CREATING THE DESERVED PROTECTION: REFLECTIONS ON CIVILIAN JOINT TASK FORCE COUNTER-INSURGENCY OPERATIONS IN THE NORTH-EASTERN REGION OF NIGERIA

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ABSTRACT

This article considers the role of the Civilian Joint Task Force (popularly called CJTF), a group of armed local population participating in the joint battle against Boko Haram, has become a platform for recruitment into the Nigerian security institutions in north-eastern Nigeria. CJTF members have played many roles, from mostly discrete surveillance networks in the north-eastern region of Nigeria to military combat auxiliaries or semi-autonomous fighting forces in the country. For the region's overstretched and under pressure militaries, they have somewhat filled the security gap and provided local knowledge. CJTF can be a powerful counter-insurgency tool, but there is a compelling need to confront the immediate concerns it raises, notably in terms of impunity, and to begin planning for its long-term post-conflict transformation. The article adopts Galula's theory of counter-insurgency. It reveals several lessons in how a community-based security structure can be applied to a conventional security engagement.

Keywords: Boko Haram; Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF); north-eastern region; Nigeria; counter-insurgency; insurgency

INTRODUCTION

The Boko Haram menace has become an established security threat in Nigeria, especially in the state's north-eastern region. It has caused extensive loss of life and property and

has elicited much fear and concern both locally and internationally. "Boko Haram" is loosely translated as "People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet's Teachings and Jihad" (*Jama'atu Ahlis-Sunnah Lidda'awati Wal Jihad*) or 'Western education is forbidden' (Isichei 1987; Adesoji 2010; Adesoji 2011; Oluwasesanmi 2011; Oyewole 2015; Akinola 2015; NSRP/UNICEF Nigeria 2017). The movement gained momentum among worshippers belonging to the al-Haji Muhammadu Ndimi Mosque in Maiduguri, Borno State, in the 1990s. However, the strict adoption of Islamic doctrine by Boko Haram's former leader, the late Mohammed Yusuf, promoted an ultimately unsuccessful movement to adopt Islamic law in north-eastern Nigeria (Onuoha 2010; Sani 2011; Osumah 2013; Akinola 2015). Boko Haram perceived the government to be a barrier to achieving their objectives, so they began to target Nigerian security forces – seen as representing the government – with isolated attacks (Yahaya 2010; Elkaim 2012; Idowu 2013). A more radical and violent splinter group relocated to Yobe State under the leadership of Abubakar Shekau. After the death of Yusuf at the hands of the Nigerian security authorities in 2009, the group's tactics evolved into more indiscriminate attacks against government and locals, which became increasingly lethal and targeted wider geographical areas.

In 2009, it was reported that Boko Haram had murdered more than a hundred people in the north-eastern states. The sect's major targets were non-Muslims rather than government institutions (Onuoha 2010; Osumah 2013; Akinola 2015, Okeke-Uzodike and Onapajo 2015). From 2011 until the present, there has been an increase in suicide bombings and incessant attacks. In response, the government set up the Joint Task Force (JTF) – "Operation Restore Order" – to confront Boko Haram insurgents vigorously. The JTF operates a tri-service military component: an intelligence component comprising the State Security Service and the National Intelligence Agency; a counter-insurgency component comprising the Nigerian Police Anti-Terrorism and Bomb Squad, and a military component comprising the Nigerian Army and the Mobile Police Force.

In September 2011, the JTF redefined its areas of responsibility beyond the core north-east region as a means of countering the activities of Boko Haram. By 2013, Boko Haram had shifted its tactics from hit-and-run to hit-and-hold and had established control over territories; and by early 2015, it controlled 12 out of 27 local government authorities (LGAs) in Borno State, five out of 21 in Adamawa State, and two out of 17 in Yobe State (NSRP/UNICEF Nigeria 2017).

In 2014, the group was declared the most violent insurgent group in the world, edging out Islamic State of Iran and Syria in terms of deaths and violence recorded. It also pledged allegiance to the Islamic State of Iran and Syria in the same year. As the nature of Boko Haram insurgency changed from a physical war to predominantly guerrilla warfare, the capacity of the JTF to provide security for the locals weakened. The insurgency in north-eastern Nigeria is a clear case of the failure of the JTF to act to protect the local population. This necessitated an increase in the number of troops deployed to the disturbed areas. This increased deployment of troops was instrumental

in the "technical defeat" and dislodgement of the Boko Haram group from its Camp Zero and Sambisa Forest enclave in December 2015 (Mohamed 2016; International Crisis Group 2017).

