Article

Violence Begets Violence: Anticolonial Mobilisation of Ressentiment in 19th Century Borneo

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Abstract

The sudden and violent uprising marking the start of the "Banjarmasin War" in south-central Borneo in 1859 caught the German Rhenish Mission Society (RMS) by surprise. A well-coordinated attack by indigenous Dayaks and prominent Muslim figures led to the brutal massacre of nine people associated with the RMS. In a matter of days, the mission work of 23 years was destroyed. In all, violence was directed at Dutch colonial forces, German missionaries, and Christian Dayaks alike. The coastal city of Banjarmasin, seat of Dutch imperialism, became the last refuge for survivors. Some blamed the RMS for the uprising, arguing that the conversion zeal of the missionaries had provoked an anti-Christian jihad. The RMS retorted that Muslims, conspiring to overthrow the Dutch, had incited indigenous Dayaks to what amounted to an anti-imperialist uprising. Recently, scholars have argued that the interference of Dutch imperialism in local politics was to blame for the uprising, and that the Dayaks were unable to distinguish between Dutch and German foreigners. This paper examines the contribution of Dutch colonial policy to the uprising, particularly its restriction of Islamic religious practices, as well as forms of cooperation between the Dutch and the RMS. Primary sources provide evidence of prolonged and severe RMS brutality against Dayaks in the decade before the war. This leads to the conclusion that the initial violence of the Banjarmasin War directed at RMS persons was no coincidence. Sufficient warrant exists to argue that this was not a matter of mistaken identity, but of reasoned calculation.

Keywords: Banjarmasin War; Borneo; Rhenish Mission Society (RMS); Rheinische Missionsgesellschaft; Dayaks; Sultanate of Banjarmasin

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Preamble

The Rhenish Mission Society (RMS) will be familiar to most of us because of its prominent place in mission and church history in South Africa. The Western Cape was the RMS's first area of operations, where it ministered among the coloured population to recently emancipated slaves. RMS stations such as Stellenbosch, Tulbagh, and Worcester are well-known, as are prominent RMS missionaries like J.G. Leipoldt, whose grandson C. Louis Leipoldt became a famous Afrikaans poet. Less well known is the fact that the RMS was also active in modern-day Indonesia, and that the area of Banjarmasin in southern Borneo was its second area of operations. There was much interaction between the RMS in South Africa and Borneo, and there were many parallels since Banjarmasin also fell under both the British and Dutch empires successively. However, work in Banjarmasin was severely disrupted in 1859 when the Banjarmasin War began—a revolt against Dutch rule during which several RMS personnel were massacred. This presentation intends to inquire into collaboration between the Dutch Empire and the RMS in Banjarmasin and their joint handling of Muslim-Christian conflict, as well as violence on the part of RMS missionaries as contributing to the Banjarmasin War.

Introduction

The RMS began actively pursuing mission in the Sultanate of Banjarmasin in southern Borneo in 1836. They struggled to make progress among the Dayak people in Banjarmasin, a predominantly Muslim country. Even so, 23 years later, the RMS still doggedly hoped for a breakthrough. Instead of a breakthrough, what came was a sudden uprising. One former missionary, then serving as a mine operator, was sitting at breakfast with his family when intruders burst in, seized him, dragged him outside, and killed him together with the child he was holding. The same fate awaited many European mineworkers. The adopted son of another RMS missionary, also a mine-worker, initially managed to flee but was eventually caught. His captors offered him freedom if he converted to Islam. When he refused, he was stabbed to death.

News of the uprising arrived in time for some of the RMS missionary families to flee their stations and seek refuge as attacks spread. Not all were this fortunate. At one station, missionaries Wigand and Kind happened to be visiting missionary Rott with their families. Stepping out of his bedroom, Rott was speared in the chest. The others tried to flee but were forced to take a stand in front of a nearby river. Wounded, they were forced into the water. Only Mrs Rott was later dragged out of the water by sympathetic Dayaks, unconscious, but alive, and reunited with her children. The others perished. Two days later, warriors surprised missionary Hofmeister in front of his house. Though wounded, he ran to his wife in the house, and then they stepped out and faced the large crowd of attackers. He prayed for them in the Dayak language, but they decapitated first him and then his wife.

