Anger in International Relations

Jo-Ansie van Wyk
https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4950-7171
University of South Africa
vwykjak@unisa.ac.za

Abstract

Anger is a neglected area in the study of international relations. Set against the broader impact of emotions on international relations and the emotional turn in the human and social sciences, this exploratory article focuses on state and non-state anger (as an emotion) in the contemporary era, here defined as the Age of Anger. The unique attributes of this era and states displaying anger are presented. The article concludes with a description and consequences of the behaviour of angry states and the inherent political utility of and dangers associated with anger.

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Introduction

The relatively recent "emotional turn" in the human and social sciences (Heaney 2011, 259), in general, and international relations (IR) (Crawford 2013, 121) specifically, has highlighted the affect and role of emotions in international relations.[1] Whereas emotions, in general, are receiving more scholarly attention, specific emotions such as anger, humiliation and fear, as determinants and consequences of state behaviour, remain under-researched. Hence, this exploratory article posits that states are emotional entities, a notion that requires a reconsideration of international relations, state identity and state interests. The article highlights a particularly neglected state emotion, i.e., anger, that can be described as one of *the* prevailing and compelling emotions in contemporary international relations. In fact, some states demonstrate emotions that characterise them as *angry states*, a development that international relations scholars and diplomats alike "neglect at our own peril" (Crawford 2013, 121). The article posits that angry states are not a new phenomenon. Likewise, it posits that the notion of an Age of Anger is also not new. However, what is new and deserving of scholarly attention, are the new manifestations of this era and angry states. What is also new are the characteristics of this era and that of angry states. These characteristics have revealed unique state behaviour and conduct; here defined as rage-craft and the diplomacy of anger.

Therefore, the aim here is to explore the nature, role and impact of emotions (in general) and anger (in particular) in international relations, and state identity and conduct in an Age of Anger and the implications thereof. The article proceeds as follows. The next section defines and outlines the significance of emotions in and for international relations before positioning anger as a pervasive and useful emotion in state conduct and international relations. Thereafter I present an analysis of what this contribution, in following Mishra (2017), calls the Age of Anger. Here, this era is defined with illustrative examples, most notably the notion of angry states as one of the prevailing manifestations of the Age of Anger. I explore new and old narratives of anger, and in the penultimate section, the behaviour and conduct of angry states receive attention by focusing on rage-craft or the diplomacy of anger. The final section contains the conclusion of the contribution.

Emotions and International Relations

Studies on emotions have an impressive pedigree, ranging from Aristotle, Plato, Spinoza, Plutarch, Seneca, Darwin, and Freud (Spielberger and Reheiser 2010, 403). However, for a relatively young discipline that concerns itself with cooperation, peace, conflict, violence and war, international relations (IR) has neglected emotions as motivations for conflict, violence, war and cooperation. The initial neglect of emotions

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1   This research was conducted during 2017 for the author's professorial inauguration lecture on 24 May 2017 and thus precedes the outbreak of Covid-19 in 2019 and the World Health Organisation's declaration of a global pandemic in 2020.

in IR has been due to the assumption by, for example, Realists, Liberals and Neo-Marxists, that inter-state relations are pursued rationally and reflective of a state's national interests (Ariffin 2016a, 1); and not reflecting a state's emotions. This view has changed significantly (Crawford 2000; Bleiker and Hutchison 2008). The emotional turn in IR has already made significant contributions to the study of IR and state behaviour. First, attending to anger, for example, and its mechanisms can improve our explanatory and predictive faculties, analyses and policy advice to angry states, politicians, diplomats, negotiators and civil society. Studying state emotions can also assist in the analysis and resolution of enduring international status conflicts such as the India-Pakistan and United States (US)-Iran relations that defy materialistic explanations. Understanding the underlying state emotions that inspire and perpetuate the antagonistic collective identities of these states, can explain the endurance of anger between these states (Roach 2016, 401; Wolf 2013, 15) and potentially contribute to resolving the impasse between them. Since 2014, for example, the globally high-ranking French research university, the Paris Institute of Political Studies (SciencesPo), offers a course, Emotions and International Relations. The United Nations University followed, as well as several international academic conferences on emotions in international relations.

Emotions comprise at least three components, namely a feeling of displeasure related to a perception (a subjective component), an idea, or the judgement that a particular material or immaterial objective has not been met (an objective component), and thus requires action to achieve this objective (an action component) (Ariffen 2016b, 211; Crawford 2000, 125). Emotions are thus stimuli determining a state's worldview, norms, actions and orientations.

Moreover, emotions determine how a state reads, understands and behaves in the world. In fact, international politics have been described as a "clash of emotions" (Fattah and Fierke 2009, 67).