Because of the irregular character of this type of insurgency and the trans-border knock-on effects the country has experienced, the crises caused by Boko Haram, in most cases, defined solely the political, social, economic, law-implementation and military mechanisms (Atitebi and Sikiru 2013; Idris, Ibrahim, and Sawab 2014; Kolo 2014; Akinola 2015; Hassan 2015; International Crisis Group 2017). The partial collapse and absence of state presence in the north-eastern region, which was being threatened by Boko Haram, prompted the locals to intervene in the defence of their communities. It therefore became necessary to devise a new approach to the surveillance and information-sharing among the actors involved, as well as to deal with the detention of insurgents and to prioritise action against insurgent threats. Although the establishment of the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) counter-insurgency provides an important context for locally driven security institutions to bolster security mechanisms, the need to ensure stability and protect local populations in the north-eastern region led to the citizen-driven counter-insurgency option. The CJTF emerged in Borno State in 2013 to protect communities against Boko Haram attacks (International Crisis Group 2017; NSRP/UNICEF Nigeria 2017). It was also a response to the perceived failure of the JTF to protect local inhabitants in the region. The role of the CJTF was merely to strengthen the existing traditional security system put in place by the community. To date, the CJTF has been the military's eyes and ears, the first respondents manning the roadblocks in towns and villages. But armed as they are with little more than traditional weapons, 680 of them have been killed so far in the conflict (Magajiya 2016).

However, the military distrusts the CJTF, believing that within their ranks are Boko Haram fifth columnists (which is probably true, along with criminals and other miscreants) (Sodanji 2016; Yacuba 2017). Nonetheless, the CJTF see themselves as community defenders. Some of them receive little or no remuneration for their work, and no insurance cover. In Adamawa State, which already had a strong presence of vigilante groups (hunter groups), the CJTF does not have a large presence. In Yobe State, the CJTF is made up of vigilantes, who are largely volunteers, and paid agents. The same applies to Borno State, where there are two civilian security groups, namely, the Borno Youth Employment Scheme (BOYES), who are paid agents, and the volunteer CJTF. The CJTF volunteers in Borno and vigilantes in Adamawa are bi-vocational, also engaging in other work; some are students who do duty after school hours; some are businessmen; some are civil servants, and yet others are farmers. Some do not report for duty when they have personal assignments (Idris, Ibrahim, and Sawab 2014; Kolo 2014; Hassan 2015; International Crisis Group 2017). In Yobe State, the members of the CJTF devote all their time to its activities and receive remuneration from the government. CJTF's

membership is estimated at 1 800 BOYES agents and 26 000 members (Babagana 2014; Campbell 2015; International Crisis Group 2017).

At this time, the CTJF's membership is estimated at approximately 25 000–36 000 (Bakare 2016; Maignawa 2017), including men, women and children. The CJTF also operates as a paramilitary force similar to the Sons of Iraq or the Afghan Local Police. With its knowledge of the local terrain and languages and its intelligence-gathering capabilities, the CJTF has contributed largely to the successes recorded so far in Nigeria's counter-insurgency efforts (Idris et al 2014; Kolo 2014; Hassan 2015; Hassan 2016; NSRP/UNICEF Nigeria 2017; International Crisis Group 2017).

This article reflects on the CJTF counter-insurgency operation in the north-eastern region of Nigeria. It focuses on the measures required to produce successful counter-insurgency outcomes. The article also explores how the existing CJTF's counter-insurgency can be strengthened to achieve effective local protection through a multilayered approach based on the synergy of efforts by local participants propounded by Galula (1964).

STRATEGIC DEBATE OF THE CJTF IN COUNTER-INSURGENCY OPERATIONS

Since the emergence of Boko Haram insurgency in north-eastern Nigeria, the counter-insurgency strategies adopted by the Nigerian security agencies have attracted critical debates. The immediate response of the government was the military solution, exemplified by the setting up of security groups known as the JTF. However, this hard counter-insurgency strategy proved grossly inadequate in curtailing the violent activities of the insurgents. Apart from the issues of poor funding, poor intelligence coordination, inadequate military hardware, corruption and ineffective leadership, the JTF also suffered from its ignorance of the affected areas. The ineffectiveness of the security measures drove the locals in the area to form what later came to be known as the "Civilian Joint Task Force" (CJTF), an alternative means of countering the Boko Haram menace. However, the existence and involvement of CJTFs in the counter-insurgency security structure has elicited mixed feelings. On the one hand, there is the argument that the composition of the local security apparatus is unconventional, non-traditional and against standard military operations, and as such can be antithetical to the overall objective of the JTF (Atitebi & Sikiru 2013; Okereke 2013; Dilolo 2014; Hassan 2015). On the other hand, there is the perspective that local initiatives would add to the local intelligence-gathering system since the natives involved are familiar with the terrain, the local people and their values in the areas under the control of the insurgent group (Atoyebi 2014; Idris et al 2014; Kolo 2014; Damina 2017; Maiganwa 2017). The argument supporting this perspective is that community-led groups such as the CJTF become significant and symbolic to the operations led by the JTF in the sense that they serve as lower security-level interfaces in interacting with local communities

and also reflect the deepening of local content and contexts in the war against Boko Haram. Therefore, although Nigeria's counter-insurgency settings remain complex, the CJTF is perceived as a timely response to the security challenges in the north-eastern region of Nigeria. This article extends the debate on the perspectives of these scholars about whether the community security option could be the future of counter-insurgency in the north-eastern region of Nigeria. By doing so, it seeks to contribute to the discourse on the importance of a community security interface as an intervention option in solving the Boko Haram security problem.