The mission work of 23 years was destroyed in a matter of days. Four RMS missionaries and many family members were dead; all the stations among the Dayaks were plundered and destroyed. Other Europeans suffered similar fates. The city of Banjarmasin became the last refuge for the survivors. All who survived, Europeans as well as some Christian Dayaks, sought refuge in Banjarmasin under the protection of Dutch forces. Many Europeans were eventually evacuated. Now the Banjarmasin War began in earnest. All mission work was suspended for the duration of the war. It would take six years before the RMS finally resumed mission work ("Gemeinsamer Bericht..." 1859, 347–351; Menzel 1978, 59–62; "Neueste Nachrichten..." 1859, 303–325; "Schwere Trauer..." 1859, 195–234; "Umschau" 1859, 379–391; "Weitere Nachrichten..." 1859, 247–272; Von Rohden 1871, 302–316).

What caused the insurrection? Some accused the RMS of aggravating Muslims with their conversion zeal and of provoking their *jihad* against the Christian missionaries. The RMS retorted that its missionaries were not in direct conflict with the Muslims and that the missionaries had not worked among Muslims, but among pagans who were swept up in the uprising by the hate of Muslims toward Dutch rule (Von Rohden 1871, 108).

The question arises: Was the RMS simply in the wrong place at the wrong time, or was there more to the story? A more nuanced exploration of the conflict between Islam and the Christian faith in nineteenth-century Borneo is necessary, including the interplay of RMS missionaries with Dutch rule and policy. This paper will argue that the RMS contributed directly to its own demise.

The Sultanate of Banjarmasin and the Expansion of Dutch Power

In the course of the seventeenth century, the Dutch gradually replaced Portugal as the dominant colonial power in the Indonesian region. Apart from a brief intermezzo of British rule (1811–1816), Dutch power held sway over what came to be known as "the Netherlands East Indies" until 1942. However, the Dutch struggled to establish colonial rule, especially in areas dominated by Islam (Heuken 2008, 5; Van den End and Aritonang 2008, 137). One such area was Banjarmasin on the southern coast of Borneo, an independent Muslim territory ruled by a Sultan (*Brockhaus' Konversationslexikon* 1894–1896; Van Rees 1865, 2). After first establishing trade treaties with the Sultans of Banjarmasin and gradually expanding their influence, the Dutch took control in 1787. They did so by involving themselves in a succession quarrel of the Sultanate. They provided military support to the candidate of their choice, and when he became Sultan in 1817, he returned the favour by declaring himself a Dutch vassal and ceding a significant part of his territory to Dutch rule. In effect, the Dutch took over complete control. They installed a governor known as the "*resident*" in the capital city on the coast, also called Banjarmasin. Further inland, the Sultan maintained nominal rule over a smaller territory.

The main problem was that, according to traditional law, the new puppet Sultan was not legitimate (Van Rees 1865, 8). This introduced an element of major instability, since the new Sultan was not recognised and depended on the Dutch to prop up his power (*Brockhaus' Konversationslexikon* 1894–1896; *Meyers Konversationslexikon* 1885–1892). Furthermore, the Dutch contractually reserved the right to approve any future successors to the Sultanate. The Banjarmasin War of 1859 would eventually take place against the background of yet another succession quarrel (Van Rees 1865, 9).

At first, Dutch interest in Banjarmasin was geostrategic. The city of Banjarmasin was of strategic importance as a major port on the Java Sea, which had long served as a base for pirates and anti-Dutch forces (Ricklefs 1981, 130). Now the Dutch took over the port and, by extension, the coastline and the seas. At first, they showed little interest in the interior, but that gradually changed. In 1837, coal was discovered in the interior (Irwin 1955, 80), and now the Dutch took an interest in coal mines (Ricklefs 1981, 130–131). The city of Banjarmasin began to serve as "the channelling point for a range of commodities that entered the Borneo interior from the city, and in turn, Banjarmasin funnelled much natural produce from the forest to the outside world" (Beekman 2009, 153). It was thus a place of considerable economic and strategic interest.

As the Dutch began to focus on the interior, they also needed to subject the indigenous people living there. The population of Banjarmasin was racially divided into Malay people and native tribes collectively called "Dayaks" (Steenbrink 2008, 493). The name "Dayak" means "people of the interior" (Schärer 1946, 1). Most Malays lived in the city of Banjarmasin or in the Sultanate in the interior. The population was also divided according to religion, with the Malay people being overwhelmingly Muslim, whereas the Dayaks historically were followers of traditional animist religions and known as head-hunters and cannibals (Schliesinger 2017, 54–57). The European colonial forces and merchants added a small number of Christians to the mix. It is estimated that less than one per cent of the population of the entire Indonesian archipelago was Christian, while Muslims constituted about 85 per cent, with the animistic Dayaks making up most of the rest (Van den End and Aritonang 2008, 141).