Jonathan Mercer (in Coicaud 2014, 500) further explains the importance of emotions:

> Emotion is necessary to rationality and intrinsic to choice. Emotion *precedes* choice (by ranking one's preferences), emotion *influences* choice (because it directs one's attention and is the source of action), and emotion *follows* choice (which determines how one feels about one's choice and influences one's preferences). [My emphasis.]

Apart from the explanatory power derived from studying state emotions, and as research on the aftermath of 9/11, the Rwanda Genocide, and the Holocaust has shown, emotions also expose a state's political memory and norms (Roach 2016, 405; Seidler 2013). Thus, the third contribution of the study of IR and state behaviour sheds light on "perceptions of judgement" (Roach 2016, 403), i.e., emotions reveal the values and norms of actors, thus revealing their identities and interests and enabling them to interpret and act in the world. By showing anger, for example, a state signals that a "normative, salient issue" it cares about has been violated (Hall 2015, 48).

The Pervasiveness and Utility of Emotions: Where Does Anger Fit in?

"All societies are full of emotions." This is the opening line of Martha Nussbaum's (2013, 1) book, *Political Emotions*. In fact, the etymology of the word "emotion" refers to a social moving, stirring, and agitation. Alternatively, in the modern lexicon, emotions always cause a stir and *vice versa*. This was evident in, for example, the international sympathetic reaction to the countries affected by the Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami in December 2004 and references to "angry Arabs" (*New York Times,* 14 May 2015).

Early scholars distinguished between *individual* (pride, love, fear, anger, etc.) and *political* emotions such as patriotism, political friendship and political love (Coicaud 2016, 24; Nussbaum 2013, 14). These political emotions become important when diplomats negotiate on behalf of their states. Paying attention to both substantive issues and emotional cues can enable diplomats to achieve their state's foreign policy objectives and advance their interests. These emotional cues, according to Wong (2016, 144), include the choice of words, tone of speech and hand and body gestures conducting emotive information on how a situation is appraised.

The current appeal of emotions for IR scholars and international relations can be explained by at least three main factors, namely the earlier neglect of emotions in the study of international relations, the pervasiveness of emotions, and the political usefulness of emotions. However, despite this appeal and as indicated earlier, the study of emotions, and particularly anger, has remained neglected in IR.

The utility of emotions lies in its diagnostic function and dispels cognitive dissonance. As an example of this, Ariffen (2016b, 214) suggests that the US may have questioned its earlier support of Iraq when it later (*ca.* 2003) accused the country (Iraq) of possessing weapons of mass destruction.

A second expression of the utility of emotions is its prognostic function, and can improve a state's status and confidence to follow a certain course of action. Emotions thus have performary and mobilising utility that empowers, facilitates, complicates and inhibits a state's relations with other states. States display and employ emotions consciously and for strategic purposes, and thus regard emotions as a rational choice (the so-called "rationality of irrationality") (Mercer 2006, 293). This, in turn, can stabilise, disrupt, restore or transform international relations (Ariffin 2016b, 214, 218).

The utility of emotions also lies in its sustainability of a state's norms and norm compliance. More than mere intellectual and principled commitment, norms and norm compliance are also emotional commitments (Ross 2016, 317). Jonathan Mercer (2006, 298) explains:

Emotion sustains norms and, of course, norm violations elicit emotional reactions. Whoever knowingly violates a norm should feel embarrassment, guilt or shame, while the observers should feel anger or indignation.

The political utility of emotions is also to sustain and increase a state's power through "the discursive use of group-specific verbal expressions, symbols and analogies" (Koschut 2017, 11). Therefore, emotional knowledge, according to Simon Koschut (2017, 9):

Is part of the asymmetries of power and social identity in international politics strengthens cohesion of a group *vis-a-vis* outsiders.

This has been evident in, for example, the George W. Bush administration's social construction of the Coalition of the Willing, the Axis of Evil, and references to a "New Europe" in 2003; Thabo Mbeki's articulation of an African Renaissance in 1997; and the United Nation's adoption of the principle Responsibility to Protect (R2P) in 2005.

Emotions such as anger and hate are one explanatory variable in understanding and predicting state behaviour, inter-state relations and international relations. Anger is a strong feeling of annoyance, displeasure or hostility. It is also a "reactive emotion, a response to a wrongful violation or insult by a blameworthy party" (Hall 2015, 47), or a "strong feeling of distress or displeasure in response to a specific provocation" (Frijda in Eznack 2013, 557). Moreover, actual or perceived insult, injustice, humiliation, betrayal, inequity, unfairness, the "incompetent actions of another", and being the "target" of verbal or physical aggression, elicit anger (Eznack 2013, 557).