Theoretical Framework

This article adopts Galula's (1964) counter-insurgency theory in order to throw more light on both the essentiality of the community security option in the north-eastern region of Nigeria and acknowledges its relevance to the seemingly endless insurgency problems besieging the region.

As an officer in the French army, Galula was strategically involved in the war in Algeria. His experience during this war prompted him to propound this theory of counter-insurgency in his work entitled *Counter-insurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice* (1964), which earned him the label "father of counter-insurgency theory." The theory states that there are two approaches to counter-insurgency: direct and indirect. The direct approach centres basically on conquering the insurgents with military force whereas the latter focuses on strategies that are built around the citizenry and which can also be referred to as the "battle for the hearts and minds" of the local populace. It essentially involves defeating insurgency by incorporating local inhabitants into counter-insurgency efforts while simultaneously employing military force.

Galula's theory therefore advocates collaboration between the military forces and the local population. It includes some tenets that are essential to the success of counter-insurgency:

- The goal of the insurgency is to obtain the back-up of the local population instead of controlling a region.
- Nearly all of the local population will be impartial in the insurgency, but the help of large numbers can be obtained with the assistance of small numbers of the local population who are receptive and zealous.
- The local population must be thoroughly secured to give them the opportunity and privilege to collaborate without fear of punishment.
- Lastly, the enforcement of order should be introduced gradually in order to partially send away the insurgents with the aim of gaining the support of the local population, strengthening the position, building a framework and establishing a long-term partnership with the local population. (Galula 1964)

Galula (1964) asserts that

> triumph in a counter-insurgency is not the demolition or devastation in the space of the insurgent's force, but triumph is that plus the seclusion of the insurgent from the local population, seclusion not enforced upon local population, but maintained by and with the local population.

Galula (1964) states further that

> in conventional warfare, strength is assessed according to criteria such as military, the number of divisions, the position, the hold and the industrial resources. However, in revolutionary warfare, strength must be assessed by the existence of support from the local populations at the grassroots.

Therefore, the security agent gains a measure of advantage when his influence is strongly backed up by the locals.

Galula (1964) submits that the military cannot, by itself, defeat the complex challenges of insurgency that oppress a community. He therefore insists that the support of members of the local population who are not part of the military force is needed if insurgency is to be defeated. This assertion can be implemented by establishing partnerships with civilians who can complement the skills and resources of the military force. Nigeria stands to gain much by this, as it would improve the coordination of the military's response to the Boko Haram insurgency. In the same vein, Galula (1964) also opines that new solutions are needed to tackle the diverse problems of insurgency. A close examination of the theory's tenets reveals that in the case of counter-insurgency the theory allows for power to be redistributed, which enables the local inhabitants deliberately to play an active part in counter-insurgency without any legal implications. Importantly, it also gives the local populace the opportunity to make joint decisions with the military on security issues.

The participation of the CJTF in counter-insurgency brings about what can be referred to as a "bottom-up approach" to counter-insurgency. This can also prove to be a very effective strategy to adopt in the fight against insurgency in the 21st century in Nigeria, because through it the locals not only acquire skills in fighting insurgency but also gain control over their communities. In addition, the involvement of the CJTF is a way to incorporate local values into the counter-insurgency operation, leading to what Galula (1964) refers to as a "local-centric strategy." CJTF involvement can also provide access to those technical skills of the military force that are not available at the grassroots level in the event of further occurrences of the insurgency. Above all, local engagement engenders a sense of identification and encourages the CJTFs to shoulder their responsibilities actively in any counter-insurgency operation.

The aptness of this theoretical orientation is underscored by the increasing realisation that the military working in isolation in the north-eastern region cannot defeat the insurgency; it is important that they join forces with the locals who are not only stakeholders in their communities but also have a better knowledge of the terrain. Even though the threats of Boko Haram insurgency emanate from a minority of the

population, these people are nonetheless integrated into their communities and not loners working on their own.

Conceptual Clarification of Security

A number of scholars have called attention to the importance of understanding security from two angles: that of those in a position to secure and that of those who are secured (Olaladeju 2004; Musbaudeen 2008; Bakare 2016). A community is composed of diverse conceptual views. It deals with those who are living within a state, specifically if the groups responsible for a community's security have also concurred on networks of norms and rules that guide their plan and strategy in discharging their duties to their local community. It must also involve the state, which must have an extensive understanding of the community.

It is important to note that there are two premises for the assertions that community security may challenge identities and that the community may serve as an instrument of integration rather than separation (Solomon 1997; Dilolo 2014; Olanisakin 2015). The community is abstract, overlapping, multilayered and complex. This creates the idea that there are many possible levels of interaction and collaboration with third parties or outsiders. On the condition that the community expands beyond the limits of the community security, the normative quality of the frontiers may change and other principles may be challenged (Solomon 1997; Dilolo 2014; Olanisakin 2015). The description of the community based on community security goes beyond the creation of frontiers to the dissolution of identities which threaten to replicate, rather than challenge, realist thinking. However, this thinking is not inescapable as community security also draws on the wellspring of collaboration that can break down local strongholds (Yusufu 2008; Dilolo 2014; Olanisakin 2015; Muideen and Kareem 2016). Whether they in fact do so or not is determined by the identity adopted by the community as well as the methods adopted in order to ensure security.