The RMS Enters the Scene on the Side of the Dutch

The Dutch at first did not allow missionaries into Banjarmasin, but when the mines were discovered and they needed to govern the interior, they changed their policy. They now allowed missionaries in but insisted that they subject themselves to Dutch supervision and promise to maintain the obedience of indigenous people to Dutch rule (De Groot 1837, 80–81). The RMS was the first Christian mission to establish a station on Borneo's coast (Steenbrink 2008, 503), and the Dutch *resident* himself paved the way for the RMS to go into the interior (Böhmer 2016, 44). Bypassing the Muslim Malays, the RMS focused its efforts on the Dayaks in the interior Pulo Petak region. Up until then, the Muslim Sultans had generally treated the Dayaks as a source of cheap labour, rather than converting them. However, with Christian missionaries on the scene, the

Muslim Malays now also sent missionaries to the Dayaks. A race between Christianity and Islam for the conversion of the Dayaks ensued (Müller-Krüger 1968, 177), which the Muslims viewed as "holy war" (Azyumardi 2008, 19).

Since the Sultanate was Muslim and the Dutch were at least nominally Christian, this meant that the RMS was perceived to be on the side of the Dutch, even more so since they were also white foreigners. It is doubtful that the Dayaks distinguished been Germans and Dutch. The connection between the RMS and Dutch colonialism was strengthened when the *resident* promulgated two laws in 1842. The Dayak's peripatetic lifestyle made it difficult for the missionaries to reach them on an ongoing basis, so they petitioned the *resident* to enact a law forcing the Dayaks to settle around the missionaries to be exposed to the gospel. The second law he enacted prohibited the Dayaks from working on Sundays and compelled them to attend services instead. Soon the Dutch enacted another law making it mandatory for Dayak boys to attend missionary schools. These laws were obviously intended to make the mission work more effective, but they caused major disruptions in the Dayak way of life and met with resistance. Some missionaries responded by forcing Dayaks to obey, leading either to sullen compliance or to even greater resistance on the part of the Dayaks. Some Dayaks repeatedly laid charges with the *resident* against a missionary for the force used against them. The *resident* was willing to move the offending missionary but made it clear that breaking with the missionaries meant breaking with the Dutch authorities and that if they refused to accept the missionaries, he would make them reimburse the RMS for the loss of the station (Böhmer 2016, 52–65; Von Rohden 1871, 293–302). It is very probable that the Dayaks, therefore, identified the RMS with the Dutch Empire, since each acted in support of the other.

Meanwhile, the RMS adopted a peculiar evangelisation method among the Dayaks. Many Dayaks were in bondage due to debt. Due to social obligations, they often incurred debts with interest rates of up to 60 per cent per annum, resulting in a spiral of debt that few could escape. Those who could not pay remained in bondage and were known as "*pandelings*." They were contractually bound to provide labour until they had paid off their debts. One problem for the RMS was that these *pandelings* could not attend schools or services. Another was the humanitarian challenges arising from mistreatment of *pandelings* by their "owners." Some died from malnutrition; elderly *pandelings* who had outlived their usefulness were decapitated as sacrificial victims to remain servants to their owners in the afterlife. In response, the RMS decided to raise money in Germany to redeem such *pandelings*. However, instead of setting them free, the missionaries took over the debts and resettled the *pandelings* around the mission stations. Now they had, quite literally, a captive audience. They had to attend devotions, school classes, and services—and they had to work. "*Arbeit macht frei*" turns out to be an old German proverb. After some years, the *pandelings* received their freedom. However, few *pandelings* converted to the Christian faith. The *pandeling* projects exacerbated frustrations between the RMS and the Dayaks, because the missionaries became autocratic station commandants who had to enforce discipline and maintain

order, while the Dayaks often rebelled (Böhmer 2016, 58–61, 110–117, 139–141; Steenbrink 2008, 500).