Some scholars refer to anger as the foundation of hostility and, in its escalated form, aggression (Spielberger and Reheiser 2010, 406). International aggression is often regarded as the product of anger (Long and Brecke 2003, 27–28) that has been considered to be the most "prominent and pervasive" emotion in war and conflict (Van Kleef 2010, 545). Hence, the description of war as "organised anger" (Thurman 2006, 12).

Expressions of resurgent populist anger on both sides of the left-right political spectrum have been ascribed to economic inequalities and the cultural backlash thesis; the latter being a reaction against "progressive cultural change" (Inglehart and Norris 2016, 2–3). To this, nationalistic rhetoric ("America First"; "Make America Great Again"; [Brexit] "Leave" campaign); stereotyping ("Angry Arabs"; "Ugly Americans"; "Axis of Evil"), distrust in political leaders, corrupt elites, large-scale immigration, and political alienation could be added.

Anger effects the social perceptions of states (Van Kleef 2010, 547). For illustrative purposes, the situation on the Korean Peninsula is presented. Since the end of the Korean War in the 1950s, North and South Korea have followed divergent political trajectories. Whereas North Korea, the masterclass in totalitarianism, has closed itself off from

international society, South Korea has developed into one of the shining examples of Asian development. North Korea became increasingly isolated, whereas South Korea became a truly globalised state. North Korea's isolation escalated due to its deviancy, a situation that strengthened the state to become more paranoid and fearful—thus more emotionally driven—of the international community. These emotions *preceded* its choice to, for example, withdraw from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in January 2003. For North Korea, withdrawing from the NPT meant that it could escalate its nuclear weapons ambitions to improve its sense of security and develop these weapons without international interference and oversight. Emotions, therefore, also *influenced* the choice to escalate the development of nuclear weapons. Finally, once North Korea had taken these decisions, it seemed more self-confident. This has been clear in the increased sophistication of its weapons tests and its increased displays of confidence (military parades, angry diplomats, and tit-for-tats with, for example, the tenure of US President Trump [2017–2021]). Thus, emotions (self-confidence and pride) *followed* North Korea's choices.

The Age of Anger: Manifestation and Character

The Age of Anger (and its synonyms irate, furious, rage, rancorous, infuriated, perturbed, mad, indignant, exasperated, enraged, and caustic) is closely associated with the events of 11/9 (the collapse of the Berlin Wall on 9 November 1989 ushering in the end of the Cold War) and 9/11 (Al-Qeada's attack on the US capital and New York on 11 September 2001). Here, the *Age* of Anger refers to the post-Cold War era, an era which Arjun Appadurai (2006, 10, 1) describes as one characterised by a "surplus of rage" and "superviolence." However, surely, political aspirations and, more pertinent to this article, anger are not recent phenomena. In fact, in *Ancient Anger*, Susanna Braund and Glen Most (2003) remind us that this present Age of Anger is not new, as history is both the cradle *and* graveyard of anger.

In *The Age of Anger, A History of the Present*, Pankaj Mishra (2017) sketches a post-Cold War world full of rage, which, he predicts, has not seen its high-water mark, and which will end with dire apocalyptic consequences. Mishra (2017) prefaces his focus on contemporary anger with references to historical examples, and attributes contemporary anger as flowing from history and to contemporary *ressentiment* (a French word with no English equivalent), meaning projecting resentment onto an external enemy. For Mishra (2017), contemporary anger manifests in, amongst other examples, the "selfie-narcissism of Islamic State"; its rape of girls and the destruction of Palmyra, a World Heritage Site; and the rise of right-wing nationalism in Europe and the US. *The Economist* (6 August 2016), amongst others, has warned of the existential *Angst* of the Arab youth:

> The evidence from around the world is that lots of young men are a recipe for instability. And Arab rulers, in fearing the youth and failing to help them, are creating conditions for the next explosion.

Progress and enlightenment, Mishra (2017) tells us, have failed us despite "turbo-capitalism"; the global export of democracy in all its shades, hyper-globalisation, and major technological advances. Too many are still left behind in a world that increasingly alienates them, resulting in *ressentiment* and anger. Despite some of the flaws in Mishra's thesis, he has successfully reminded us of the emotional state (i.e., anger) of contemporary international society and its members, i.e., states, their leaders and populations. Hence, this article proposes additional and unprecedented characteristics of the Age of Anger.