The question of what security is and how it is maintained has stimulated a vast amount of scholarly literature and debates (Waleakin 2005; Mallam and Musa 2011; Dilolo 2014; Olanisakin 2015; Muideen and Kareem 2016). Security can be presumed to be a discourse that analyses particular problems and rationalises precise solutions. To express it in simple terms, a discourse about security consists of factors that include the need to recognise who or what it is going to be secured, and why. Whereas it is important to emphasise the importance of the security of the individual, community and locality, it is also important to examine why they should be secured (Musbaudeen 2008; Patrick 2012).

For some scholars in the field of community security, the state should first be secured since it renders an intrinsic level of order that authorises the communities or societies and individuals to pursue their own perception or interpretation of a good life (Waleakin 2005; Mallam and Musa 2011; Dilolo 2014; Olanisakin 2015; Muideen and Kareem

2016). For other scholars, community security should help to prevent insecurity because of the common norms, values, interests and identities that it promotes or supports as well as the need to recognise threats authoritatively (Olaladeju 2004; Musbaudeen 2008; Bakare 2016). This role is usually fulfilled by the state, but it can also be performed by a local community. Within a community, recognising threats involves recognising others – that is, aliens – who pose threats to the stability of the community. Recognising others is a major component of community approaches to security. This is because others always serve as a threat to the survival of the state (Dilolo 2014; Olanisakin 2015).

The state has reflected the unity of purpose of the community by modifying the conceptualisation of security to the narrow notion of the survival of the state (Dilolo 2014; Olanisakin 2015). This perspective stems from a defective perception of what a community is. It also overlooks the extent to which community security and the state operate their various mechanisms: security entails recognising identities, the threat, the actors dealing with the threat and an appropriate response.

In conclusion, the argument of appropriateness is socially built into the framework of community security, and it refers to both the local social norms of its local inhabitants and the broader norms of the state. Therefore, Makinda's (1998) conception of security as a "preservation of the norms, rules, values, and institutions of society" appears to be more relevant here. Makinda (1998) further contends that all the institutions, principles and structures associated with society, including the citizens, are to be secured against both internal and external threats. The term "preservation" is an important component of this definition, as it presupposes conscious, deliberate and definite steps and actions. Therefore, the perception of the state's leaders determines its actions and guides its efforts, which becomes evident in the vertical and horizontal components of the community or society's security plan.

Community Security as an Analytical Framework

The notion of community security has become an essential topic in both national and international security discourse. Open debate should extend to the role of community security in the development of an approach to counter-insurgency. Quite a number of works have been published on community security in Nigeria (Adamu 2009; Mohammed 2009; Modu 2011; Micheal 2013; Bukar 2013); the literature on community security is rich, having attracted varying opinions and scholarly analysis. But it is not easy to describe or define community security. It is an exclusive concept partly because its function cannot be arrived at simply by marrying the definitions of community and security; but it is communicated by state and national stakeholders with every step taken and at every stage of security policy formulation. It is also communicated when security issues and policies are appraised and evaluated. In this respect, community security remains an idea through which any government can be complimented and strategically endorsed.

According to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), community security should entail:

> a programmatic approach that seeks to operationalize human security, human development, and state-building paradigms at the local level. (2009, 9)

From the definition above, it can be inferred that community security is about functional approaches that ensure human security and development at the community level by supporting the government. It is becoming an issue in contemporary security. Still, the notion of community security is varied. It almost defies definition, interpretation, clarification, explanation or construction. Likewise, it is not only the perception and conception of community security that appears evasive: so, too, do its "analysis" and "critique" seem to be.

Whereas the concerns of non-governmental organsiations (NGOs), government institutions, stakeholders and individual actors about community security have gained momentum and prominence of late, it has remained a debatable issue. And in spite of the complications that have arisen in trying to conceptualise community security, it continues to be an authentic approach to achieving security in a state. Many scholars emphasise the necessity for community security, since state security institutions can no longer secure life and property, or prevent insurgency, singlehandedly (Adamu 2009; Mohammed 2009; Oluwasesanmi 2011; Bukar 2013; Micheal 2013; Atoyebi 2014). The fate of state security institutions therefore is dependent upon public collaboration and partnership (Adamu 2009; Mohammed 2009; Micheal 2013; Bukar 2013). Atoyebi (2014) refers to the enemy-within-concept, that is, *Ehin ikunle lota wa inu ile laseni ngbe*, which simply means "Your enemies are among those who are very close to you" (2014, 65). Kasaure (2015, 12) opines that community security has become so significant that if state security institutions are lax in their duty, the concept may be indirectly appropriated by local leaders.

Micheal (2013, 46), furthermore, asserts that "community security presents the starting point or origin for the strong and active security." Babagana (2014, 54) adds that state security officials in a community generate favourable circumstances for making local state security institutions more efficient and functional, especially if collaboration and partnership exist within the security institutions. Jamiu (2014, 31) concurs: in order to bring about transformation and successfully manage all forms of insurgency or any form of social challenge in a community, the state security institutions must establish and create viable collaborations and partnerships within it. Hammed and Hammed (2016, 76) also argue that the idea proffers an inclusive, intelligent and analytical proposition to state security institutions and that this proposition depends on stable groundwork of enquiry or experimentation being merformed.