The Role and Influence of the Hajjis

To gain a more complete picture of the Muslim-Christian rivalry, we need to take a closer look at the Muslim missionaries among the Dayaks and their standing in the Dutch Empire. The Dutch noticed conspicuous Muslim figures agitating among the indigenous peoples of the Netherlands Indies. They stereotypically referred to them as priests, popes, padres, Wahabees, and "fanatics dressed in white Arab turbans and garbs" (Aljunied 2004, 159–175; Aljunied 2005, 105–122). As Saleh explains, most of these were, in fact, *hajjis* (Saleh 1975, 140), Muslims who had returned from the *hajj* to Mecca. These *hajjis* would be conspicuous in their white Arab dress, which they would adopt for life after completing the *hajj*. The Dutch colonial authorities viewed the *hajjis* with suspicion. One prominent Dutch ethnologist described the *hajjis* as dangerous, cunning, and filled with a lust for power and greed for money, recommending that they be "supervised and contained" (Aljunied 2005, 110).

One factor that shaped Muslim consciousness over against colonial authority of the Netherlands Indies in the late 1850s, was the Bengal Mutiny. True, the Bengal Mutiny broke out in India, then occupied by the British. However, many believed that it was instigated by "Pan Islamism," a "movement that appealed to Muslims all over the world to realise and re-establish their bonds as well as concern for each other. Most importantly, it called for Muslims to acknowledge the Sultan of Turkey as the Caliph or 'The Ultimate Leader from amongst the Believers' " (Reid 1987, 267). Even though the concept of "Pan Islamism" remains contested, some argue that the violent suppression of the Bengal Mutiny created "excitement even amongst the Muslims in the Dutch East Indies" (Aljunied 2005, 110), thus aggravating Muslim resentment and tensions toward colonial authorities.

It is thus highly significant that the recorded number of *hajjis* travelling to Mecca from the Netherlands Indies rose exponentially toward the end of the 1850s:

HAJJ YEAR	INDIES PILGRIMS
1850	71
1852	413
1855	1,668
1860	1,420

The above are official figures, but there is reason to believe the true numbers were even higher (Eisenberger 1928, 204). The reduction in the number of *hajjis* in 1860 was probably due to the so-called "*Hajji* Ordinance," which Dutch colonial authorities passed in 1859, possibly in reaction to news of the Bengal Mutiny. This ordinance was intended to curtail the spread of fanatical anti-colonial passion among Muslims. It stipulated that an exorbitant payment be made and a specific passport be obtained by all Muslims from the Netherlands Indies intending to participate in the *hajj*, "with the goal of openly discouraging it" (Aljunied 2005, 111). Yet such an exponential increase of *hajjis* seems to suggest a rising interest in Islam and a more devoted practise of its tenets. It specifically suggests a growing devotion by many to keep the Muslim commandment of the *hajj* whenever humanly possible, and also suggests a stronger emphasis among Muslims on the pure keeping of Islam as a whole. If so, this would have had a number of consequences for the relationships of Muslims toward non-Muslims, possibly leading to a concomitant rise in tension between them, especially when *hajjis* returned as Wahhabi devotees. The Dutch authorities "surveilled their subjects as potential conspirators in anticolonial behaviour … Indonesian *hajjis* stayed in the Hejaz for a long time, studying religion, setting up businesses, and starting families in the process" (Hellwig and Tagliacozzo 2009, 190). This, at any rate, would lend credence to the notion that returning *hajjis* were imbued with a more zealous faith, possibly with a form of radicalised Wahhabism that might prove threatening toward colonial power. Many such *hajjis* were sent to the Dayaks for the purpose of proselytising them (Van Rees 1865, 26–32).

The Succession Debacle of the Banjarese Sultanate Leads to Uprising

In order to understand the developments leading up to the Banjarmasin War of 1859, we must return to the issue of the succession quarrels in the Sultanate. The volatility of succession affairs in the Sultanate was exacerbated by two factors. Firstly, whereas the Dutch had exiled the rightful heir to the Sultanate when they installed his pro-Dutch illegitimate rival, the family of the rightful heir was permitted to stay in Banjarmasin. Their continued presence created the potential for conflict, since they were a living reminder of the discrepancy between colonial power and traditional law, and there was a rising groundswell of sympathy for their rightful claim to the throne. Secondly, as mentioned above, the Dutch retained the right to approve future successors to the Sultanate. As they established coal mines in the interior of Banjarmasin, they chafed at the fact that the richest coal-bearing lands were still under the direct control of the Sultan. They decided to use the uncertainty surrounding the succession to the Sultanate to gain control of these lands (Kielstra 1917, 241–242; Meyners 1886, passim).