New and Old Narratives of Anger

In *A brief History of Anger,* Michael Potegal and Raymond Novaco (2010, 9) indicate the "powerful role that anger has played in human affairs since the beginning of recorded history." They present examples of the anger of the ancient pantheons of gods and that of the biblical God. We read of divine anger such as the wrath of the biblical God and the anger of Roman, Greek and other gods. In both Greek and Roman mythology, the deities for anger were feminine, respectively Furor or Ira (the etymology of the word irate) and Lyssa.

Whereas anger remained the prerogative of deities showing their strength and power, human anger has been considered a taboo, a sign of madness and weakness, and a psychological affliction. More than 2 500 years ago, Plato defined anger as a negative emotion that should be tempered with reason (Spielberger and Reheiser 2010, 403). The founder of International Law, Hugo de Groot (Grotius), in 1625, referred to anger as a "destructive force" (Linklater 2014, 575), and Spinoza referred to the inability to control emotions as a form of "bondage" (Heaney 2011, 260). However, in contrast to the anger taboo, Potegal and Novaco (2010, 14) explain the socially and state-sanctioned anger of ordinary humans, i.e., "Berserkers," Viking warriors, and men running "amok" ("murderous frenzy and rage") who, in their seemingly uncontrolled anger, won conflicts and wars for the Norse and the Malay (Potegal and Novaco 2010, 14).

Our modern lexicon and culture remain littered with references to emotions and, specifically, ancient anger. Not only one of the seven deadly sins (along with pride, envy, avarice, sloth, gluttony and lust), anger (along with denial, isolation, bargaining, depression and acceptance) is also one of the five stages of grief and death (Kübler-Ross 2014, 49). Etymologically, the word anger derives from Old Norse and Middle English, *angr* and *angr vex*, meaning grief and sorrow. In Japanese, for example, the word *ikari*, depending on the *kanji* (or logographic character) used, can mean either anger or anchor. The Mandarin word for anger—*shengqi*—means generating *qi,* which is gas, air, breath, spirit, life force, or life energy. Russians have two words for anger, namely *serditsia* and *zlitsia*, referring respectively to anger against an individual and anger against a political situation (Mair 2016).

Afrikaans, a language less than a century old, has adopted both the words "*berserk*" and "*amok*" (*woede, vernietiging*). References to anger are evident in Afrikaans that define

"*kwaai*" (angry), *inter alia*, as cool, great, tasty or acceptable/in order, and David Kramer, in his song *Johnny Raakvat,* refers to Johnny's "*kwaai kitaar*" (noisy, but great, music). The All Blacks continue to perform the traditional Maori *haka* (traditionally an ancestral war dance expressing anger and strength) before rugby games; and Wednesday, for example, derives from old English (Wōdnesdæg), the day of Wodin/Odin, the Norse god of war and death.

The Commercialisation of Anger

Cultural and institutionalised organised anger is evident in the commercialisation of anger. In fact, *angertainment* seems to be very popular. *Angry Birds*, for example, is a popular computer game and later a series of films of Finnish origin. Eight film sequences of *Fast and Furious* have been released, and that with an accompanying colouring book for kids *and* adults (Wilson 2017)! Disney cartoons aimed at child audiences are full of anger and violence. Moreover, social media is "all the rage."

The Industrialisation of Anger

Earlier, war was described as organised anger. War is also industrialised anger. In 2015, sales of arms and military services by the top 100 companies in that sector amounted to US$370.7 billion (SIPRI 2016). Ironically, anger management is a growing global industry. In the US, for example, this industry is worth US$16.5 million (2016).

The Narcissistic Display of Anger

The term "narcissistic rage" refers to the link between shame and humiliation, and aggressiveness and vengeance, and involves a spectrum of degrees of rage, which eventually culminates in "chronic narcissistic rage" (Harkavy 2000, 356). Public hangings, online videos and live streaming of murders and road killings have been reported. Moreover, the release of classified documents such as the Panama Papers and the release of documents via WikiLeaks are additional examples where anger has been personified as the anger and narcissism of individuals and groups, such as Julian Assange, Anonymous, and others.

Anonymous Anger

The prevalence of so-called anonymous Troll Armies on internet generating fake news, fake support and anger for and against states and other political actors is indicative of the increasing anonymity of anger. Examples of this include Israel's "*hasbara*" (explanation); the Ukraine's i-army.org; the Twitter Troops of the 77th Brigade in the UK; South Korea's KakaoTalk directed against North Korea; and Turkey's AK Trolls (*The Guardian*, 6 November 2016).