Mohammed (2009), Adamu, (2009) and Bukar (2013) argue that community security makes the movements and actions of the state security institutions more noticeable and accountable to the public. Hammed and Hammed (2016, 43) believe that community

security is an appropriate approach to tackling the challenges of communities, since it is decentralised and deals with insurgency prevention and the fear of the threat of insurgency. Modu (2011, 33) is of the view that in order to eradicate any form of criminal components from an urban community, officers of the state security institution must at every stage encourage the establishment of the state security institutions and build collaborative partnerships with the local populace.

Yahaya (2010, 87) observes that "the community security idea, discerns the community as a confrere and collaborator in advancing security rather than as inactive clientele." Jamiu (2016, 13) maintains that pursuing transport regulation programmes for commuters helps the local inhabitants to perceive that the state security institutions are helping to improve their standard of living and quality of life. Magaji (2004, 46) prescribes the use of voluntary institutions such as the Peace Corps, Girl Guides and Boy Scouts so as to involve youths in supporting community security. Kauna (2016, 87) observes that state security officials will evolve into peace-builders, innovators and decision-makers, and that their own standard of living, quality of life and work satisfaction will improve as a result.

Authenticated studies of security institutions where community security actions or operations were applied suggest that it has not [contributed] to the expansion of crime or problems of nepotism or malfeasance of behaviours as some experts or critics and analysts anticipated, or as others are still asserting will happen. (Magaji 2004; see also Yahaya 2010; Oluwasesanmi 2011; Kauna 2016)

In considering community security, Cindo (2006, 43) observes that it might not be rational to set aims for the state security operatives or institutions and then expect the state security institutions to establish a blueprint to confirm those aims.

Momoh (2015, 56) established that the mainly uncritical acceptance of community security is in itself a threat. Any suggestion or scheme, regardless of how appealing it is, should be subjected to rigorous and cynical surveillance. Momoh further states that since order can be upheld only by a community itself, the state security institutions alone cannot do it. In spite of the fact that the state security institutions need the consent of the locals if they are to be efficient and functional, on several occasions that consent is not given. Momoh also holds that if the state security institutions then revert to law enforcement to carry out an operation, the community will believe that community security was neglected or deserted. He concludes that community security is an "idealistic deception" or a "sentimental misconception" (2016, 27), since it is situated in a world we have lost, as many experts are arguing or contending. Mohamed states that if the state security institutions become entangled in community engagement, it would present "critical queries of political accountability or responsibility" (2016, 29). He maintains further that to claim that state security institutions' non-involvement will unwrap straightforward solutions to and counter-measures for "injustice and discrimination" is either a "childlike misconception" or "indicates an increase of the political powers of the state security institutions, which conveys threatening intimidation" (2016, 16). Kanu

(2015, 51) holds that "in the absence of effective or more desirable internal regulation the strategy is like a hazardous missile launched in an imprecise route but capable of [going] astray" (2015, 51). Kanu (2015, 19) also concludes that community security is vague, shadowy and an explicit and internally antithetical and opposed perception that would give up legitimacy, freedom and adeptness for autonomy and order.

It would appear that Kanu (2015, 34) does not encourage the democratic system of government as the approved and authorised system of government and has no concern for law and order in communities. One wonders what form of community security he refers to when he states that community security does not strengthen the rule of law and in several categories may weaken it (2015, 35). Aje (2010, 67) insists that state security institutions and what they do have always been open to doubt in democratic systems of government. If there was a democratic system of government where the rule of law was obeyed to the letter, then there would be no need for any community security. However, since offences against the law and lawlessness are on the upsurge, it is important that conscientious citizens and law-abiding locals recognise the need for community security in their communities or country.

Jamiu (2009, 32) contends that state security institutions do not actually desire to make any adjustments to their behaviour and are using community security to secure legality or legitimacy. Dahiru (2008, 29) observes that community security will not reduce the stress and restlessness among the state security institution officials and the public, but at best that it would make state security institutions' activities more suitable and satisfactory to the public, even if justice were infringed. Audu and Abba (2009, 79) state that if community security were an entity and more than just diction or rhetoric, then the state security institutions would not execute it. Kande (2017, 10) contends that it is reasonable to assume that community security in the pre-colonial era was more rhetoric than reality. In this respect, Damina (2017, 89) states that transformation within state security institutions is beyond the bounds of possibility. The state security institutions at the level of the lower cadres vigorously protect their rights and privileges. Re-creating the community is nearly as hard to do; the most that can be achieved is to reinvent it in allegorical conditions. Tanko (2017, 90) argues that community security programmes grant small actual power to the community. He further asserts that such programmes have rarely functioned as a tool for absolute reorientation of remorseless state security institutions, and that they are in most situations cosmetic at best.

