

The Possibility of a “Minor Discourse” that Deterritorialises Neoliberalism Politically

Bert Olivier

Summary

In their work on Kafka, Deleuze and Guattari elaborated on the meaning of and criteria for a “minor literature”, that represents a people instead of a genre, has a directly political and collective function, and “deterritorialises” existing literatures. In this article the question is posed, whether their insights may be transposed to the broader field of language, specifically in the sense of discourse, to help one understand the possibility of a “minor discourse” – a particular way of using discourse – that would be “directly political”, as opposed to the dominant discourses of the present, which tend to disguise their political effectivity behind an economic façade. Moreover, what are the chances that such a minor discourse could deterritorialise the existing, dominant discourse of neoliberalism to the point where fissures may appear within which a “minor discourse” might be strengthened? The contra-capitalist, radically democratic “minor discourse” on the part of Naomi Klein is examined as demonstration of its discursive efficacy in deterritorialising neoliberalism.

Opsomming

In hul werk oor Kafka brei Deleuze en Guattari uit op die betekenis en kriteria vir 'n “mindere letterkunde”, wat 'n volk eerder as 'n genre verteenwoordig, 'n direk-politiese en kollektiewe funksie het, en bestaande literature “deterritorialiseer”. In hierdie artikel word die vraag geopper, of hul insigte na die breër veld van taal uitgebrei kan word, spesifiek in die sin van diskoers, om 'n mens te help om die moontlikheid te verstaan van 'n “mindere diskoers” – 'n besondere wyse waarop diskoers benut word – wat “direk politiese” sou wees, in teenstelling met die dominante diskoerse van vandag (wat hul politieke uitwerking agter 'n ekonomiese masker verberg). Verder: wat is die kans dat 'n sodanige mindere diskoers die bestaande, dominante diskoers van neoliberalisme tot op die punt sou kon deterritorialiseer waar krake daarin sou verskyn, waarbinne 'n “mindere diskoers” bevorder en versterk sou kon word? Die kontra-kapitalistiese, radikaal-demokratiese “mindere diskoers” van Naomi Klein word verder ondersoek om te demonstree hoe die diskursiewe effektiwiteit daarvan neoliberalisme deterritorialiseer.

We live in a time of unmitigated crisis, something that manifests itself at various levels of everyday awareness. First there is the continuing, and some would say worsening, global economic crisis – not merely in terms of the

prevailing economic model of neoliberal capitalism, but more fundamentally as a growing awareness that the dominant economic model, which inescapably implicates the political sphere (Guattari 2000; Stiegler 2010, 2015; Conio 2015), can no longer accommodate the needs and aspirations of the world's people (Klein 2007, 2014; Castells, Caraça & Cardoso 2012; Hawken 2007; Hardt & Negri 2001, 2005, 2009, 2012; Stiegler 2010, 2015). Then, connected with this, there is the worsening ecological crisis, which is fuelled by the unrestrained growth-policies of capitalism, with their concomitant exacerbation of climate change, fresh-water depletion, ocean acidification, species extinction and arable soil reduction, to mention just some of their excessively deleterious eco-destructive results (Kovel 2007; Lovelock 2010; Foster, Clark & York 2010; Klein 2014). To this can be added the crisis of global migration, particularly the ongoing (during 2016-2017) refugee crisis in Europe (reported on in all international media), which is inseparable from the two crises referred to above, but also from what is sometimes described as “regional ethnic conflicts”, and which tends to aggravate the former two crises in a vicious cycle of complex interconnectedness. One could continue along this trajectory of uncovering crises of variegated stripes – such as those that Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri (2005) have identified, including the crisis of (non-) “representation” and the interminable global wars of the present era of “Empire” – but the point is that they are all ultimately interconnected.

Against this backdrop of pervasive global crises in a globalised world, a question that has probably occurred to many reflective people is this: Is there any way to mitigate these crises, and possibly initiate a process of some kind that has the potential to reverse the processes that have reached the point of manifesting themselves as multiple crises? In a historically contingent, human (social and natural) world, there are no guarantees, but there are some avenues of thinking and practice that present themselves as something worth pursuing. One of these is suggested by Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari's idea of a “minor literature/language” (2007), which I would like to examine more closely with a view to formulating the possibility of a “minor discourse” in the current global situation of neoliberal discursive hegemony.

From Minor Language to Minor Discourse

The notion of a “minor language” is developed in their book on Kafka, where Deleuze and Guattari elaborate on the political implications of what they call a “minor literature”. In this regard Ronald Bogue's remark is pertinent to the question of a “minor discourse”:

In *Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature* Deleuze and Guattari directly take up the topic of “the people” and relate it specifically to the arts. In a diary entry dated 25 December 1911, Kafka states that in the literature of a small group,

THE POSSIBILITY OF A “MINOR DISCOURSE” THAT DETERRITORIALISES ...

such as that of the Czechs or Yiddish-speaking Jews, “literature is less a concern of literary history than of the people”. Deleuze and Guattari argue that such is the case of all “minor literature”, and that one of Kafka’s chief goals as a minor writer is to foster the invention of a people.

(2007: 98)

To be able to assess the relevance of this for the present theme of the advent of a “minor discourse” and by implication the invention of “a people of the future” in the context of multiple crises facing the world, one therefore has to turn to Deleuze and Guattari’s *Kafka: Towards a Minor Literature*. Here (1986: 16) they claim that the “first characteristic of minor literature ... is that in it language is affected with a high coefficient of deterritorialization”. For Deleuze and Guattari (1983: 382) “deterritorialization” entails something like dismantling the comparative stasis and stability that characterise identifications of all kinds, in the process setting free what they call “desiring-production”. It stands in a tensional relationship of mutual implication with “reterritorialization”, which is thought of as “arresting” or discontinuing the productive process, but both of which presuppose a “territory” to begin with. It is therefore consonant with what they understand by “schizoanalysis” (1983: 316), which “deterritorializes” psychic identifications, freeing “desiring-production” in the process. Adrian Parr sums it up as follows:

Perhaps deterritorialisation can best be understood as a movement producing change. In so far as it operates as a line of flight, deterritorialisation indicates the creative potential of an assemblage. So, to deterritorialise is to free up the fixed relations that contain a body all the while exposing it to new organisations.