Sacred Anger

The events of 9/11 are widely regarded as a global turning point in respect of religion. Since September 2016, The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria's (ISIS) [later renamed

Islamic State, IS] online magazine *Rumiyah* (Arabic for Rome) has replaced previous online publications such as *Dabiq* and *Dar al-Islam*. Published online in English, Arabic, German, Turkish, French, Indonesian and Uyghur, *Rumiyah's* reference to Rome is from a *hadith* containing Mohammed's prophecy that Muslims will conquer Rome. The publication promotes ISIS and is intended to inspire its followers with statements such as "The Kafir's [unbelievers'] blood is halal to you, so shed it" (Ingram 2016).

Private Political Self-sacrifice

Whereas the *kamikaze* of the Second World War or soldiers in war represents state-endorsed political self-sacrifice, contemporary suicide bombing, suicide terrorism, hunger strikes by "enemy combatants" and self-immolation are illustrative of recent expressions of anger (Fierke 2013). Moreover, this self-sacrifice expresses anger and suffering (martyrdom) on behalf of others.

Public Normalisation and the Mobilisation Effect of Anger

Anger also features in public relations and military campaigns. During the Second World War, for example, the British government launched its Anger Campaign, an internal propaganda campaign including slogans, posters, cartoons, and lampooning the enemy (Germany and its Axis allies) to motivate and inspire British citizens for the war effort (*BBC* 24 October 2016). In the wake of 9/11, US President George W Bush (2001) articulated and communicated his country's emotions:

> Our grief has turned to anger, and anger to resolution. Whether we bring our enemies to justice, or bring justice to our enemies, justice will be done.

In November 2016, for example, a US-supported offensive involving 30 000 soldiers to remove ISIS from Raqqa in Syria was called Operation Angry Euphrates (*NBC News* 7 November 2016). These examples notwithstanding, states and their representatives also often strip words from their emotional connotation. In fact, some states have introduced terms such as ethnic cleansing rather than genocide, and collateral damage rather than the killing of innocent civilians, resulting in a completely different emotional impact (Koschut 2017, 7).

Unresolved Accumulated Inter-generational Humiliation and Anger (Harkavy 2000, 357).

This is evident in, for example, the Middle East (Fattah and Fierke 2009, 67–93). In his poem *ID Card,* Palestinian poet, Mahmoud Darwish, reminds us of the connection between unresolved anger and unfulfilled expectations:

> Beware, beware of my starving
> And my rage (*Haaretz* 21 July 2016).

Rage-craft, or the Diplomacy of Anger

This aspect is one of the foci of the next section.

Angry States: Definition and Behaviour

Anger informs state behaviour in at least three ways (Sasley 2011). First, to follow conventional IR and approach the state as a single indivisible actor, a person, or as Alexander Wendt (2004) observed, "States are people too." Hence, we refer to Pyongyang, Washington, Harare or China, Iran or Russia. A second approach is to follow the behaviour and emotions of individual state leaders as representatives and decision-makers of a state. Individual state leaders' character and emotions thus guide state behaviour. Take the tenure of US President Donald Trump. By the middle of his term in office, Trump's personality and character had significantly influenced international public perceptions about the US and resulted in an increased anti-American sentiment in the world.

A third approach to discuss anger as informing state behaviour is to regard the state as a group and, in following Sasley (2011, 454), follow the internal process by which group members' (state decision-makers') cognitive and emotional practices represent, comprise and reflect that of the group (state) and so determine state behaviour.

Who, then, are contemporary angry states? One of the characteristics of anger is that it is always relational (Fattah and Fierke 2009, 70)—even intimate. Hence, an angry state is always in an emotional relationship with the target state(s). A review of international relations since 11/9 and 9/11 reveals two international geographies of anger. The first geography of anger is evident in Africa and some parts of Latin America, where anger is directed internally in states (i.e., internally angry states). The second geography of anger reveals that some states have externally directed anger, i.e., anger against another state or other states; hence, externally angry states (hereafter angry states). States that seem to fall within this category include, for example, India and Pakistan; the US and North Korea; Arab states of the Middle East and Israel; China and Japan; Russia and its former Soviet Republics, Libya, and the US and Cuba. Based upon the literature on these states, this article proposes an analytical framework to study angry states as illustrative examples of the importance of emotions for the study of IR, the conduct of international relations and the practice of diplomacy.

The conduct or behaviour of states remains a central focus area for IR scholars. "Good" behaviour by "good" states often accounts for a peaceful and stable international system, whereas the "bad" behaviour of "bad" states accounts for instability and conflict. "Good" states comply with internationally settled norms, and "bad" states do not. Yet both types of states draw scholarly attention and accrue some material or immaterial benefits from their behaviour.