Owing to the fact that the state security institutions manage all information about offences against the law and anarchy, that they make use of rhetoric in political dramas to control feelings of their efficiency and power (Gambo 2016, 16). Audu (2007, 67) suggested the probability of an increase in state security institution malfeasance when the state security institutions and the locals work together. Some scholars also exposed the failure of state security institutions to limit the rate of crime and use road blockage and security patrol for their selfish interest especially for exploitation of the local populations (Dahiru 2008; Jamiu 2009; Gambo 2016; Damina 2017). Audu (2007, 34)

and Yahaya (2010, 97) argue that the many constructions and analytical deficiencies of these researchers point out the poor ideology on which they were based. Damina (2017, 49) also argues that Audu (2007) and Yahaya (2010) did not have any fault-finding stipulations or conditions regarding the capacities and limits of community security.

Magajiya (2016, 83) observes that fault-finding researchers usually study the models of social institutions as beliefs and forms of rhetoric that are distinct from realism. Sodanji (2016, 55) argues that state security institutions such as law-enforcement agents were initially guarded since they did not want to become inept societal social officers; many security analysts, he argues, tend to dismiss as shoddy any community security notions that do not have instantaneous results. Still, Kyauta (2015, 21) foregrounds the fact that the efficiency and effectiveness of the state security institutions are predominantly driven by outsiders among the locals.

Jamiu (2009, 45) and Gambo (2016, 37) also state that it appears that locals will only too willingly dispossess themselves of function and duty for their own deficiencies by just as willingly condemning the most apparent, well-defined display of force or power by the state security institutions. Nevertheless, Salim (2015, 76) points out that the effectiveness of state security institutions and community responsibility should not be seen as irreconcilable conditions, but rather as inseparably co-dependent.

Yacuba (2017, 15) has concluded that much of the opposition against community security is justified on the ground of high cost; he states further (2017, 67) that, in the long run, the advantages might offset the foundation costs. He also indicates that not even the analysts are sure of how to assess the efficacy of state security institutions precisely. Dahiru (2008, 90) and Kyauta (2015, 48) argue that the fundamental contribution that state security institutions might make towards community expenses is very small and requires small numbers of state security officials. Regarding the expenses involved, Rani (2014, 19) indicates that the poor budgetary allocations for the state security institutions and adverse economic conditions should be enough reason for the adoption of a community security strategy.

Kyauta (2015, 89) corroborates this claim, arguing that events have shown that community security as a security approach is a better and more efficient avenue for making use of state the resources of security institutions. Efome (2013, 32) has also contended that members of the community can be more beneficial instruments in helping the state security institutions to prevent crime. Contrary to what analysts affirm, community security removes law enforcement's oppositional connections with law-abiding or conscientious citizens. Damina (2017, 29) and Modu (2011, 11) established that where in rural areas deep-seated or well-established concerns exist, community security could unfreeze effective space between the state security institutions and the locals. Based on Damina's (2017, 76) and Modu's (2011, 42) submissions, the use of a civilians' enquiry committee can help to satisfy citizens' assumptions of responsiveness and responsibility on the part of law-enforcement officers.

But Magaji (2004, 23) insists that eradicating all forms of substandard practice is time-consuming. Adewusi (2003, 45), moreover, argues that community security symbolises a fundamental or basic shift in the ideology of security, and for this reason analysts must note that such a divergence in security institution ethics is problematic and tedious to execute. Ladokun and Paul (2013, 56) state that a reconstruction of the approaches to community security is essential in order to make the adjustments they recommend. Nevertheless, these reconstructions will have to come from both within and outside the state security institutions, and that will not happen without some difficulties.

Muili and Paul (2013, 67) submit that it is essential to bridge the gap between those scholars who perceive community security as the panacea for security issues and other scholars who are strongly opposed to the idea of community security. Olanisakin (2015, 6) states that community security should be regarded as a supportive measure rather than an alternative to all other required kinds of security. The major plan of action is to decentralise the operations of the state security institutions as much as possible and take them to the community as a way of partnering with the locals. After scrutinising the scholarly works on the subject, Wojuade (2011, 34) concludes that crystallising various opinions on community security into a logical entity is a formidable and conceivably fruitless burden.

Although several scholars, researchers and critics have raised several points regarding the ineffectiveness of community security, it is difficult to determine whether they are in logical agreement with one another. Several arguments against community security are situated within the complication of execution, safeguarding public participation, monetary involvement, and quantification of the achievable favorable outcome. The scholars in support of community security emphasise its advantages, whereas those against not only emphasise its disadvantages, but also view it as a means of influencing state security institutions politically. It is, however, interesting to note that none of these analysts and researchers suggest more functional notions for resolving or fighting the challenges of insurgency.

Understanding Counter-insurgency in Nigeria's North-eastern Region

The conceptualisation of counter-insurgency remains a taxing undertaking, because a range of factors make it difficult for it to be restricted to a single definition, thanks to its changing nature from one nation-state to another. Therefore, counter-insurgency remains dynamic, fluid and multi-directional, but it is critical to the survival of any nation-state against insurgency. According to a US military field manual, counter-insurgency is "that [combination of] military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency" (US Government Counter-Insurgency Guide (2009, 8). Based on the same view, the US Government Counter-Insurgency Guide (2009, 13) describes counter-insurgency as "comprehensive civilian-

military efforts taken to simultaneously defeat and contain insurgency and address its root causes."

