

THE PROPAGANDA MODEL AND THE MEDIATION OF THE LAND QUESTION IN ZIMBABWE

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ABSTRACT

This article critiques the mediation of the Zimbabwean land reform programme in the period 2000–2010 by both the state-controlled and the privately-owned press. Its thrust is to establish the framing patterns that emerge and relate these to Herman and Chomsky's Propaganda Model. The bold claim by Herman and Chomsky that the media, particularly in the West, pander to the whims of the powerful political and pro-capital elites is explored. Using a qualitative case study approach, data for this study were collected from four Zimbabwean Weeklies, namely *The Sunday News* and *The Sunday Mail*, which are state-owned, and *The Independent* and *The Standard*, which are privately-owned. News stories on the land reform programme drawn from these weeklies over the 10 year focus period are analysed with the view to ascertaining the tenability of the Propaganda Model. Using the tenets of the Propaganda Model and critical discourse analysis, the study exposes the polemical representations of the land issue by the press. The emerging polemics are attributed to the overbearing influence of ideology, ownership, corporate pro-capital interests and biased source selection. However, the tripartite alliance which the propaganda model claims as existing among government, capitalists and media owners comes unstuck in the Zimbabwean media-scape. There is evidently a fractious relationship between state media and private media in Zimbabwe. The political and economic contestation of power in the nation manifests in the press. It is quite clear from the findings of this study that there is still need for a model that comprehensively attempts to capture the role of the press and its place in Africa.

This study explores the extent to which Herman and Chomsky's (1988, 2002) Propaganda Model (PM) can be deployed to foster an understanding of the rationale behind the polemical framing and representation of the land question by the Zimbabwean print media. In exploring the representational tropes that emerge from the local press, the analysis focuses on the following discursive themes: the land occupations, known as the Fast-Track Land Reform Programme and initiated in the year 2000; white farmers and property rights; war veterans; farm occupiers; rule of law and property rights issues. Its major thrust is to establish how the privately-owned print media and the publicly-owned press articulate and represent the abovementioned land reform matters. It also seeks to relate the emerging representational frames to the key tenets of the Propaganda Model. The analysis seeks not only to establish the tenability of the PM, but also attempts to evaluate its suitability in capturing the operations of the press in Zimbabwe during the years of political and socio-economic crisis at the start of the millennium. *The Sunday Mail*, *The Sunday News*, *The Standard* and *The Zimbabwe Independent* constitute the primary sources of data for this analysis and the data were collected over the 10-year period spanning 2000 to 2010. This period represents, arguably, the most pernicious and tumultuous crisis period experienced by Zimbabwe since independence. Data has also been extracted from unstructured interviews conducted with journalists and senior managerial media practitioners from across the media divide. Before the data are presented and analysed a historicisation of the land issue in Zimbabwe is put forward in order to put the representational or framing patterns that emerge in the news stories into perspective. Critics have argued that the land question is at the heart of the Zimbabwean predicament (Hammar et al 2003, Zeleza, 2008, Moyo, 2003, 2005, 2011, Mlambo, 2009, Ndhlovu-Gatsheni, 2008 among others); its explication from a historical perspective can therefore provide some useful contextualisation within which the land question can be comprehended. The historical exploration of the land question is followed by a restatement of the theoretical approaches and analytical methods deployed in the analysis of the data.

The political economy of the media is the broad theoretical standpoint from which the tenets of Herman and Chomsky's (1988, 2002, 2008) propaganda model are derived. According to McChesney (2008, 12) the political economy of the media 'is a field that endeavours to connect how media and communication systems and content are shaped by ownership, market structures, commercial support, technologies, labour practices, and government policies.' The approach attempts to establish linkages between the media, on one hand, and the economic and political systems on the other in demonstrating how social power is enacted in society. Arguably, the media is a fundamental variable in understanding the exercising and deployment of power in contemporary societies. Mosco (1996, 25) observes that the political economy approach, though variegated and heterodoxical in nature, is preoccupied with unravelling power relations that 'mutually constitute the production, distribution and consumption of resources'. News is a resource that can be produced, distributed and

consumed. How the news-making value chain is controlled and managed to ensure survival is fundamental in understanding the media's mediatory role in the exercise of power over a particular resource. Mosco (1996) identifies three critical tenets of the media research process that can be used to organise thoughts in a political economy. These are commodification, structuration and spatialisation. Below is a brief explanation of these tenets and how they are applied in this study.

Commodification is a capitalist-oriented process that fulfils the profit motive of business ventures by transforming the use value of an object into an exchange value. News, from this conception, is not simply information without exchange value. The news must attract an exchange value in the market, and the news must be a marketable commodity. The exchange value of a news item is therefore determined by its ability to meet individual and societal needs. Thus the labour and institutional processes involved in the manufacture of news become essential in understanding the possible reasons for a particular journalist and newspaper to represent an issue in a particular way. How *The Independent* or *The Sunday Mail* represent the land reform as news is, to some extent, influenced by the market imperative which advocates the packaging of news as an exchangeable commodity. Garnham (1977) (as quoted in Mosco 1996, 148) observes two dimensions of media commodification, namely the direct production of media products and the use of media advertising to sustain commodification in the whole economy. The production process must be perfect, responsive and imaginative enough to attract an audience (in other words, readers) which the media house can in turn deliver to its advertisers. I argue later in the analysis that it is this imperative that has considerably influenced the framing of the land question by the press in Zimbabwe.

Structuration – which owes its genesis to Giddens (1984) – is a process ‘by which structures are constituted out of human agency, even as they provide the very medium of that constitution’ (Mosco 1996: 213). From a media perspective, it is critical to note that the analysis of the journalist's work must also involve the analysis of the institution the particular journalist works for. This is mainly because the structure provides the framework within which the journalist works. Although the journalist is an agent in the news-making process, he or she remains answerable to the structures of power that superintend over the production, distribution and consumption processes. The journalist-as-social-actor has his or her behaviour circumscribed by a matrix of social relations and positioning determined by political, economic and institutional structures. This particular point is essential in accounting for the polemical positions assumed by the print media in its analysis of the Zimbabwean crisis.

The third entry point into the political economy of the media approach is spatialisation. Mosco (1996) notes that spatialisation refers to the process of transcending space and time limitations in social life. The concept has a resonance in media research from the perspective that ‘communication processes and technologies are central to the spatialisation process throughout the wider political economy’ and that spatialisation has pride of place in the communication industries (Mosco

1996, 173). Spatialisation also addresses the forged strategic alliances and corporate linkages that exist among producers, suppliers and customers. Such linkages help in creating a corporate hegemony premised on powerful relationships which the media can use to propagate a particular stance on an issue that seizes its attention – such as the contested matter of land reform in Zimbabwe. Although the issue of spatialisation and concentration is not as expansive in the Zimbabwean media industry as in Western countries, the corporate and political linkages in the local industry are quite evidently telling. As McChesney (2008) observes, media is at the centre of the capitalist political economy and its marketing system. In light of this, normative journalistic imperatives like non-partisanship, neutrality, objectivity and professionalism are spotlighted as the study critiques the representation of the land question by the press.

Although this study makes reference to the above tenets of the political economy of the media, it relies more on the propaganda model promulgated by Herman and Chomsky. A brief restatement of this model and how it is applied in this study must suffice at this point before an analysis of the framing of the Zimbabwean crisis by the selected local weeklies can be offered. The Propaganda Model (PM), promulgated by Herman and Chomsky (1988, 2002), is to some extent influenced by Walter Lippmann (1921) who argued that the elite class manufactured consent in a bid to perpetuate and safeguard their positions and interests. Herman and Chomsky identified a set of factors or filters that are ‘linked together, reflecting the multileveled capability of government and powerful business entities and collectives to exert power over the flow of information’ (Herman 2000, 102). The five filters are ownership, advertising, sourcing, flak and anti-communist ideology, the last-mentioned having since been revised to market ideology or neo-liberalism, or the dominant ideology at any given time.

Herman and Chomsky contend that the media are owned by wealthy people and governments that wield considerable power and influence. Some media corporations, particularly privately owned ones are profit oriented and market driven. As argued by Klaehn (2003, 359) the PM ‘predicts that patterns of media behaviour will reflect the ways in which power is organised in society’. The ownership and profit orientation of major media firms have a considerable influence on the shaping of media discourse. This analysis will demonstrate how this claim is buttressed by the representation of the Zimbabwean crisis by the selected local weekly press. The PM also notes that advertising is a principal source of revenue for mainstream commercial media institutions. It is from this perspective that media institutions find themselves promoting media discourse which is not injurious to the interests of advertisers and their economic or capital establishments. Klaehn (2009) observes that the first two filters, namely ownership and advertising, ‘play heavily into news production processes highlighting the macro-level structural dimensions that in effect shape mainstream news discourses’ (p 44). The focus on both government-

owned press and privately controlled media in Zimbabwe will provide sufficient data to prove or disprove the tenability of the above claims.

Sourcing is identified as the third filter of Herman and Chomsky's model. The major contention is that the media rely heavily and uncritically on 'elite information sources' (Herman 2000, 101). Institutionally affiliated sources are taken as the primary definers of social reality that dominate news discourses. It is clear from this perspective that journalists as agents in the newsmaking process work closely with the agents of power in manufacturing news that is functional in terms of the political and economic status quo. This explains the recurring use of particular sources by the press in promoting and authenticating a particular perspective on the news that it presents.