The defining feature of angry states is obviously their anger and variations on their anger. The presence of other emotions of these states is acknowledged, but discussed here only where particularly relevant to anger. Angry states are typically not multilateralists, preferring unilateralism and selective multilateralism. They can engage collectively with a disparate identity and are not internationally recognised as angry. These states do not seek recognition like contested states or are necessarily under-developed or collapsed/failed states. They are *de jure* and *de facto* states and are internationally active to varying degrees. Finally, angry states constitute a distinct—and under-researched—class of states in international relations.

So, what are the *sui generis* attributes of angry states? This article proposes the following set of attributes.

Recognising Emotions

The so-called "Spy Plane Incident" illustrates this. On 1 April 2001, a US ER-3 surveillance plane and a Chinese F-8 fighter jet collided over the South China Sea. Whereas the US plane managed to make an unauthorised emergency landing in China, the Chinese plane crashed into the sea with the pilot presumed dead. China detained the US crew for 11 days; a period of escalating anger between these states only subsided once the US had apologised for being in China's air space, and this apology led to the release of the American crew (Shepperd 2013, 115–144).

A second example of recognising emotions include the US and Cuba's relations. Since the Cuban Revolution of 1959 that brought Fidel Castro to power, the US and Cuba have maintained an anger posture towards each other. Castro's strong anti-American rhetoric, the US's humiliation (nationalisation of US assets, the Bay of Pigs debacle, and the Cuban Missile Crisis) has maintained decades' mutual anger (Leogrande 2017, 104–127), which only, somewhat, softened during the final days of Barack Obama's presidential tenure.

According to Gallup's *2015 Global Emotions Report*, which measured feelings and emotions in 148 states, respondents from Iraq and Iran seemed the angriest in the world. Respondents from Cambodia, Liberia, South Sudan, Uganda, Cyprus, Greece, Togo, Bolivia, and the Palestinian Territories also reported high levels of anger (Gallup 2015, 7–8). In *Anti-Americanisms in World Politics*, Peter Katzenstein and Robert Keohane (2007, 9–29) link anti-Americanism to, amongst other elements, anger towards the US's foreign policy that manifests in anti-American rhetoric, violence and mobilised radical anti-Americanism.

Emotional displays by states (individually or collectively) are also not new. Recent examples of confession and guilt (Germany for the Holocaust), remorse and apology, for example, include Russia's 2010 apology to Poland for the Katyn massacre (Horelt 2014). In 2015, for example, Amr Mousa, the former Secretary General of the Arab

League, referred to the "Arab world's humiliation by three non-Arab states—Iran, Israel and Turkey" (*New York Times,* 14 May 2015).

In some instances, states such as Cuba, the former Soviet Union, and Libya have expressed their anger towards the West as a collective and not necessarily always against one particular state. Angry states understand emotions and are skilful in constructing and displaying anger. What makes states angry? Perceived humiliation, changes in social and moral status and prestige, unresolved historical grievances, and the hegemonic behaviour of other states. Emotions such as humiliation and betrayal contribute to the production of anger, violence and war (Fattah and Fierke 2009, 87).

Unique State Identity and Status

A state's identities and interests rest on two pillars, namely its political purpose and its international status. Political purpose includes beliefs about the appropriate political and economic governance of the state. In other words, it includes ideas about "what values, principles, traits, and symbols characterise the country and what values and principles should govern relations between countries. It also involves ideas about what the country's national mission is" (Clunan 2009, 29–30).

International status refers to the rank and positioning of a state in an "imagined international hierarchy" of political, military, social, and economic power, which involves evaluations of the material power possessed by a state itself and all other parties (Clunan 2009, 29–30). The value of a state's political purpose is that it informs the state about the in-groups to which it should belong. These in-groups are defined by material attributes such as power, wealth, political and economic governance, culture and tradition. A state's political purpose, therefore, also indicates whether it is a status-seeker or a status-maintainer (Clunan 2009, 32).

States employ four identity management strategies, namely mobility, competition, creativity (Clunan 2009, 34–35), and, my contribution, emotions. Mobility (leaving one group to join another group) includes assimilation. In the latter case, one group dissolves into another and takes on the identity of the second group to acquire membership of a more satisfactory group. Competition involves social action to change prevailing conditions or a situation and social competition over status and prestige. Creativity aims to redefine or change the attractiveness of existing attributes of an actor. Emotions, as an identity management strategy, and thus emotions' political utility, are discussed below.

The Utility of Anger

For constructivists, anger between states is socially constructed due to the contestation on the meaning or understanding and resolution of an event. Some scholars converge on the idea that "emotions are social because culture influences their experience and

expression" and that who and what states are and do, depend on their emotions (Linklater 2014, 574).