When both definitions are critically examined, they are seen to focus on the aspect of military, political, economic, psychological and civic actions taken to defeat the insurgency. The notion of counter-insurgency postulates an insurgent problem in a performing (however, usually weak) state. While the insurgents always create a problem for the current situation, counter-insurgents seek to strengthen the present state of affairs and circumvent the internal problems. The issue of Boko Haram is a good example of this contemporary form of insurgency. Based on Kitson (1971, 9), the perception of counter-insurgency is this:

> The first thing that must be apparent ... is that there can be no such thing as a purely military activity because the insurgency is not primarily a military activity. At the same time, there can be no such thing as a purely political solution.

In gaining a better understanding of counter-insurgency, it is pertinent to look at the conceptual clarification of Thompson (1967), Moore (2007), Galula (1964) and Petraeus (2010, 5). Moore (2007, 6) defines counter-insurgency as an integrated set of political, economic, social and security measures intended to end and prevent the recurrence of armed violence, create and maintain stable political, economic and social structures, and resolve the underlying causes of an insurgency in order to establish and sustain the conditions necessary for lasting stability.

It is important to provide guidance about the causal factors of the insurgency. Furthermore, attention should be given not only to defeating its activities against the local population but also to guiding about what can bring about the insurgency and how to prevent its frequent occurrence. It is pertinent to note that the outstanding counter-insurgency operation comprises several components, which can include consulting and providing security, maintaining essential services, building up backward and forward governance, maintaining economic growth and encouraging conciliation.

Galula (1964, 45) says of the process of counter-insurgency that to confine soldiers to purely military functions while urgent and vital tasks have to be done, and nobody else is available to undertake them, would be senseless. The soldiers must then be prepared to become a propagandist, social workers, a civil engineer, a school teacher, a nurse, a boy scout. But only for as long as he cannot be replaced, for it is better to entrust civilian tasks to civilians.

Many scholars and experts such as Galula (1964), Thompson (1967), Kitson (1971) and Kiras (2010) have published prominently in the field of counter-insurgency.

The US Government Counter-Insurgency Guide (2009, 3) states that counter-insurgency comprises the "comprehensive civilian and military efforts taken to simultaneously defeat and contain insurgency and address its root causes." Zambernardi (2010, 2) argues that "counter-insurgency is a rebellion against a constituted authority when those taking part in the rebellion are not recognized as belligerents." The US

Government Counter-Insurgency Guide (2009, 4), shedding more light on the conceptualisation of counter-insurgency, describes it as follows:

> the organized use of subversion and violence to seize, nullify or challenge political control of a region. As such, it is primarily a political struggle, in which both sides use armed force to create space for their political, economic and influence activities to be effective.

The productive and persuasive counter-insurgency operations incorporate a blend of integrating economic, political, security and informational elements that strengthen government legitimacy and weaken insurgent leverage over local populations. Counter-insurgency operations should be organised to protect the local population from the atrocities of insurgents. It should also be geared towards attacking the insurgents economically, socially and politically. In addition, Zambernardi (2010) notes that counter-insurgency draws from three principal purposes or actions (the local populations and the military forces), even though a normal procedure may require that two of these purposes are selected. Zambernardi (2010) also proposes that it is beyond the bounds of possibility to achieve them at the same time, that is, to enforce protection, distinguish between enemy insurgents and the local population, and the physical defeat of insurgents.

Zambernardi (2010, 3) further asserts that a state can protect civilians from harm with the support of the local population themselves in order to prevent collateral damage being caused. He concludes that, for optimum performance, a state has to pursue only the two aims and strategies (that is, the use of the military and the involvement of the local populations against the insurgents). Galula (1964, 38) also suggested principal standards (the military and local populations) that would condition the execution of counter-insurgency in a struggle against insurgency. Counter-insurgency is a combination of the efforts of the local population and the military planned to collectively defeat the insurgency and at the same time destroy all the causal factors of the insurgency. Different from conventional warfare, strategies involving the local population are usually the most active and potent component, with the military forces performing an authorising role. Counter-insurgency is an intensely complicated operation that requires the multi-faceted support of the local population.

Moreover, counter-insurgency strategies must be flexible and active. Lines of action will frequently be aimed at the local population instead of the insurgents and therefore strengthen the legitimacy and authority of the government concerned, at the same time defeating the insurgents. Scholars contend that this can be achieved only through political ratification of the need to improve governance and deal with fundamental injustices or grievances. Nevertheless, despite their capability and keen interest, the local population can never fully compensate for an ineffectual and imperfect authority or administration.

Insurgent actions carried out under the guise of Islam are in most cases compelled by political rhetoric and ideological thinking that link Jihadist belligerents to Boko Haram and with several other Islamic insurgency groups. Their routine plan involves using the local population as the suicide bombers and turning the local population into

victims of war. Moreover, their plan is to enforce a severe and deeply politicised kind of Islam globally, the underlying belief of an insurgent group such as Boko Haram lying in the purity and practice of Islam worldwide.