In 1852, the commonly recognised heir-apparent died under mysterious circumstances, leaving two contenders for the throne, the elder of whom was an illegitimate son (Ricklefs 1981, 131). Since their grandfather, the reigning Sultan, was getting old, an heir needed to be designated. Once again, the Dutch intervened, designating the

illegitimate son as heir-apparent over the legitimate heir in exchange for favouring Dutch interests (Irwin 1955, 175). Formal protests by the reigning Sultan and other nobles went unheeded. The succession struggle created great uncertainty among the general population (Van Rees 1865, 14–16). When the old Sultan died in 1857, the heir-apparent was installed as Sultan amid popular discontent.[1]

Over the following months, the discontentment of the Muslim subjects grew. Whenever social unrest occurred in the Sultanate, the new Sultan called in the Dutch troops to solve the problem (Saleh 1975, 145–146). As a result, anti-Dutch sentiments flourished. In early 1859, the family of the rightful heir to the throne ousted by the Dutch in 1817 now proclaimed one of its princes to be the new rightful Sultan. The family claimed that Allah himself decreed in a vision that they should do so (Saleh 1975, 149). The new pretender to the throne called himself Sultan Kuning. He received a great deal of popular support, with many Malays recognising him as the new Sultan. Thousands of people flocked to his cause. Kuning convened his new followers to a great assembly. After praying to the prophet Muhammad, he invoked *jihad* and called for the slaughter of the reigning Sultan, the "kafirs" (infidels), and the Dutch. Kuning promised them that Allah would be pleased with them for killing the oppressors. What followed was the Banjarmasin War of 1859–1867 (Saleh 1975, 149).

The Banjarmasin War

The colonial authorities of the Netherlands Indies became very alarmed when reports of the uprising began trickling in. Losing confidence in local authorities, they sent a military commander with troops to Banjarmasin. He relieved the *resident* of his duties and instituted martial law in the Sultanate. However, by then, the mines of Banjarmasin were already under attack. The Dutch dispatched a ship upriver to Martapura, the traditional seat of power of the Sultanate, which was close to a number of mines. The ship encountered bodies of Europeans floating downriver—the first casualties of the uprising. Soon, the ship had to fend off a direct attack. Meanwhile, Kuning's guerrilla forces, which eyewitnesses claim included *hajjis*, attacked several mines in the area of Martapura, killing most Europeans and destroying the infrastructure. A Dutch fort was also attacked and the occupants killed. Bands of attackers then made their way to the Pulo Petak region, calling on the Dayaks to join their cause. Many did so. Over the following days, attacks were carried out on various RMS mission stations, leading to the missionary casualties described above.

War continued between the Malay-Dayak coalition and the Dutch Empire, but the Dutch had superior weaponry and forces. Soon, they abolished the Sultanate of Banjarmasin altogether and assumed direct control. Eventually, Kuning was killed in battle. "The war took a heavy toll of Dutch finances and manpower. Rural Islamic leaders led a

1 Except where otherwise noted, the following details are drawn from Van Rees 1865, *passim.*

courageous and determined resistance" (Ricklefs 1981, 131). The "struggle caused considerable loss of life and immense damage to property in many parts of southern Borneo. Although by 1862 Dutch troops had won the upper hand, the 'state of war' in Bandjermasin did not officially end until 1867, and even then, peace was restored only in coastal areas" (Irwin 1955, 175). Even so, "sporadic resistance continued until 1905" (Ricklefs 1981, 131).

European Reactions

When news of the uprising broke in Europe, some blamed the RMS missionaries for aggravating the Muslims and provoking a *jihad* against the Christian proclaimers (Von Rohden 1871, 108). Others, however, argued that the uprising was simply an attempt to dethrone the reigning Sultan, and that religious fanatics had used the opportunity to attack Dutch rule (*Leydsche Courant* 1859). Prominent Dutch politicians believed the uprising was due to a combination of succession struggles, poor leadership by the *resident*, the strength of Islam in the area, and "religious fanaticism" led by the *hajjis* (Van Hoëvell 1859, 96–99). The consensus was that if the Dutch authorities had provided better governance, the whole tragic affair could have been avoided.