The fourth filter of the PM, referred to as 'flak' by Herman and Chomsky, stresses how the institutional actors wield both economic and political power which they exert to subtly or patently control news making patterns (Herman and Chomsky 2008; Klaehn 2005, 2009; McChesney 2008; Winter 2002, 2007; Lovaas 2010). Lovaas (2010, 19) commenting on the use of flak in the newsmaking process opines that

when journalists report or write stories that threaten economic or political power, structures, or practices, negative flak often comes back to the reporter, editor, or newspaper. This process has a way of containing what is acceptable to report, investigate, and expose.

This causes journalists to violate their professionalism as they pander to the whims and caprices of existing structures of power. The framing of news is done in such a way that it remains reflective of the interests of the media institution and the economic and political establishments. It is interesting to find out what happens in an economic and political environment such as Zimbabwe where economic and political power are heavily contested due to a lack of consensus among the elite as regards political and economic issues.

The last filter, originally described as anti-communism, has been revised to free market neo-liberalism or the dominant ideological positions in a given socio-economic and political environment. Chomsky, (as quoted in Lovaas 2010), notes that this filter thrives on artificial fears generated by the establishment. The people must be made to believe that the prevailing economic or political status quo is the most ideal or that the path chosen by the politicians or by the captains of industry is in their best interest. People must be made to believe that any challenge to the existing economic or political structures of power is detrimental to their well-being. Once people are frightened, they will be persuaded to accept the position sanctioned by the authorities. The fear factor has been extensively deployed by economic and political players in Zimbabwe as their power over the politics and the economy has generated acrimonious contest. Use of the PM will enable the analysis to focus on how specific actors and events characterising the Zimbabwean crisis are represented by the press. The PM is useful in this analysis owing to its appealing account of the

intersection of power and meaning in media discourses and the framing of particular issues by the press. In other words, the analytical approach adopted in this study lead us to critique media behaviour and performance over the period under review – 2000 to 2010 – in the context of the multi-layered socio-economic and political crisis that beleaguered Zimbabwe then.

HISTORICISING THE LAND QUESTION IN ZIMBABWE

The land question in Zimbabwe is fundamentally linked to the country's colonial experience. A brief exploration of this experience, especially as it relates to the land issue, is included here to provide a background against which some of the emotive issues surrounding the land question can be understood. The arrival of white settlers under the leadership of Cecil John Rhodes in 1890 marked the beginning of the colonial experience in the country. Coming from South Africa – a land endowed with great mineral wealth – Rhodes and his Pioneer Column expected a similar discovery of fortune in the new colony. As Thompson (1985) notes, this expectation was not met to their satisfaction as mineral deposits discovered in those early days were not as expansive and rich as the mines in South Africa. What complicated issues for the settlers were that the Shona and Ndebele people were self-sufficient subsistence farmers who were not keen to work for the colonialists in their mines. Thompson observes that, in response to that reluctance, 'through a systematic policy of land alienation, often carried out by force, the white settlers were able to push enough Africans off the land to supply a cheap labour force to the mines' (1985, 138).

Land alienation meant, among other things, depriving Africans of the privilege of being able to farm on the land, the prerogative to claim a stake on it and the expropriation of a resource which hitherto had been a means of livelihood for them. Terence Ranger (1985), in one of his seminal works, *Peasant Consciousness and Guerrilla War in Zimbabwe* chronicles the measures taken by successive colonial regimes to alienate Africans from their sole livelihood resource – the land – in a bid to economically advantage and elevate the whites while subduing and repressing the blacks. The British South Africa Company (BSAC) heralded an era of conquest, uprootment and dislocation of the blacks marked by the violent expropriation of their land and its successor, the Rhodesian government inaugurated in 1923, continued in the same vein.

Ndhlovu-Gatsheni (2008) chronicles the campaign of dispossession and subjugation orchestrated by the successive colonial regimes in a bid to entrench colonial settler hegemony. The first reserves where Africans were herded to were designated in the Gwaai and Shangani areas in 1894. The areas, as British Deputy Commissioner, Sir Richard Martin observed were 'badly watered, sandy and unfit for settlement' (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2008, 65). This development marked the beginning of a millennial land-related struggle spanning the colonial and post-colonial phase. By 1905, the BSAC had presided over the creation of sixty reserves covering 22 per cent

of the new colony. The bulk of the land was set aside for the white settlers. Palmer (1977) notes that in 1914 whites, who numbered 23 730, had assumed ownership of 19 032 320 acres of land while an estimated 752 000 Africans occupied a total of 21 390 080 acres of land.

The setting up of commissions such as the 1914 Reserves Commission and the 1924 Morris Carter Land Commission which respectively institutionalised the delimitation of the reserves and the spatial segregation which underpinned settlerism, further entrenched land alienation. The recommendations of the latter commission paved the way for the enactment of the Land Apportionment Bill in 1930 and its implementation in 1931. The Act introduced a raft of measures in the control of access to land. Through the provisions of this Bill, land was fragmented into European Areas, Native Reserves, Native Purchase Areas and Forest Areas. This saw the number of reserves increasing from 60 (in 1905) to 98 to cater for the ever-increasing land pressures among the growing African population. The Act also introduced segregated tenure categories for the different land areas. While in European areas land became private property with title deeds, land in reserves was under communal tenure with no title deeds. In other words, Europeans owned land, while Africans were deprived of this ownership. Although African Chiefs were empowered to allocate land, they exercised this privilege under the supervision of Native Commissioners. In areas where Africans were allowed to buy land (the Native Purchase Areas) the soils were comparatively poor and the general conditions less favourable. These areas were strategically designated so as to act as buffer zones between the majority of blacks in reserves and the white farmers in their rolling properties (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2008).

It is clear from this land ownership pattern that the white minority controlled a disproportionately huge amount of land at the expense of the black majority. The total land available for African use was about 30 per cent, while the white minority controlled about 70 per cent of the land. Mlambo (2009) notes that the influx of whites into the country after the Second World War (17 000 in 1948 alone) had a huge impact on the African population in many ways. Firstly, over 100 000 Africans were forcibly displaced from their lands, which were re-classified as European areas, and resettled in already overpopulated arid reserves. As a result, between 1945 and 1955, about 100 000 blacks were uprooted and dislocated to tsetse-infested reserves in places such as Muzarabani and Gokwe (www.zimembassy.se/land_reform_document.html). The skewed land policies, their patently racial bias and their impoverishing effect became a major source of dis-ease among the increasingly disenfranchised blacks.

Smith's 1965 Unilateral Declaration of Independence preceded the enactment of the Land Tenure Act in 1969 which provided for the division of the land into half between the blacks and the whites. 44, 9 million acres were set aside for each race. This obviously did not take into cognisance demographic realities on the ground. Black settled areas experienced further massive land pressures resulting in overstocking, high population densities, land degradation, reduced yields and acute

poverty. Palmer (1977) explores at length the racially skewed settler land policies which resulted in massive eviction of black farmers from their land to pave way for the colonial settlers. Palmer's study enjoys pride of place in the historiography of the land question in Zimbabwe as it highlighted the centrality of the land question to the future development of the country.

THE LIBERATION WAR AND THE LAND QUESTION

Jocelyn Alexander (2007) makes a fundamental observation when she posits that land is about identity and production and that it has aesthetic values and spiritual significance. This portrayal of the land has strong resonance in the material and metaphysical construction of land in Zimbabwe's cosmology and material worldviews. Palmer (1977, 1990), Ranger (1985) and Lan (1985) all point to the centrality of the land question to the eruption of the liberation war and the ostensibly massive support that the guerrillas executing the struggle enjoyed from the peasants who had suffered and were suffering the most under the colonial land ownership injustices. Alexander's claim that land 'fires political struggles' (2007, 183) echoes the expression '*mwana wevhu*' popularised in wartime and loosely translated as "son of the soil". Son of the soil was a tacit claim for originality and undiminished rights of ownership to the Zimbabwean land. It was also an expression of rebellion against the third-rate citizen status accorded to the blacks and manifestly expressed in the racialised land ownership structures. Scoanes et al (2010) confirm that Zimbabwe's liberation war of the 1970s was fought principally over land. Another point that serves to emphasise the centrality of the land issue in Zimbabwe's liberation war is the historical fact that various initiatives and negotiations such as the 1976 Geneva Conference and the Malta conference in 1978 collapsed due partly to the unresolved land question. The 1979 Lancaster House Conference almost failed owing to the emotive land question. As Lan (1985) reflects, the most pervasive inequality experienced by all Zimbabweans was based on the control of access to land. 'The landless and the powerless have no need to remember who their ancestors have been' (1985, 21). It was the exasperating feeling of powerlessness and dispossession emanating from land alienation that spurred blacks to take up arms against the colonial establishment.

Although Norma Kriger (1992) sidelined the repossession of the 'losts lands' as the central, unifying aspiration of the struggle and placed the forces that divided Africans at the centre of her analysis, her claims attracted widespread rebuttals. Scoanes et al (2010) make reference to Robin Palmer who, with much precise foresight in 1977, postulated that the greatest predicament awaiting whatever government that would assume power after independence would be the vexatious land issue, itself deployed as one of the principal instruments for entrenching white hegemony.

