence often leaves an indelible mark on the constituency’s political landscape. The destruction of public property and disruption of activities in markets and bus stations, for instance, illuminate both the extent of this violence and the significance of public spaces to party politics. From as early as the year 2000, such spaces have served as epicentres for clashes between different political parties, to a point where one claimed oversight of one such space and the other party another. Today, the tussle has been between young party stalwarts from the PF and UPND, with the former accused of unlawfully collecting daily levies in markets and bus stations. Political parties ought to rid these spaces of party politics perpetrated by their youth wings.

To the majority of participants, the main consequence of political and electoral violence is widespread intimidation. Over 80% of the respondents mostly and strongly agreed

that political conflicts involve voters' and opposition party members' intimidation, with deleterious effects. The infringement on citizens' freedoms and expressions not only deprives communities of peace, but impedes democracy. Electoral violence, note Abba and Imam (2016, 22), is a deviation from the fundamental principles of democracy which "deprives people of a voice in governance." By nurturing political apathy and indifference of the citizenry, this is a direct affront to democracy. Burchard describes electoral violence as being inimical to democratic consolidation. She succinctly adds that

individual voters, building blocks of democracy are adversely affected by electoral violence. Electoral violence results in lower levels of democracy satisfaction at the individual levels and those who fear electoral violence exhibit lower levels of trust in relevant actors and electoral institutions. (Burchard 2015b, 3)

Others, like Koko (2013), have argued that election-related violence undermines democratic institutions as well as diminishing the credibility of institutions (including political parties) responsible for entrenching democracy. This is a fact that most political parties probably do not realise; nor do they see its negative effects on their integrity and standing in society. They may pay no price for their actions if as Goldring and Wahman (2016, 118) contend, violence is normalised within the electoral process particularly and those culpable are not rejected by the voters.

Conclusion

Despite a general denunciation of political and electoral violence within the Zambian polity, young party supporters' participation remains a crucial factor in its continuation. While young party stalwarts should serve as conduits between their respective parties and the populace to disseminate party ideals and policy alternatives, their focus is different. This study has shown, as have Özerdem and Podder (2015, 5), that "the position of youth in society has a bearing on their leadership and possible role in peacebuilding." For example, continued active involvement in electoral violence will certainly relegate them to the fringes of the polity where they will remain a disregarded voice in national affairs. Young people's cognisance of the country's social, economic and political issues ought to inevitably kindle greater participation in political party and national governance concerns.

The findings of the study confirm some earlier commenters' views that while young people are purveyors of political conflicts and violence, they still remain excluded or marginalised from formal political processes and structures (Van Gyampo and Anyidoho 2019). To promote greater political plurality three suggestions informed by this study are offered. First, improvement of young people's voice and engagement with other political players hinge to a great extent on training in civic participation and apprenticeship. Therefore, the need to enhance the capacity of young men and women through increased participation in decision-making, party activities and programmes is

great. The realisation of this intervention will in one way or the other instil a sense of responsibility and civil leadership.

Second, the study's findings point to the need for authentic civil interactions and coexistence between members of the UPND and the PF as major political players in the country. This should be allowed to permeate all their respective party structures. Third, it is essential that young people commit to curbing violent electoral campaigns and that work towards dialogue, coexistence, tolerance and mutual trust among political players is supported. Such encouragement will replace the co-option and manipulation of youths by senior political leaders to serve their ulterior motives.

As part of this research and to contribute to the three propositions, the author co-designed an intervention (dialogue sessions) and held a series of meetings with young party supporters from PF and UPND. The purpose of this engagement was to use dialogue to transform their involvement in political conflict by engaging in collective reflection on the issues that emerged from this study. Both outputs and outcomes from this intervention will be published in the near future.

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