For states, anger is very useful. Controlled rage is useful to the development of social relations in a society, whereas uncontrolled rage (and thus a negative connotation) damages civil relations and societal stability (Wymer and Labbie 2004). It is simultaneously the emotion's paradox (Hall 2015, 46). Anger can threaten relations between states and regional and international stability, *and* protect what a state values. It, therefore, shapes states' incentives and risks in states acting on anger. Moreover, anger can be a sign of state strength and underlie a state's resolve to protect its national interests and deter another state from acting against it (Hall 2015, 47).

Besides its stabilising, protective and motivational utility, anger also has a social function, which entails seeking redress from the target state. Redress, according to Hall (2015, 48), can include retribution, compensation, an apology, or a revalidation of the norms that were perceived to have been contravened.

Anger is "other-directed, intentional communicative acts that organise social interactions" (Wong 2016, 150). In these interactions, a state's anger communicates its intentions and provide insights into its possible future behaviour. According to Wong (2016, 152):

> Emotions provide negotiators with information not only about what is and is not acceptable, but also about each other's "type." An angry counterpart is perceived as tougher than one who is emotionless, and is more likely to extract concessions in subsequent rounds of bargaining.

Another utility of anger is that a state can frame, or construct, an issue as "emotional" or "explosive" (Hall 2015, 52). The US's rallying, or construction, of its own anger as well as its ability to rally collective displays of anger with its Coalition of the Willing in the wake of 9/11 is an example of this. The US has been very successful in constructing and reinforcing the War on Terror beyond a mere US interest to a global War on Terror since 9/11.

Angry States often have Angry Leaders, and vice versa

Another characteristic of this Age of Anger is the anger of state and political leaders, rather than diplomats expressing their states' emotions. In fact, diplomacy does not seem to be the only anger management strategy available to states. Leaders' anger is increasingly reported and tweeted. Whereas Barack Obama was the social media presidential campaigner, Donald Trump took to Twitter to get to the White House. A serial tweeter, Trump has repeatedly displayed his anger against opponents, including the media, Democrats, Russians, and North Korea (*The Journal* 29 April 2017).

Rage-craft or the Diplomacy of Anger

How do we know that a state is angry? Often, its anger is expressed in a "discourse of accusation and blame" (Hall 2015, 47), as well as a discourse humiliating or shaming another state. Furthermore, anger is expressed through, amongst others, strong-worded statements, the recalling of diplomats, embargoes, sanctions, and terminating diplomatic ties. Anger does not constitute coercion. Although anger and coercion both put demands on the target state and have the potential to escalate to the use of force, anger and coercion differ in several aspects. Anger is often expressed through a particular discourse and rhetoric (see sequence earlier or below), whereas coercion does not necessarily follow the same sequence and logic. The logic of coercion entails making a demand, waiting for a response, and with failure to meet the demand resulting in the threatened action, a different trajectory to anger that often ebbs and flows with strong statements, subsides and escalates again (Hall 2015, 51–52).

A state, therefore, strategically calculates the dangers and risks associated with its anger, making the display of this emotion a calculated rational decision. Hence, Hall (2015, 49) describes the diplomacy of anger as a "deliberative, state-level effort to actively project an emotional image." Here, state-level emotions can include the emotions of individual decision-makers.

Typically, anger's trajectory begins when a state perceives an action to be wrong (Hall 2015, 47). Once states have chosen to display anger on the international stage, a sequence of three behavioural indicators, or the practice of diplomacy of anger, follow (Hall 2015, 49). The first indicator is *discursive*. Typically, a state issues one or more strong-worded, emotionally-laden statements referring to its outrage. Though strong-worded, these statements are, at best, formulated within the confines of diplomatic convention but can also be un-diplomatic, derogatory, and provocative. More importantly, the discourse of anger that follows frames the trigger as a wrongful act or event that requires material or immaterial restoration, such as an apology or material compensation (Hall 2015, 49).

The second indicator in this sequence is *expressive*. At this stage, an individual such as the president, an ambassador, diplomat or official enters the stage and conveys official anger to the target state and/or international community. For this, several techniques of so-called emotional labour are available and require an individual to project official anger by being angry him- or herself through "surface" or "deep" acting or authentic anger (Hall 2015, 22, 49).

Finally, the third behavioural indicator in this sequence of the diplomacy of anger is *substantive gestures*. A state may opt to express its anger through strong-worded statements and condemnation. However, real anger and rage are displayed by substantive gestures ranging from punitive actions (sanctions, recalling diplomats, terminating diplomatic relations) to major shows of force (military parades and military exercises), or even conflict and war (Hall 2015, 50).