THE LANCASTER HOUSE SETTLEMENT AND THE LAND ISSUE

The Lord Carrington-led Lancaster House Conference, convened to negotiate an end to the liberation war, was a protracted and tense negotiation that opened on 10 September 1979 and dragged tortuously on until 21 December of the same year when a ceasefire agreement was finally signed. Among a number of sticky issues which threatened to cause the collapse of the negotiations was the land question. The particular contention on the land question, on the part of the Patriotic Front, was, as Martin and Johnson (1985) put it, 'on the restriction placed on the ability of a new government to redistribute land that had been taken from the Africans over the previous ninety years... (315). This is corroborated by Mtisi, Nyakudya and Barnes (2009), Muzondidya (2009) and Thompson (1985) who, in particular, assert that the land concessions were the most difficult to make as 'land was the symbol of the whole struggle'. Johnson quotes Tongogara, the ZANLA supremo, who stressed that 'anyone who joins the armed struggle, he's joining on the basis of land' (p. 68). Former ZANU PF Women's League Chair Thenjiwe Lesabe, (as quoted in Willems, 2004), avers about the importance of land as follows: 'Why do you think we called ourselves children of the soil during the 1950s and 1960s?' (p. 1768). Although Norma Krieger (1992) and Blair Rutherford (2013) argue against the land question as the single most important factor which fuelled the liberation war it still can be argued that other factors, though important, remain subservient to the unifying effect of the land issue as land was – and remains – the birthright of every bona fide Zimbabwean.

The Lancaster House Constitution expressly stated that land was not to be confiscated, but would have to be acquired according to the willing-seller-willing-buyer principle. The Patriotic Front accepted this proviso partly because of the verbal promise made by the British and Americans to fund the land purchases (Mtisi et al 2009). The Lancaster House Constitutional provisions were to remain in force for the first ten years after independence. Although this facilitated the smooth transition from colonialism to self-determination, it kept the government, in a way, hamstrung and encumbered in pursuing a rigorous land reform exercise. Lord Carrington, the Chairman of the Lancaster House Conference issued a statement on 11 October 1979 stating that:

We recognise that the future of Zimbabwe, whatever its political complexion, will wish to extend land ownership. The costs would be very substantial indeed, well beyond the capacity, in our judgement, of any individual donor country and the British Government cannot commit itself at this stage to a specific share in them. We should however be ready to support the efforts of the Government of Independent Zimbabwe to obtain international assistance for these purposes (www.zimbabwembassy.se/land_reform_document.html).

It is very clear from the various studies and assertions cited above that the land question has indeed been fundamental and decisive in the struggle to liberate Zimbabwe.

THE LAND ISSUE IN POST-INDEPENDENCE ZIMBABWE

On the land question, Wolmer (2007) observes that ‘with Independence in 1980 decolonisation was not accompanied ... by radical land reform incorporating large scale redistribution, restitution or reparations. Rather, the status quo was legalised in the Lancaster House Constitution’ (p. 187). The Lancaster House Constitution’s willing-seller-willing-buyer formula is often cited by numerous scholars (Moyo 2000, 2005, 2011; Wolmer 2007; Murisa 2011; Muzondidya 2009; Mtisi et al 2009; Scoanes et al 2010 and many others) as one of the biggest impediments to the speedy resolution of the land question. The lethargic donor countries – particularly the British Government – as well as the resistant, and not-keen-on-land-reform Commercial Farmers Union and the hesitant and legally entrapped new Government of Zimbabwe all contributed to a painstakingly slow land reform process.

Moyo (2002) has identified three distinct phases in Zimbabwe’s land reform spanning from 1980 to 2000. The first stage is the 1980 to 1990 period where the land redistribution process was guided by the Lancaster House Constitution. Of the targeted eight million hectares earmarked for redistribution, government managed to achieve 40 per cent. The second phase is the 1990 to 1996 period characterised by the enactment of the Land Acquisition Act in 1992, the implementation of the neoliberal Economic Structural Adjustment Programme and the implementation of a gradualistic compulsory land acquisition process which was severely resisted by the Commercial Farmers Union through litigation. The third phase starts from 1997 and its defining moments include the donor conference and the massive compulsory land acquisition in 1997 which later intensified in 2000 after the ill-fated 2000 constitutional referendum and the introduction of the Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FSLRP).

At Independence in 1980, there were 6 000 large farms and estates owned by whites and occupying 70 per cent of Zimbabwe’s arable land. Throughout the 1980s there were intermittent land occupations masterminded by landless peasants and war veterans. Marongwe (2003) observes that, in 1980, about 200 farms were occupied and, in the mid-1980s, 800 more farms were occupied. The government responded to this land hunger by implementing a land resettlement programme. By 1996 government had resettled 71 000 families, although this number was a far cry from its resettlement targets set over the preceding years. From 1980 to 1999, the land reform process did not move at a pace commensurate with the land hunger and pressures in the communal areas. The 15 million hectares controlled by 6 000 large scale commercial farmers had only been reduced to 12 million hectares by 1999. Upon the introduction of the Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP)

in 2000, the whole land ownership structure suffered an unprecedented seismic shift as peasants, war veterans and government officials threw caution to the wind and embarked on a wholesale land invasion exercise.

THE STATE-CONTROLLED PRESS AND THE MEDIATION OF THE LAND QUESTION

The emotive and crisis ridden land reform process marked by the state-sponsored Fast-Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP) heralded a turning point in Zimbabwe's body politic. The print and electronic media became critical theatres in which the cataclysmic drama orchestrated by the land repossession exercise was staged. How the press spotlighted and framed the land question, the framing patterns that emerged, and the motivation behind the adoption of particular representational standpoints constitute the main focus of the ensuing analysis. This section critiques the framing of the land question by the mainstream state-controlled weeklies, namely the *Sunday Mail* and the *Sunday News*. A latter section will focus on the privately-controlled *Standard* and *Zimbabwe Independent* weeklies. These weeklies have been selected mainly because of their continual presence in the Zimbabwean mediascape from long before the period under review. Others that could have been selected, such as *The Daily News on Sunday* and *The Sunday Mirror* ceased operating during the crisis period.

The Sunday Mail, founded in 1935, and the *Sunday News*, established in 1930, belong to the state-controlled and now renamed Zimpapers Pvt Ltd (1980) stable. Zimpapers Pvt Ltd has roots that can be traced back to 1891 when *The Herald*, its flagship daily newspaper, was established by the settlers led by Cecil John Rhodes. At Independence in 1980, the South African Argus Group had a controlling stake in Zimpapers. The new government did not waste time in making sure that it had a patriotic press that would champion its vision and policies. In 1981 the government formed the Zimbabwe Mass Media Trust (ZMMT) which it used as a vehicle to secure a controlling stake in Zimpapers using a grant provided by the Nigerian government. By 1981, the Government of Zimbabwe, through the ZMMT, had a 51 per cent controlling stake in Zimpapers. The rest of the shares are held by pension funds, insurance companies, investment funds and individuals (Sanders 1991 in Mawarire 2007, 14). Over the years, the Government, through the Ministry of Information and Publicity, has enjoyed the sole responsibility of appointing the Board of Directors and the Chief Executive Officer. In fact, before the Minister makes the board appointments, the suggested names are taken to the President for approval. Dr Charles Utete, a former Permanent Secretary in the President's Office, has served for years as Board Chairman. It is this Board, chaired by government functionaries such as Charles Utete, that makes editorial appointments. It takes no stretch of the imagination, given the foregoing, to establish the direct or indirect influence of the State on the editorial policy of the Zimpapers stable.

Though overly dominant, *The Sunday Mail* commands a huge following in the northern part of the country, while its sister paper, the *Sunday News* has a respectable readership in the southern part. Since they are headquartered in the two biggest cities of the country and in two key regions, namely Mashonaland and Matabeleland, the two weeklies stand astride Zimbabwe's geo-political terrain. The combined reach and influence of these papers, given the huge readership they command, is indeed instrumental in the battle of ideas and their contestation – a key aspect of the crisis engendered by the land reform process. In the quest to comprehend and critique the framing of the land reform process by the state-controlled press and to reveal the forces influencing the particular representations that emerge, this study has assembled news stories covering the land reform predicament and the challenges and opportunity this revolutionary exercise engendered from the year 2000 to 2010. A total of 150 stories on the land reform process were collected over the specified period from the two state-controlled weeklies. What follows is an analysis of this data with close reference to the Propaganda model.

CONTEXTUALISATION OF THE LAND REFORM

The state-controlled weeklies approached and framed land reform as a revolutionary exercise meant to right a colonial injustice. On 18 June 2000, at the peak of the land expropriation exercise, *The Sunday Mail* ran two stories whose main thrust was to legitimise and create a historical base from which the exercise could be comprehended. The first story was titled: '*Land Issue: The legal history since 1980. Why Mugabe has waited till now*' and the second one '*Nothing strange in land redistribution*'. The first story is couched in a matter-of-fact tone meant to make it sound factual, distant and apolitical in a manner that satisfies the normative expectation of narrative fidelity or empirical credibility. This is partly the reason why, in the story, the President is referred to simply as 'Mugabe'. The story, in typical historical narrative style, chronicles the legal and constitutional journey the State embarked on in its quest to address the land question. It starts with the 1981 Communal Land Act, which transformed the Tribal Trust Lands into Communal areas, highlighted the 1985 Land Acquisition Act drawn up in the spirit of the Lancaster House Constitutional Agreement – and giving the government the first right to purchase excess land from the white owners for redistribution to the landless blacks – and looks at the 1992 Land Acquisition Act, which removed the willing-seller-willing buyer clause enshrined in the Lancaster House Constitution. This act paved the way for the government to compulsorily buy white-owned land for redistribution. The spirited resistance staged by whites against this law between 1992 and 1997 is clearly captured in a manner that prepares the reader to be at least sympathetic to the Fast Track Land Reform Programme. The narrative of the article culminates in February 2000 by highlighting the rejection of the draft constitution owing to the coalition of opposition and human rights groups that de-campaigned

the proposed charter. Clearly, the story implicitly sought to demonstrate that the government had travelled a long, legal and tortuous road in its quest to address the land imbalance while the landless people patiently waited to be resettled. The appeal to reason, buttressed by the use of facts and statistical information, is aimed at exonerating the government from any wrong-doing and appealing to critics to appreciate the rationale behind the land reclamation process.