Some blamed the killing of the missionaries on Muslim fanaticism aroused by the Bengal mutiny (Money 1861, 123–124). What chroniclers found difficult to explain, however, was that "Christian" Dayaks in Pulo Petak not only took part in the uprising, but also in the killing of missionaries. How could this be (Van Rees 1867, 40–41)? Modern scholars have argued that the interference of Dutch imperialism in local politics led to the uprising, and that the Dayaks were simply unable to distinguish between Dutch and German foreigners (Lekebusch 2008; Saleh 1975); in other words, that the death of the missionaries was, in reality, a case of mistaken identity.

Violence

Tragically, sources have now been found that demand a revision of that conclusion. Evidently, the Dayak *pandelings* on the main station in Pulo Petak suffered not only a disruption of their way of life, but also prolonged and violent abuse from the missionary running the station, by the name of August Hardeland. Corporal punishment was commonly used at the time, but Hardeland subjected the Dayaks to such brutal treatment that his fellow missionaries considered him to be beyond the pale and refused to go along with him. But they could not stop him.

Hardeland's motto was that "a good beating can be a good gift from God" (Hardeland to the RMS 12 January 1852, 181r-v). And so he administered his "good gifts," meting out in excess of 200 lashes at a time with a rattan cane. His beatings were by no means reserved for men; he also habitually beat women, stripping them naked and whipping them in public, even pregnant women, seeking to instil fear and obedience. He also resorted to sexual abuse to extract confessions from suspected evildoers (Van Hoefen

to the RMS, 7 August 1855). At least one young girl died as a result of Hardeland's ministrations; others came close. One report stated: "A few Dayaks told me of their own account how *Tuan Djeland* ['Master Hardeland'] beat the people before I arrived, that he beat them until the blood spattered on the ground, and that he heated iron bars until they were red-hot and used them to frighten them" (Zimmer to Wallmann, 13 May 1856).

In light of such brutality, there surely can be no coincidence that Christian Dayaks joined in the killing of the missionaries. One great irony is that Hardeland broke with his colleagues and left before the uprising began, and his successors and colleagues were the ones who bore the brunt of repressed Dayak anger. Also ironic is that this brutality was not publicly known, so that RMS supporters could not possibly understand what had happened and clung to their belief in the innocence of their society instead. However, the missionaries themselves had for long had premonitions of violence, and unfortunately they were proved right.

Conclusion

In light of the evidence, it would seem that the RMS mission to Dayaks led to opposition by *hajjis* in Banjarmasin. Islamic revivalism, hostility toward the infidel, and ideas of a holy war were blended with traditional, nativist elements in a context of foreign domination and local frustration. It is significant that Christian Dayaks joined Muslim agitators in violence, and that this violence began at the mines, areas of economic exploitation, spread to the mission stations, and then continued to focus on government installations. This approach lends credence to the argument that the goal of the uprising was to rid the Sultanate of all foreign influence with the express mandate of Allah.

This conclusion is strengthened by the Banjarese persistence. The long duration of the war, despite heavy tolls, shows that the uprising was directed not only or necessarily even predominantly at eliminating the RMS missionaries as Christian proselytisers, since the death or departure of these by no means ended the violence.

Rather, it was the instability of the Banjarese Sultanate, created and exacerbated by the ill-conceived and short-sighted governance of the Dutch Empire, its avarice toward the resources of Banjarmasin, and its self-interested endorsement of illegitimate puppet figures that gave rise to the rebellion. The war was an attempt to regain control of the Sultanate and its resources. In the perspective of the Banjarese Muslims, the RMS missionaries were a particularly noxious Christian manifestation of the oppressive foreign intruders, and so they were made to suffer the fate intended for all of them.

The Dayaks were known as warriors and head-hunters, and their participation in the rebellion does not necessarily come as a surprise, especially since the Muslims constituted the majority population of the Sultanate and many Dayaks were favourably disposed to the Muslims. However, the fact that Christian Dayaks were so readily won

over to the rebellion and even participated in the killing of missionaries suggests that the conversion of some may have been superficial. To be sure, the RMS enforcing of the resettlement and attendance laws promulgated by the Dutch likely contributed to the resentment the Dayaks felt toward the RMS missionaries and erased any distinctions that might have been made between the German missionaries and the Dutch overlords. However, the killing of the missionaries was intentional and directed against those who had wronged them, shamed them, and gone unpunished for so long. In the end, the violence exercised and tolerated by the RMS was returned in ever greater measure—violence begets violence.

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