An explanation of counter-insurgency was given by Moore (2007, 34), who contends that insurgency can be conceptualised as an integrated set of political, economic, social and security measures intended to end and prevent the recurrence of armed violence, create and maintain stable political, economic and social structures and resolve the underlying causes of an insurgency in order to establish and sustain the conditions necessary for lasting stability.

According to Moore (2007, 17), an outstanding counter-insurgency operation must involve these two major components: the local population and the military forces. He adds that these components would show whether the counter-insurgency operation is a success or a failure: judging by the support of the local population, it could be judged whether a counter-insurgency operation could be seen as more effective for having involved the locals.

Thompson (1967, 23) states that "counter-insurgency as a movement [is] undertaken by a national government in an attempt to combat an insurgency", whereas, according to Thompson (1967, 23), in reality all attention is placed on the national government through its use of military forces, without any support or assistance in defeating the insurgency being forthcoming from any quarters. In addition, no attention is given to the political legitimacy of the government framework that the counter-insurgency operation would administer. Petraeus (2010, 21) claims that the military have usually strengthened the significance of political legitimacy in a counter-insurgency operation. He states that it is necessary that the counter-insurgents maximise all accessible national power mechanisms to their benefit in order to defend the present government. The lasting and outstanding counter-insurgency strategies rely on the locals to protect their own community and follow the government's rule, which can also support the actions of the government in eliminating all forms of the insurgency, including the causal factors.

Petraeus (2010, 17) stated that the most important aim of counter-insurgency is to help the state to provide the security that will pave the way for locals to become involved in the operations. Consequently, the strategies proposed by Thompson (1967) deviate slightly from those adopted by Petraeus (2010) in respect of the implementation and operations of counter-insurgency, because Thompson's methods also include the use of national instruments of power in counter-insurgency operations.

To conclude, counter-insurgency is a multiplex joint partnership that merges or combines the local population and military institutions. It is usually more population-centric (its focus is on securing a given population or populations) than enemy-centric (focused on defeating a particular insurgency group). Outstanding counter-insurgency demands the adoption of multifaceted approaches that involve local populations in operations. All the proponents of counter-insurgency insist that an effective and efficient counter-insurgency operation integrates and synchronises both the local populations'

and the military forces' activities to create a holistic approach aimed at weakening and defeating the insurgents while bolstering the government's legitimacy in the eyes of the local population. The definition in the US Counter-Insurgency Guide 2009 will underpin this debate about perceptions of counter-insurgency.

CONCLUSION

Civilian Joint Task Force – Community Security Option

This article has concentrated on the north-eastern region of Nigeria using Galula's theory of counter-insurgency. It reveals how a community-based security structure can be applied to a conventional security engagement in north-eastern region of Nigeria. Having acknowledged the possible benefits that community security could yield in defeating Boko Haram's insurgency since early 2013, the CTJF has been engaged in counter-insurgency operations in partnership with the JTF. The two groups have also combined forces in order to ensure the protection of the lives and property of locals, which collaboration has involved intelligence-gathering and physical combat in their bid to achieve their aim.

The CJTF sprang up as a reaction to JTF's deficiency in counter-insurgency: the CJTF came into existence because of the JTF's inability adequately and efficiently to provide protection for the life and property of the locals. The CJTF, as a result, fills the gaps left by the JTF in their counter-insurgency operations. It has also been recognised that some of the aspects of the CJTF that have not been studied – for instance those in the states of Borno, Yobe and Adamawa, and also in the north-eastern region states of Nigeria – could be implicit in this notion of a search for the protection of the life and property of local inhabitants, either covertly or overtly related to the incapacity of the JTF to secure its entire terrain.

Nevertheless, this reaction to the JTF's deficiency in counter-insurgency does not fundamentally suggest state fragility. CJTF counter-insurgency could equally engender a contradictory, conflicting and divergent alternative. The International Crisis Group (2017, 5), in its study of the CJTF in Borno state, Nigeria, in 2013, makes this point when it argues that rather than considering the CJTF counter-insurgency group as proof of the presumed inadequacy or imperfection of the JTF or the fragility and failure of the Nigerian state, the CJTF should instead be recognised as an attempt to foreground the kind of community security examplified by the civilian-driven or bottom-up counter-insurgency in Nigeria.

Based on this alternative perspective, the perception of the CJTF in this article is rooted in the premise that members of the CJTF are "watchmen" (International Crisis Group 2013, 4). Kauna (2016) and Damina (2017) contend that there is a framework where the CJTF can be recognised as a form of community security through its

persistent collaboration and partnership with the JTF counter-insurgency operation and with local inhabitants. Accordingly, the CTJF is essential in a counter-insurgency landscape that is typified by a large number of groups and operations. Community security as a campaign and an operation in response to counter-insurgency needs to be used by the federal government through the JTF in order to support counter-insurgency operations in Nigeria. As has been shown, the involvement of local communities in counter-insurgency operations is essential, because it enables them to solve problems of insurgency such as that of Boko at the local level.

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