Similarly, the second story: 'Nothing strange in Land Redistribution' is quite assertive in its rationalisation and historicisation of the land reform process. Its premise is encapsulated in the claim that white ex-combatants of the first and second World Wars were given land, farming inputs and tax-free living allowances as compensation for their heroic exploits. This is a tongue-in-cheek attempt to sanitise and justify the crusade by war veterans to occupy white-owned farms since, unlike the first and second World War white ex-combatants, they had waited for 20 long years to receive due recognition for their war-time labours in the form of the land. The story goes on to say that whites expropriated the land to compensate their servicemen. From this perspective, war veterans spearheading farm occupations are somewhat absolved from any wrongdoing. A story in *The Sunday Mail* titled '*Land Issue has always been at the heart of the politics in Zimbabwe*' is yet another attempt to frame the land question in a dominant or official historical perspective. The Lancaster House Conference, which paved the way for the independence of Zimbabwe, is revisited in a way that establishes a link between its provisions on the land issue and the prevailing land occupations crisis. The story dismisses claims on the violations of democratic principles, rule of law and lack of transparency as a smokescreen covering the real issue at stake – the redress of a 90-year-old colonial injustice. Thus, the land crisis is cast as a matter between Zimbabwe, a victim of colonialism and the plunder it engendered, and Britain, the imperial plunderer and her progenies. Other stories similarly framed in the state-controlled weeklies include '*Lest we forget the other side of land grabbing*' and '*Mazowe Valley belongs to us: Chiweshe villagers lay claim on Citrus Estates*'. In the latter story, the historicisation of the land question is attributed to the common villager rather than to the elite as is common practice. This is intended to project a popular sense of injustice as the source of the impetus behind the widespread farm occupations at the turn of the millennium. The media is thus seen here playing a fundamental role in perpetuating and legitimising the government's ideological positioning on the land issue. The hegemonic role of the press is affirmed by this tacit attempt to generate consent to the pro-government position on the land question. This confirms one of the key tenets of the propaganda model, namely the overarching influence of the dominant ideology in the framing of news stories and the role of ownership in the same.

What emerges from the above framing of the land question by the state-controlled press is captured clearly by Norris et al (2003: 14) who argue that framing occurs 'when the media makes some aspects of a particular issue more salient in order to promote a certain problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation and/or

treatment recommendation'. The salient issue in all the stories highlighted above is that the land question is a historical and an unfinished business of the struggle for independence. Thus, the crisis engendered by the farm occupations is defined as a colonially authored problem which the war veterans and all Zimbabweans have a moral obligation to this colonial imbalance. The matter-of-fact tone used imbues the stories with a detached, objective and non-ideological aura. The use of dates, statistical information and references to known historical occurrences is a tried, tested and effective credibility strategy the thrust of which, as van Dijk (1996) asserts, is to persuasively reinforce the 'truth' of claims advanced. However, what we get is a dominant frame rather than multiple frames within the stories. This is at variance with the multiperspectival approach which American Sociologist of news Gans (1979, 2003) advocates. The multi-perspectival approach differs from the homogenising and totalising solo perspective in that it reports multiple ideas and issues that relate to a particular story. The land question is a socio-political, economic and diplomatic issue which calls for complex portrayals in order to establish its ramifications to Zimbabwe's body politic. Apparently, the seemingly detached and non-ideological framing of the land question in the stories highlighted above belie their hegemonic intentions whose thrust is to buttress the ideological position of the status quo on the matter (Shoemaker and Reese 1991; McQuail 2010). However, in other stories on the land question, as highlighted later in the analysis, the state-controlled press is less circumspect as the news frames deployed expunge any grain of doubt as to which side of the political divide they belong.

WAR VETERANS, FARM OCCUPIERS AND THE LAND CRISIS

The press has directed much attention to the agents of farm occupations – such as War Veterans and villagers in communal areas – as well as members of the uniformed forces, ZANU PF members and government officials. Over 50 per cent of the 150 stories sampled from the state-controlled weeklies make one or more statements on the perpetrators or champions of the farm occupations and land reform process. However, less descriptive stories have been set aside and more descriptive ones selected and subjected to analysis since these definitively bring out the position of the press on the perpetrators of the farm occupations.

The following stories, published in the state-controlled weeklies and concerning these perpetrators, have been selected for analysis: '*Forestry Commission warns illegal settlers*' (*The Sunday News*, 30/06/2000), '*We will not budge, say war veterans*' (*The Sunday News*, 05/03/2000), '*Ex-fighters given until today to vacate farms*' (*The Sunday News*, 05/03/2000); '*War veterans defy High Court Order*' (*The Sunday News*, 19/03/2000), '*War veterans dig in*' (*The Sunday News*, 04/06/2000), '*War vets call for land before polls*' (*The Sunday Mail*, 09/04/2000), '*Mugabe denies*

link to farm invasions' (*The Sunday Mail*, 26/03/2000) and *'War veterans should be emulated says official'* (*The Sunday Mail*, 07/04/2002). In these stories and in others not cited here, the war veterans are framed as the key architects of the farm occupations. Notably, the war veterans are euphemistically depicted as *bona fide* liberation war ex-combatants, not as rabble-rousing individuals with questionable liberation war credentials. Thus, the frames affirm the legitimacy of the war veterans and are free from pejorative connotations. This is in sharp contrast with Tiyaambe Zeleza's (2008, 14) characterisation of the land reform crusaders as 'a self-declared anti-imperialist enclave of tattered radical credentials, ...'. In the stories cited above, war veterans are variously referred to as 'Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans Association (ZNLWVA) members', 'ex-combatants', 'former freedom fighters', 'ex-fighters', 'sons and daughters of the soil' and simply as 'war veterans'. A close look at these frames reveal that the journalists use so-called purr words when describing war veterans, with the aim of creating an aura of decency and virtue around them. Herman and Chomsky (2002) argue that purr words carry positive and warming overtones. By referring to war veterans invading white owned farms as ZNLWVA members, the journalists project the view that the farm occupations were a mass driven revolutionary exercise; just as these members carried the aspirations of the masses in the prosecution of the liberation struggle, they today continue championing the unfulfilled aspirations of the masses through land reclamations. The strategy removes individual agency and culpability, and prevents the invasions from appearing like acts orchestrated by whimsical and disorganised individual miscreants. The collective nouns 'ex-fighters', 'ex-combatants', 'former freedom fighters' and 'war veterans' establish a link between the liberation war, which was waged to free the country from the stranglehold of colonialism and the post-independence imperative to deliver to the people of Zimbabwe economic independence. The war veterans are framed as legitimate crusaders in that revolutionary process. The purr words used to describe them signal an overt approval by the state-controlled press of the mission the ex-combatants had chosen to embark on. The disruptive and sometimes chaotic and violent effects of the farm occupations are denied salience in the stories. This representation of the war veterans by the state-controlled media is in keeping with the government's description of the same.

The other group of farm occupiers are collectively referred to as 'peasants', 'people who settled in the forestry areas', 'landless peasants', 'landless masses', 'landless people', 'land hungry communal people', and 'sons and daughters of the soil'. The import of these framing devices is that they diffuse the associated element of criminality involved in the farm occupations. The subtle encouragement for farm invasions loaded in these frames is hardly concealed. If the masses are still landless Zimbabweans in a country that has gone 20 years into its independence, then surely they are justified in taking the law into their own hands and settling themselves on white-owned farms. After all, the framings seem to suggest, that whites are vestigial elements of the colonial establishment, which the blacks politically dethroned in

1980. The landless people or masses are thus cast as victims of colonialism who deserve to find a space they can claim as their own in an independent or sovereign Zimbabwe. This is reflected in the statement in *The Sunday News* story titled ‘*Farm labourers caught in middle*’ (12/03/2000) and attributed to Stanley Ncube – a former ZIPRA commander who maintains that ‘the only invasions that occurred in this country were by white colonialists long ago. We are not invaders. What we are doing is to repossess land captured by the invaders’. This assertion is put into perspective by the historicisation of the land question given earlier in the analysis and the representation of farm occupiers as people acting not at the instigation of government, but out of a growing sense of deprivation and injustice. Casting the farm occupiers and the war veterans as people with a legitimate grievance is a discourse device that illuminates the fundamental social problem of dominance and inequality. The white landowners are cast as the dominant group while the landless blacks are presented as the subjugated and dispossessed other. From this perspective, the state-controlled press projects itself as presenting news from the perspective of the disenfranchised landless masses. Thus the press is seen not to condone, legitimate or ignore social inequality and injustice represented by a minority that owns 70 per cent of the productive agricultural land and a majority that controls 30 per cent. As Herman and Chomsky (1988, 2002) observe, media institutions are hegemonic in that they organise and institutionalise power and dominance. The selection of sources and quotations is yet another framing device used by the press in the representation of farm occupiers and the land reform crisis. Tankard (2001) identifies source selection and quotes selection as key framing devices. The state-controlled weeklies in some of the stories cited above have a preferred choice of sources and quotations which betrays their pandering to the dominant ideology on the land question. In *The Sunday News* story titled ‘*War Veterans defy High Court Order*’ the sources include Sifiso Velelani – a Nkayi-based war veterans spokesperson, Croffat Ndhlovu – a war veteran, Samson Sibanda – a ZNLWVA Gwanda District Chairperson, and Chenjerai Hunzvi, the President of the ZNLWVA. Justice Garwe is cited only as the judge who presided over the land invasion case in the High Court and declared the farm occupations illegal. His opinion is not solicited. What have been made salient in the story are not the legal arguments justifying the verdict, but war veterans’ reactions to the judgement. It is clear that the press decided to frame this story in a manner that solicits sympathy for the war veterans who, apparently, have been misunderstood by a court protecting an unfair status quo in land ownership patterns. The following quotations from the sources are quite revealing. ‘*What we want is land*’ (Sifiso Velelani), ‘*the struggle is far from over; we will soldier on until we feel our sacrifice was worth the effort. We want our children to inherit the land*’ (Samson Sibanda); ‘we cannot accept the humiliation of being told by a white man to pack our bags and leave our land’ and ‘the President supports us and I don’t think the police will do anything ... I am prepared to be arrested in the fight for land for the