The Institutionalisation and Routinisation of Anger

Emotions are often institutionalised, incorporated, and eventually deeply embedded in the processes and structures of national and world politics, constituting the routinisation of anger. The institutionalisation and routinisation of emotions are perhaps the key threads that tie the agential aspects of emotions to the structures and processes of world politics. It is perhaps easiest to see the institutionalisation of emotion when new emotions have been dramatically evoked and policies pivot in response. Consider the effects of fear and anger after the 9/11 attacks (Crawford 2013, 121–123). The US's fear and anger have been institutionalised in, for example, the Patriot Act, the establishment of the Department of Homeland Security and its invasions in Afghanistan in September 2001, and the invasion it led into Iraq in March 2003. In Europe, the fear of an out-of-control Germany and Soviet Union, and its successor Russia, resulted in the eventual establishment of the European Union.

The Significance and Dangers of Anger

The significance of an emotion such as anger for IR is that it reveals what is important to a state. Apart from this *revelatory* characteristic of anger, it also has a *communicative* characteristic by communicating what a state regards as important. It is never about anger only. Anger is always also about other emotions such as humiliation, indignation, and fear (Hassner 2016, 352). A third characteristic of anger is that it has a *moral* component. In communicating its anger to another state, a state reveals that another state is behaving in contrast to its norms and interests, but it is also indicating how the receiving state should (just, fair or correct) have behaved (Hall 2015, 47).

Views on anger range from humans' predisposition to anger and thus make anger unavoidable and uncontrollable, to the view that anger can, and should, be controlled (Thurman 2006, 4–6). This, notwithstanding, we are not free from what Spinoza called the "bondage" of anger. Anger rages in French *banlieues* (outer inner cities), *Londonistan*, among Germany's "*Ausländer* jihadis" (Leiken 2012), in *madrasahs*, Wall Street, the White House, Luthuli House, Pretoria, and elsewhere.

Apart from dangers and risks, anger can have a moderating effect on a state's behaviour (Garry 2014, 241). However, anger and displaying anger carries significant dangers and risks for a state. Among these, anger can justify state behaviour. Subsequent to 9/11, a very angry US created a new geo-politics of anger with references to an Axis of Evil (North Korea, Iraq and Iran), an "arch of instability", a Coalition of the Willing, and a War on Terror. Apart from this, the US's emotional state in the wake of these events has resulted in emotions of anger and fear, resulting in legal exceptions such as renditions, detaining "enemy combatants" in Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay, and the reinforcement of "American exceptionalism" (Ross 2016, 315–316). In other words, the US has emotionally legitimised its exceptionalism. In fact, Ross (2016, 317) referred to this as "affective exceptionalism."

Anger can also undermine trust between and confidence in states and cloud their rationality (Leogrande 2017, 105). Further to this, anger can lead (or motivate) a state to behave in a manner it would otherwise not have done (Hall 2015, 47). This can escalate, should the target state remain defiant and continue to provoke, resulting in "destructive aggression" (Hall 2015, 48). It can also signal a state's weakness and result in it being the target of reversed anger, if abandoned prematurely (Hall 2015, 48).

Conclusions

The article posits that we live in an emotional world where anger and angry states (as an example of emotional states) are not new phenomena, but that their current manifestation and character largely differ from earlier so-called "ages of anger" and "angry states." Therefore, the aim here has been to explore the nature, role and impact of emotions (in general) and anger (in particular) in international relations, and state identity and conduct in an age of anger, and the implications thereof.

This contribution has aimed to expand the understanding of the notion of a contemporary era of anger. It has identified several unique features of this era, i.e., the commercialisation and the industrialisation of anger, the narcissistic display of anger, anonymous and sacred anger, private political self-sacrifice, the public normalisation and the mobilisation effect of anger, unresolved accumulated inter-generational humiliation and anger, and rage-craft, or the diplomacy of anger as expressions of the unique behaviour of angry states. The article has defined unique attributes and behaviour of angry states as unique states in terms of their identities and leadership, but also as states recognising the political utility of emotions in the international context, thereby institutionalising and routinising anger, rage-craft and the diplomacy of anger.

Finally, the article has attempted to explore emotions, specifically anger, and its appeal to ordinary citizens, states and scholars. I have provided examples of additional manifestations of, and explanations for, the current Age of Anger, states' construction of useful anger, and the behaviour of angry states. We cannot ignore these emotions. We live in this world. Therefore, I call for more conversations and research on the topic. As Andrew Linklater (2014, 577) reminds us:

> We have not seen the end of anger in politics or, indeed, of the politics of anger.

As the post-Covid-19 world unfolds, the manifestation and character of anger and angry states may remain unchanged or static. It is too soon to tell.

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