people' (both by Chenjerai Hunzvi). The first quotation is poignantly declarative and uncompromising. It is simply saying the judgement is inconsequential because it does not deliver land to the landless people. The second is couched in militaristic terms. The use of the words 'struggle', 'soldier' and 'sacrifice' evokes war time memories and experiences. This is an attempt to link the land occupations with the unfulfilled liberation war promises and expectations, something that government officials have repeatedly done. Without explicitly denigrating the High Court judgement, the story is framed in a manner that frowns at legalism. The claim that 'we want our children to inherit the land' is meant to project a selflessness akin to that exhibited by the ex-combatants who sacrificed their lives for the country's independence. Chenjerai Hunzvi's first statement is assertively declarative in a manner that makes the judgement ring hollow. The stage for the enactment of power and its contestation is set. This is reinforced by the use of the collective pronouns 'we' and 'our', which is meant to give popular appeal to the declaration Hunzvi is making. In the context of these quotations, Justice Garwe is cast as a lone individual trapped in legalism and pronouncing a judgement that has no mass appeal. The punch line is in the last quotation, in which Hunzvi declares that the land occupiers enjoy the support of the President. It is clear from this assertion that the struggle has assumed an extra-legalistic proportion. Clearly the choice of sources and quotations provides apertures through which the pro-government position of the state-controlled press on the farm occupations can be ascertained. The state-controlled weeklies favour the land occupations, never mind the legal infractions of the whole exercise and its socio-economic and political ramifications. This abets Tuchman's claim in Reese (2007 149) that 'news is brought into being by the active forces of order that bracket out certain happenings via the routinised, legitimised and institutionalised structures that favour certain ways of seeing.' The press, in this instance, plays a hegemonic role as it implicitly encourages readers to celebrate the 'heroic' exploits of war veterans and farm occupiers in a way that clearly advances the interests of the government and debunks counter-narratives from oppositional, privately owned media.

THE LAND REFORM PROGRAMME AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

The farm occupations and the Fast Track Land Reform Programme promulgated by the Government triggered an avalanche of reactions from the region and the international community at large. This section focuses on how the state-controlled press captured and framed these reactions. Below are some of the stories the state-owned media presented on international reactions to the land question. 'ANC fully backs Zimbabwe land reform' (*The Sunday Mail* (SM), 28/05/00), 'Nkomo takes swipe at delegates over land' (SM, 21/05/00), 'SADC Leaders back Zim land stance' (SM, 23/04/00), 'SA opposition leader visits farms: Trip meant to express solidarity with opposition parties, farmers' (SM, 19/04/00), 'British Intelligence unleashes hate

campaign on new farmers' (SM, 23/03/03) and '*Luciano applauds Zim land reform*' (SM, 04/11/07). The following stories were selected from *The Sunday News*: '*Boost for President's land stance: SADC leaders throw weight behind Mugabe*' (23/04/00), '*Tony Blair and GW Bush must listen to SADC*' (16/12/01) and '*ANC vows to pursue land reform programme*' (18/01/04).

The use of the words 'fully backs' in the first *Sunday Mail* story suggest that the African National Congress (ANC), a sister revolutionary party to ZANU PF, unequivocally shares the ideals of the Government of Zimbabwe regarding the land reform process. This view is reinforced through source selection: an ANC executive committee member, Ngoako Ranathlodi, is alleged to have said 'land reforms in Zimbabwe could no longer be deferred as there were gross imbalances in land ownership'. Kgalema Motlanthe, the then ANC Secretary General, weighed in by asserting that 'the land issue must be resolved now because it was central to the liberation struggle waged in Zimbabwe'. Again the land question is framed as an unfinished business of Zimbabwe's liberation struggle. The story: 'SADC Leaders back Zim land reform' elevates the government and places it on a high moral pedestal regarding its stance on the land issue. What is clear in the story, but remains unsaid, is that if leaders in SADC who enjoy historical affinities with Zimbabwe and have an insight into developments on the ground owing to their geographical proximity to the theatre of the crisis endorse the land reform process, then nobody from elsewhere is qualified to express a contrary view unless they harbour ulterior motives. Britain is cast as a belligerent and sulking former coloniser that lacks the willpower to own up to its colonial liabilities. A similar story in *The Sunday News*, with a screaming headline on the front page, declares and celebrates the same regional support highlighted above. This time, SADC leaders have 'thrown their weight' behind President Mugabe's land reform programme. This metaphoric frame is a potent device that is instrumental in fostering a dominant interpretation of issues through the forceful way in which it conjures visual images of a claim being made. By not offering a countervailing perspective on the question of regional support, the story does its part in controlling knowledge and influencing understanding in a manner that reinforces the government's position on the land question. This further affirms the hegemonic role which the state-owned press plays.

Another attempt to frame the land reform as enjoying international support is evident in the story: '*Luciano applauds Zim Land reform*'. Luciano, the Jamaican reggae maestro, is given space to express his views on the land question and he captures his sentiments in a historically and metaphysically reflective way as follows: 'Let us not forget that our land was forcefully taken away from us against the will of God, against the will of the people. Our land was stolen; hence the people have the right to reclaim it'. The historical facts stated in this refrain, although tinged with emotive language, have a validity that is not dismissible at face value. It is this standard line that the government and farm occupiers have repeated several times over. In fact, factuality is a normative principle in the presentation of news. Anybody

who challenges the rationale behind the land reform is thus challenging the will of God and the will of the people. This discourse strategy is as persuasive as it is coercive since one cannot violate the will of God and the will of the people and still be morally blameless. Thus the story deploys effective strategies to galvanise people to rally behind the land reform as doing so is akin to fighting in God's and the people's corner. The ideological persuasion in this story is lost in its presentation as a self-evidently true narrative. In other words, the press appears not to be doing ideological work, yet it is pre-occupied with exactly that. Other voices that negate this representation are muted or implicitly vilified. Thus the media's role in manufacturing consent and creating consensus is made manifest through the use of likeminded sources.

Other stories that capture foreign perspectives that negate the government's position on the land question are framed in a manner that besmirches the source of the alternative view. A typical example is *The Sunday Mail* story titled: 'SA opposition leader visits farms: Trip meant to express solidarity with opposition parties, farmers'. At face value the headline makes the story appear like a neutral recording of facts, but when it is read in the context of other stories that largely affirm the government's position on the land reform process and on those that negate it, it fails to fit into what van Dijk (1985) calls the relevance structure. What is, however, relevant and most important for this story is captured in its sub-heading which basically states that Mr Tony Leon's trip is meant to express support for the opposition party and the white farmers who happen to be all strongly opposed to the land reform. Therefore Mr Leon is cast as a neo-colonial apologist seeking to defend his kinsmen – the commercial farmers. In other words, the story intimates that Leon is a man who must not be taken seriously as his interests are inimical to the government's pro-people revolutionary ideals. Herman and Chomsky's propaganda model provides satisfactory explanation as to why the two weeklies frame the land issue in a manner that is reflective of the government's ideological inclination. The five filters, namely ownership, advertising, sourcing routines, flak and dominant ideology have a cumulative effect that circumscribes the operations of journalists and media houses alike. It would be inconceivable, for example, for a journalist from the state-controlled press to write anything that attacks government's position on the land issue. The collective force of the filters has the effect of galvanising pro-government supporters and others against contrary framings of the land reform. The framing of the land question clearly adds credence to the claim by the propaganda model that the press colludes with the dominant powers by generating consent through peddling the dominant ideology. However, there is no such collusion between the state-controlled press and the business sector which is the mainstay of the capitalist system as the propaganda model claims. In fact, during the peak of the land reform process, the state-controlled press experienced an unprecedented flight of advertisers owing to its stance on the land reform which was deemed inimical to business. The

government and its parastatals continued to advertise in the state-controlled press due to their intricate economic connections.

THE PRIVATELY-OWNED WEEKLIES AND THE LAND QUESTION

While the state owned weeklies valorise the land reform programme and laud it for being mass driven and revolutionary in its attempt to remedy a colonial injustice, the privately-run and pro-opposition weeklies assume a diametrically opposed position. In the following sections, the analysis will explore how *The Zimbabwe Independent* and *The Standard* have framed the land question. Before delving into this analysis, a brief statement on the founding and ownership structure of these two weeklies is appropriate. *The Zimbabwe Independent* and *The Standard* belong to the ZimInd Publishers Group, whose holding company is the Alpha Media Group, owned by Trevor Ncube – a Zimbabwean entrepreneur. Ncube is a career media practitioner who started as Assistant Editor for the *Financial Gazette* in 1989 before becoming its Executive Editor in 1991. After leaving the *Financial Gazette*, he became the inaugural Editor of *The Zimbabwe Independent* in 1996. *The Zimbabwe Independent* was launched on 10 May 1996 with Clive Murphy and Clive Wilson as its major shareholders. Sarah Thompson and Trevor Ncube were the other shareholders. Ncube had the least number of shares with a 2, 5 per cent stake.

The founding team included, besides the four noted above, Mike Curling who was responsible for finance, an acerbic anti-Mugabe critic, Iden Witherell, as Ncube's assistant editor and Janet Hogan, among others. Sarah Thompson, who had impressive industry connections, headed the advertising portfolio and was ably assisted by Janet Hogan. Clive Murphy's company was in charge of distribution. Trevor Ncube opines that Sarah Thompson attracted 'adverts of all shapes and sizes' and 'secured long term advertising contracts'. On editorial thrust, Ncube declares that 'our brief was to help create a country where democracy flourished and where basic human rights were sacrosanct' (Ncube 2009). Thus, the avowed mission was to champion the rule of law and constitutionality. With a similar ownership structure, *The Standard* was launched on 13 April 1997. Similarly, the paper declares its duty as 'to serve and inform the public which we strive to do professionally, courageously and responsibly while enhancing stakeholder value and upholding press freedom, human rights and cultivating democratic values'. The paper swears to avoid a doggedly pro-government approach as it adopts a purportedly 'middle of the road thrust'. Brian Latham, *The Standard*'s Deputy Editor, appointed at the height of the land reform programme in April 2002, was also a stringer for *Bloomberg News*, *The Independent* (UK) and *The Farmer* – a local magazine run by The Commercial Farmers Union, BBC, Reuters and ARD German TV. By 2001, Trevor Ncube had scooped the entire equity without changes in editorial policy and thrust. Currently his Alpha Media Holdings enjoys five publications in its stable, including the highly

acclaimed *Mail & Guardian* which is South African-based, but regional in its reach. The ownership structure and founding principles articulated above will be useful in critiquing the framing of the land question by the Trevor Ncube weeklies.

LAND REFORM IN THE GLARE OF THE PRIVATELY-OWNED WEEKLIES

The *Zimbabwe Independent* and *The Standard* adopt a strikingly uniform and complementary approach in their framing of the land question. Although the news reports are written by different journalists reporting to different editors, the similar slant and biases they exhibit in the framing of their stories are quite revealing, though not surprising. The pro-government weeklies analysed above reveal the same complementary approach, though, with a fundamentally different bias from the private press. *The Zimbabwe Independent* and *The Standard* describe the land reform programme as ‘a tale of lawlessness’, ‘Zimbabwe’s curse’, ‘ruinous’, ‘chaotic’, ‘disastrous’, ‘Mugabe’s messed up agrarian reform’, ‘farm seizure’, ‘Mugabe’s programme’, ‘politically driven exercise’, ‘land grabs’, ‘Mugabe’s campaign’, ‘Mugabe’s so-called fast-track resettlement programme’ and ‘Mugabe’s seizure of white-owned farms’, among many other negative framings.

The snarling descriptive epithets and putdowns listed above are intended to evoke negative reactions and feelings of anger and rejection against the land reform exercise and those championing it. Robert Mugabe is chided and denigrated for embarking on what has been framed as a self-serving programme, which violates human and property rights with catastrophic consequences for the people of Zimbabwe. The press, as one of the primary institutional definers of social reality and domains of ideological expression and persuasion, consciously ‘make some aspects of a particular issue more salient in order to promote a certain problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation and/or treatment recommendation’ (Norris et al 2003, 4). From the lexicalisation given above, we are compelled to accept that the land reform is lawless, chaotic, ruinous, disastrous and a curse to Zimbabwe. We are also made to believe that the programme has no material benefit to Zimbabweans because it is orchestrated by selfish politicians who are looking after their political survival. The following few stories, among many similar ones, from *The Zimbabwe Independent* are instructive: ‘*Beef industry on verge of extinction*’ (02/01/2004), ‘*Sugar estates reduced to wasteland*’ (02/04/2004), ‘*Land reform becomes Zim’s curse*’ (13/05/2005) ‘*Save conservancy going up in smoke*’ (15/09/2000), ‘*Rhinos at risk from Mugabe’s campaign*’, (14/04/02) and ‘*State fiddles as land disaster unfolds: country deeply scarred*’ (14/01/2005).

The stories cited above have an apocalyptic and doomsday ring to them. These headlines or topics are semantic propositions (van Dijk 1999) and they define the information that readers are supposed to find important. They have the potential,

at worst, to shock and numb the reader and, at best, to instigate an insurrection against the political establishment at whose behest such a ruinous programme is being orchestrated. The lexicon used to frame the land reform reflects the ideological orientation of the paper regarding the land crisis. The import of the cited stories and many similar ones in the two weeklies is that the land reform programme is reducing Zimbabwe to a wasteland, is setting the country ablaze and is a curse to the nation. The implicit recommendation is that its perpetrators, who are devilish, must be exorcised and expunged from Zimbabwe's body politic. There is no dissonance between this framing of the land question and the mission statement of the weeklies articulated by Trevor Ncube in the introductory remarks given above. This persistent use of derogatory lexical items to frame the land reform programme point to a possible ideological control over newsmaking being imposed in the two stables spotlighted here. Ogenga (2010) cites Curran (2000a) who explains how ownership of the media exerts influence on media content and promotes the owners' commercial interests. Kupe (2010) observes that African media assumes the role of surrogate opposition. This is quite evident in the anti-government approach adopted by the two privately owned weeklies. It is already evident that the collusion between the government and the media – which is broadly alleged by the Propaganda Model – comes unstuck when it is applied to the privately owned press in Zimbabwe. A prominent media practitioner who has served both the private press and the public press argues that the lack of the collusion predicted by Herman and Chomsky's model is a result of a national agenda or national interests which remains an unsettled issue in Zimbabwe and many African countries. In the United States, where this model has been broadly applied, national interests are a relatively more settled issue.

FRAMING THE FARM OCCUPIERS: THE PRIVATELY-OWNED WEEKLIES' PERSPECTIVE

The following stories from *The Standard* have been selected from a large sample to give an insight into how the farm occupiers have been framed by the private press: 'Looting threatens tobacco industry' (15/05/2002), 'Mujuru embroiled in dispute over farm' (17/03/2002), 'Land Programme a disaster, says Mukanya' (06/01/2002), 'War vets leader warns Msika' (13/01/2002), 'Mudenge linked to farm invasion' (09/05/2004), 'Mash East PA embroiled in land wrangle' (15/02/2004) and 'New farmers decimate lion population'. From *The Zimbabwe Independent*, the following similarly framed stories are selected for analysis: 'CIO, ZNA join farm invaders' (07/07/2000), 'Made in Xmas farm invasions' (02/01/2004), 'Mpofu, RTG in fresh land row' (30/01/2004), 'Kondozi seized in latest farm raid' (16/04/2004), 'Triangle next – Mnangagwa' (07/05/2004), 'ZANU PF youths aid nuns in farm seizure' (04/06/2004), 'Farmer murdered' (11/02/2005) and 'New wave of farm invasions: Madzongwe leads pack of invaders' (26/10/2007). These stories represent a sample

from over 75 stories whose portrayal of the land reform and the people involved in the farm occupations is largely the same.

Clearly, in the above stories, the farm occupiers are not cast as land-hungry peasants acting out of their free will and sense of deprivation. They are simply greedy, lawless senior government officials, repressive state forces and armed militias unleashing violence on white-owned farms. Mudenge, Mujuru, Made, Mnangagwa, Mpofo, Mutasa, all senior cabinet ministers, and other senior government officials are fingered here as instigating farm occupations and are painted as dishonourable and selfish people who have no regard for the danger they are posing to the country's agricultural productivity and food security. There is a conscious effort in this framing of farm occupiers to debunk the claim in the state-owned press that the farm occupations were a mass revolution spearheaded by land hungry peasants fed up with the legal trappings encumbering efforts to redress the colonial imbalance in land ownership. The dominant frame in these stories is that the farm invaders are ZANU PF members who concentrate on 'destructive activities', a 'reign of terror' and 'farming hunger' to use words attributed to Thomas Mapfumo – a renowned and self-exiled Zimbabwean musician. It is critical to note, at this point, that Mapfumo's assertions against the land reform programme were the subject of an attack by scholar and critic Maurice Vambe in a 2003 *Sunday Mail* opinion piece, in which Mapfumo is excoriated for renegeing on liberation war ideals, of which he was once an avid supporter. Where the invaders are war veterans, most of the stories start by dismissing their claims to be genuine war veterans before launching a scathing vilification. Thus, war veterans are described as 'self-styled war vets', disrespectful loose cannons that must be reined in, social miscreants and savages looting people's property, brutalising and murdering innocent civilians. The social inequality in land ownership is de-emphasised as the private press vicariously makes an effort to naturalise, justify, authorise and rationalise the prevailing status quo in land ownership. This is in keeping with established capital interests in Zimbabwe's largely agriculture-based economy. It is therefore, not surprising that the farm occupiers are framed as people abetting the state in violating property rights and wrecking the existing status quo in the farming business and national economy at large. The pro-capital and pro-opposition neo-liberal ideological thrust and anti-government orientation of the privately owned weeklies is thus unmistakable.

Where farm occupiers are described in less virulent terms as 'new farmers' or 'resettled farmers', they are quickly rubbished as a misguided and indolent people who indulge in the 'plunder of wildlife' and ignore the core business of farming for the nation. However, in some cases, where the invasions are isolated and sporadic, a well-known political figure, for example, Edna Madzongwe – speaker of the upper house – is framed as leading 'a pack of invaders', as if the invaders were following her from one farm to another. Framing the farm occupiers as a pack of invaders blindly following and imitating Madzongwe dehumanises them and reduces their agency in making choices about moving in the direction of their own desiring, as

well as projecting them as sub-humans acting instinctively. In all the cited stories, farm occupiers who deserve to be named are government ministers, ZANU PF politicians and war veterans with questionable credentials, ZANU PF youths and relatives of senior ZANU PF functionaries, while other alleged party members taking part in the invasions are presented as faceless and nameless invaders. The dehumanisation of farm occupiers is exacerbated by lack of background historical material and the mere presentation of their actions as sudden, baffling and without reasonable cause (Braham as quoted in Gurevitch et al 1982). The privately owned weeklies do not make an attempt to historicise the land question. A senior staffer in the private press argues that their business is not to produce news stories that support the land reform since that is the business of *The Sunday Mail* and *The Herald*. He goes further to say that those who oppose land reform represent a market which they must exploit. By adhering to the journalistic ideal of focusing on the present and ignoring history, the private press deprives readers of a complete narrative on the land crisis. There is an attempt to manufacture consent by consistently giving readers an incomplete story, skewed against land redistribution and in favour of the existing capitalist economic order. Lovaas (2010, 259) makes reference to Galtung and Ruge (1997) who argue that 'news is constructed through the criteria of selection. The selection process depends on the criteria that give greater news value to some facts and events than others'. Klaehn (2010) echoes the above assertion by positing that the media portray an increasingly myopic and orthodox view of the world. This is quite reflective of Herman and Chomsky's propaganda model. Since the privately-owned press have a pro-business bias, they spiritedly attack anything that threatens to upset the economic status quo and valorise sources that uphold the economic hegemony, for example, pro-capital economic commentators, Western sponsored non-governmental organisations and the opposition party (Movement for Democratic Change), renowned for its neo-liberal, pro-capital economic ideals.

LAND REFORM AS AN INTERNATIONALLY CONDEMNED PROGRAMME

While the state controlled weeklies celebrate 'regional support' for the land reform programme and dismiss international condemnation as an expression of imperial hegemony and colonial hangover, the privately owned press project diametrically opposed views. Both *The Zimbabwe Independent* and *The Standard* cast Zimbabwe as a reclusive state, unnecessarily attracting international condemnation due to its ill-conceived and lawless land reform programme. The international ire and isolation that the ZANU PF government attracted to itself is framed as total and widespread. The following stories from the two stables are illustrative: 'UN abandons Zimbabwe' (11/08/2000), 'Mbeki condemns Mugabe over land, lawlessness' (27/08/2000), 'UN rejects land reform strategy' (03/11/2000), 'Pressure mounts on Mugabe' (01/12/2000) and 'UNDP offers Mugabe a last chance on land' (05/01/2001). All the

above stories are from *The Zimbabwe Independent*. *The Standard* weighed in with the following: 'Six million face starvation' (23/06/02), 'Envoy slams land reform' (25/04/2004), 'How land reform in Zimbabwe led to ruin' (29/09/06), 'Nigeria woos Zimbabwe farmers' (11/01/2004) and 'Mudenge linked to farm invasions' (09/05/2004) among many similarly framed stories.

In 'UN abandons Zimbabwe' the title suggests that the international family of nations has reached consensus on the decision to renounce, dump and give up on Zimbabwe, owing to the country's recalcitrance and breach of internationally acceptable values. The impression created is that the Government of Zimbabwe is a renegade state that goes against the counsel of nations embodied in the United Nations. The story even mentions that the United Nations resolved to embrace the recommendations of the Donors' Conference which urged that land reform should 'proceed on a legal, willing-seller/willing-buyer basis'. The story violates the tenets of investigative journalism by not probing further to establish why this Lancaster House Constitutional provision did not yield equitable land redistribution over the period between 1980 and 2000. In another story by *The Zimbabwe Independent*, the United Nations Development Programme technical team lambasts the Zimbabwe government's failure to run a coherent and non-coercive land reform programme. The story frames the government as chaotic and lacking institutional capacity to legally acquire land and settle beneficiaries in an orderly manner. As noted earlier, the state-controlled press framed the land reform programme as a revolutionary exercise. The nature and character of revolutions is that they do not proceed in an orderly and non-coercive fashion. Revolutions are rapturous, deconstructive and a form of violent rebirth. The private press does not seek to reconfigure this process beyond the interpretative frame provided by its sources. There is an apparent monolithic, hegemonic and myopic approach to the land crisis peddled by the press at the behest of the pro-capital neo-liberal establishment and this was clearly reflected in the ownership of the two stables by the year 2000 when some of these stories were written. By 2000, Clive Wilson was still publisher and Chief Executive Officer of *ZimInd*, although Trevor Ncube had acquired a 51 per cent stake. Sarah Thompson, who Ncube confessed had widespread corporate networks, was still the link between the corporate world and this media house.

While the state-controlled press touted regional support for the land reform programme as sufficient justification for the Government's continued crusade on compulsory land repossession, the private press sneered at that and cast the government as a complete pariah state with absolutely no credible international and regional support. The then South African President and known ally of Robert Mugabe, Thabo Mbeki, is presented as condemning Mugabe. Nigeria's Obasanjo is exposed as a duplicitous and two-faced ally who 'supports' Mugabe's land reform while at the same time luring the castaway farmers to farm in his country. In fact there are numerous stories in the private press that highlight how Mugabe's castaway white farmers have been embraced and offered land in Malawi, Mozambique,

Zambia and other countries. Presenting the land reform programme as lacking support even from Mugabe's traditional allies is a special discourse strategy that makes the government's programme appear to be a completely unjustifiable and eccentric pursuit. A reflection on the history of Zimbabwe and on the land question presented earlier in this chapter exposes the striking incompleteness of the narrative presented by the press on the land crisis. In fact, Lovaas (2008) disabuses us of the legitimate expectation of completeness in news narratives when he observes that 'institutional constraints like advertising, capital, and ownership limit newspapers' ability to provide a complete view of the world' (244). In Herman and Chomsky's propaganda model, advertising, capital and ownership are referred to as filters which hamstring and proscribe a journalist's professionalism in news writing. While the Trevor Ncube stables embrace the notion that 'editors must not be ideological handmaidens of the ruling class' (Mukasa 2003), they do not seem to have problems in reinforcing middle class and pro-business values. The news on Zimbabwe's ostracisation in the private stables appears to be pre-formulated by influential news sources as there is a common ring to them. The UN and its agencies – such as the UNDP, WFP and FAO – feature prominently as sources, as do Western diplomats, in framing the relationship between Zimbabwe and the international community. As argued by van Dijk (1985), Herman and Chomsky (1988, 2002, 2008), Scudson (2002), Mabweazara (2011) and Klaehn (2005a, 2009) among others, sourcing plays a decisive role in newsmaking practices. Institutionally affiliated sources are primary definers of reality and are also centres of news generation. Source selection and use is circumscribed by the political culture and ideological positioning of a paper on the issue being covered. Newsrooms thus select and cultivate sources whose 'political orientation rubber stamp the newspaper's editorial slants' (Mabweazara 2011). It is therefore not surprising that the private press rarely solicits views of government officials and resettled farmers on the benefits of the land reform programme, except in cases where these provide information that discredit the entire programme.

LAND REFORM, VIOLENCE AND LAWLESSNESS

Two of the most distinctive characteristics of the news frames on the farm occupations and land reform programme in the private weeklies have been violence and lawlessness. That the land reform was characterised by violence and extrajudicial manoeuvres is undeniable. This section explores how lawlessness and violence have been framed by the private weeklies. It draws parallels between the portrayals in the privately-run weeklies and the framing of the same issues in the state controlled weeklies.

As highlighted in the stories below from *The Zimbabwe Independent* and *The Standard*, violence and lawlessness feature prominently: 'War vets turn Karoi commercial farms into war zone' (17/11/2000), 'War veterans bleeding Zimbabwe to death (11/08/2000), 'CFU contests resettlement process' (20/10/2000), 'CIO,

ZNA join farm invaders' (07/07/2000), '*ZANU PF MPs organising farm invasions*' (17/11/2000), *Solve land issue legally*, Mbeki' (16/03/2001), '*Looting threatens tobacco industry*' (12/05/2002), '*A farmer's plea for help: A tale of lawlessness and brutality*' (16/03/2001), '*Farmer murdered*' (11/02/2005), '*Mashonaland East PA embroiled in land wrangle*' (11/01/2004), '*Battle for control of Kondozi turns ugly*' (19/01/2004), '*Msika orders ARDA off Kondozi farm*' (18/04/2004), '*Mohadi sues Made*' (27/06/2004) and '*How land policy in Zimbabwe led to ruin*' (29/09/2006). The agents and perpetrators of violence in these stories are ZANU PF officials and MPs, members of the uniformed forces and security agents, war veterans and ZANU PF youths. The occupied farms, in Karoi for example, are presented as war zones. The word 'war' is associated with extreme forms of violence and extrajudicial killings. In a war situation, the warring parties are armed, although civilians may be caught between them. What is made apparently repugnant about this particular war zone is that the war veterans and police officers ganged together to unleash a 'reign of terror' against defenceless farmers. The violence is framed as unprovoked and almost sadistic; farmers risked physical harm at the slightest provocation. The war veterans are further portrayed as perpetrating violence, stock theft, poaching and wanton destruction of property and equipment. The press project an unholy alliance between the war veterans and 'land grabbers', on the one hand, and the police, on the other. There is a crisis of expectations that becomes apparent when law enforcers are presented as joining hands with 'criminals' to adulterate human rights and the rule of law.

The framing of war veterans as 'militias', 'hit squads', 'marauding hooligans who cannot countenance the face of a white man or woman', 'murderers' and 'vandals' features prominently in many stories including in the story '*Farmer murdered*' and '*A farmer's plea for help: a tale of lawlessness and brutality*'. In the latter story farmer David Wheeler recounts how war veterans brutalised his family at Calgary Farm. The following words are used to frame the treatment of farmers by war veterans: 'harassed', 'disrupted', 'whipped', 'assaulted', 'mutilated', 'tortured' and 'issued threats of death'. The war veterans and farm occupiers are described as 'thieves, squatters and vandals'. They are the aggressors while the white farmers are the hapless worthy victims. The dominant frame is: in a country where the Vice President issues an order and it is scoffed at by non-descript people of questionable credentials, where state security agencies, the police and the army join forces with criminals, and where elected Members of Parliament organise and lead farm invasions, the rule of the jungle reigns supreme. As noted earlier, the private press does not attempt to account for this violence and lawlessness; it is presented merely as an endemic collapse of the moral and constitutional fabric of the government presided over by ZANU PF. It is critical to note that the accentuation of violence and lawlessness in the framing of the land reform process by the private press is in keeping with the papers' anti-land reform stance occasioned by the programme's unambiguous intentions to subvert and overturn the economic status quo in the

farming business. The stance is also in keeping with the papers' foundational principles built around pro-opposition affinities, free market economic ideals and an avowed anti-government stance (see Mabweazara 2011). It is quite intriguing that the private press see nothing positive in the land reform programme, only the chaos, violence, lawlessness and a drop in productivity among resettled farmers. Numerous scholarly studies (Scoanes et al 2010; Tendi-Miles 2010; Moyo 2001, 2011, Mutopo 2011) show various benefits, notwithstanding the challenges, that accrued from the land reform programme, including liberalised land ownership patterns and improved livelihoods. Joceyln Alexander (2007, 1) offers a useful insight into land matters when she avers that 'land is about identity as well as production and class formation; it is about aesthetic values and spiritual meaning, as well as being central to the construction of the institutions of state; it *fires political struggles and violence* (my emphasis) alongside the literary imagination ...' It is this problematisation of the land question and the attendant violence and lawlessness that seemingly eludes the press.

A cursory glance at the state-controlled media reveals a completely different state of affairs. While the private press bemoans the violence and lawlessness characterising the land reform process and present war veterans and farm occupiers as congenitally violent and lawless, the state-controlled press euphemises violence and lawlessness by presenting the twin ills as part of the process of midwifing a new dispensation, where land ownership inequities are addressed. The farm occupations, cast as acts of violence and lawlessness in the private press, are presented as an expression of protest and bitterness by a people that have suffered gross injustice for too long. Jabulani Petchu, a war veteran leader, sanitises the invasions by arguing that 'we do not invade farms. We liberate the land and settle the landless masses'. Another war veteran leader, Andrew Langa, claims that 'landless people are on strike after waiting for government to address the land question for twenty years'. The issue of property rights raised by white farmers and given pre-eminence in the private press is frowned upon as whites are presented as beneficiaries of a legalised land grabbing that took place during the colonial period and that was upheld by the independent ZANU PF government. There is also an attempt to justify the farm occupations by asserting that white farmers rejected reconciliation which could have led to a peaceful and mutually beneficial resolution of the land question. The *Sunday News* story '*Farmers regret rejecting reconciliation,*' (02/04/2000) cites Mr Dick Evans, a white farmer, who laments their failure to embrace reconciliation as a factor that has caused the land invasions. This portrayal absolves war veterans and farm occupiers of any wrongdoing as their actions are a culmination of the spurning of a peaceful gesture by white farmers.

Clearly there is no end to the apparent trading of accusations and counter accusations between the private press and the state-controlled press on the land reform crisis. The patently polemical framings are buttressed by a socio-economic and political environment that is fraught with seemingly unbridgeable polarities. The sustained Manichean and binaristic frames used across the media divide to capture

the land reform process cannot be explained by journalistic idiosyncrasies. Rather, it points to deep-seated institutional and political economy of the media factors such as ownership structures, foundational principles, source selection, political and ideological inclinations of the media house and the general operating environment. The polemical frames emerging from the representations of the land question by the private press and the state-controlled press presented in the table below further illuminate the divergent portrayals from across the media divide.

ISSUE	FRAMING BY PRIVATE PRESS	FRAMING BY STATE-CONTROLLED PRESS
Beneficiaries of the land reform programme	ZANU PF party functionaries and top members, top government officials and members of the uniformed forces.	Land hungry masses and peasants including war veterans and political figures from across the political divide.
Legality	Violent, lawless and a violation of property rights.	Legalised by the enactment of various constitutional amendments passed in Parliament. Violence limited and not widespread. An acceptable extra-judicial process to right a colonial wrong.
Resettled farmers and productivity issues	Resettled farmers grossly incompetent and unproductive. A massive blow to food supply. Indulge in poaching and looting property left by white farmers. Catastrophic environmental damage.	Have potential to be highly productive if given adequate support. Some already treating farming as a business. Productive capacity limited by resource constraints occasioned by sanctions.
International support	Absolutely no international and regional support. Widespread international condemnation by all progressive forces.	Sufficient regional support. Criticism from erstwhile imperial masters and their cronies sulking over the loss of land by their kith and kin. Criticism from local political apologists acting at the behest of their imperial handlers.
Farm mechanisation	A political gimmick to buy voters. Equipment looted by senior ZANU PF and Government officials. Equipment distributed along party lines.	Broad based and mass empowerment programme. Non-partisan and a boost to the land reform programme.

Clearly, the list of issues related to the land reform programme – characterised by centrifugal perspectives, lack of convergence and overwhelming diametrically opposed viewpoints – is quite long. The palpably antagonistic framings of the land crisis from across the media divide are all inherently persuasive but incomplete narratives imbued with a potentially illusive false and deceptive sense of completeness. It is quite clear that the press, as primary definers of reality, provide a platform on which the enactment and contestation of economic and political power is made manifest. As Herman and Chomsky (1988) point out, the media are embedded in the economics and politics of their operating environment in a manner that makes them dependent upon the political and economic establishments for their profitability and continued subsistence. From this perspective, it would be unthinkable for *The Zimbabwe Independent* and *The Standard* to write glowingly in support of the land reform programme and to project the farm occupiers as victims of a colonially – inherited, skewed land ownership structure and continue to enjoy the patronage of advertisers from industry and commerce, itself a white dominated economic preserve. Similarly, it would also be foolhardy to expect journalists employed by *The Sunday Mail* and *The Sunday News* to cast aspersions on the land reform programme and frame the whites, whose farms were being reclaimed for redistribution as victims of a violent and illegal process and still expect the editors to see their employment contracts through. Ownership and institutional affiliation constraints impose an unlegislated censorship regime on the press, thereby circumscribing the journalist's freedom in framing particular issues. This, to a greater extent, explains the irreconcilable representations of the land issue by the two media establishments explored in this study. Evidently, the dichotomised frames captured in the table above reinforce Butler's (2009) claim that frames are prone to reversal and subversion. The two antagonistic stables reverse and subvert each other's frames on the land question.

CONCLUSION

This study has analysed data from *The Sunday Mail*, *The Sunday News*, *The Zimbabwe Independent* and *The Standard* on the framing of the Zimbabwe land reform programme. It has analysed the framing of the land reform programme, farm occupiers, war veterans, international and regional support or lack of it, as well as violence and lawlessness, among other issues, by the above mentioned weeklies. An unmistakable pattern has emerged from this analysis, in which the state-controlled press has been shown to give an unreservedly positive representation of the land reform programme, although noting the attendant challenges associated with such a monumental and revisionist programme. On the other hand, the privately owned press categorically dismiss the land reform programme as chaotic, retrogressive, calamitous, partisan, lawless and violent. The antagonistic portrayals have been linked to the ownership, ideological, political and sourcing constraints that hamstring

journalists as they try to pander to institutional inclinations when framing the land reform programme. Clearly, the claim by the media to be the fourth estate is put to question as its practitioners in Zimbabwe are shown to be more like lapdogs at the service of the powerful political and pro-capital elites. Although the Propaganda Model has been found to apply extensively to Zimbabwe's media environment, it falls short in providing a satisfactory account of the polemical state of the local press. The press in Zimbabwe requires a canonical approach that unpacks its characteristic dissonance on key political and economic issues. While a homogeneous portrayal of the crisis would be far too much to expect from the local press, the Manichean mediation of the crisis betrays a worrying parochialism and stultification inimical to the dictates of investigative journalism and news-making practices.

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