(2010: 69)

Hence (ignoring for the moment the technical Deleuzian meanings of “line of flight” and “assemblage”, discussed below; see Parr 2010: 18, 147), one can conceptualise the language, or discourse, that has to be “invented” to be able to communicate the urgent need for a fundamental social, economic and political (and therefore also linguistic) reorientation in the early 21st century, by analogy with a “minor literature”. It must therefore be a “minor language” (or discourse) tasked with the thoroughgoing deterritorialisation of the current neoliberal discursive landscape within which people find themselves globally, with a view to liberating the potential for novel desiring-production, so that new “lines of flight” may be created.

The second attribute, for Deleuze and Guattari (1986: 17), of minor literatures as exemplified in the work of Kafka “... is that everything in them is political”, which is inseparable from the third characteristic, “... that in it everything takes on a collective value”. While in major literatures the socio-political milieu always comprises the backdrop for their true concern, namely “individual concerns”, a minor literature does not and cannot take this

normalised social sphere for granted, because by virtue of being “minor”, even its focus on individual issues registers a challenge to the normalised sphere of social and political values, which today comprises neoliberal society. Furthermore, precisely because a minor literary figure is outside the valorised, “normal” social sphere, or even at the margins of “... his or her fragile community, this situation allows the writer all the more the possibility to express another possible community and to forge the means for another consciousness and another sensibility” (Deleuze & Guattari 1986: 17). One must keep in mind, however, that: “The major and minor mode are two different treatments of language, one of which consists in extracting constants from it, the other in placing it in continuous variation” (Deleuze & Guattari 1987: 106). As I shall argue below, such a minor treatment of (language as) discourse occurs in the work of Naomi Klein’s criticism of neoliberalism. Because a shift away from neoliberal discourse towards a minor language or discourse would entail nothing short of a “revolt” (Kristeva 2000) of sorts, it is significant for the present theme that Deleuze and Guattari (1986: 18) add: “We might as well say that minor no longer designates specific literatures but the revolutionary conditions for every literature within the heart of what is called great (or established) literature”.

This is tantamount to claiming that, for a “revolt” to occur, in literature, art, the sciences, or in social, economic or political discourse, for that matter, the seeds of such a revolution first emerge in a minor key, to use a musical metaphor. Paradoxically, to retain its revolutionary potential, it cannot afford to become “major” in the fullest sense of the term, although – like a minor literature that eventually reaches “major” literature status – one might hope that, to depose the hegemonic neoliberal discourse, it would eventually get to that point. As Deleuze and Guattari suggest, above, the minor element in all literature is precisely the gist of revolutionary potential harboured within it, just as, today, any post-neoliberal discourse must already be lodged within the “heart” of neoliberal discourse itself as the potential of its transformation. This can be articulated in terms of Deleuze’s (2005: 85-86) notion of the “crystal of seeds” – in cinema, but *mutatis mutandis* also in social history, as I have argued elsewhere (Olivier 2016). Such a “crystal of seeds” denotes, metaphorically, a condensed image within which the “seeds” of, and potential for, change are detectable within the crystal at stake, which is neoliberalism in this case.

One gets a clearer idea about the requirements for a (major) discourse, as opposed to a literature, to transform itself into a “minor discourse”, where Deleuze and Guattari write about Kafka’s approach (1986: 19):

Go always farther in the direction of deterritorialization, to the point of sobriety. Since the language is arid, make it vibrate with a new intensity. Oppose a purely intensive usage of language to all symbolic or even significant or simply signifying usages of it. Arrive at a perfect and unformed expression, a materially intense expression.

In the light of this, as well as the following remark on their part, I shall attempt to show that, in a manner analogous to Kafka’s literary “deterritorialization”, in the work of Naomi Klein a deterritorialisation of major “discourse” occurs (Deleuze & Guattari 1987: 105): “Conquer the major language in order to delineate in it as yet unknown minor languages. Use the minor language to *send the major language racing*. Minor authors are foreigners in their own tongue”.

Language, Discourse, Assemblages and Lines of Flight

But why insist on the need for a minor discourse, as opposed to language? The first reason for this is that discourse can be understood, in Lacan’s theory of discourse (1978: 12; 2007: 31-32; Olivier 2012), for example, as language that is not innocuous in cratological terms – regarding power-relations, that is – but instead as language, insofar as meaning and power converge in it. One cannot doubt that Deleuze and Guattari have something similar in mind in the Kafka book where they write about the tension between deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation in language (1986: 20):

Ordinarily, in fact, language compensates for its deterritorialization by a reterritorialization in sense. Ceasing to be the organ of one of the senses, it becomes an instrument of Sense. And it is sense, as a correct sense, that presides over the designation of sounds (the thing or the state of things that the word designates) and, as figurative sense, over the affectation of images and metaphors (those other things that words designate under certain situations or conditions). Thus, there is not only a spiritual reterritorialization of sense, but also a physical one. Similarly, language exists only through the distinction and the complementarity of a subject of enunciation, who is in connection with sense, and a subject of the statement, who is in connection, directly or metaphorically, with the designated thing. This sort of ordinary use of language can be called extensive or representative – the reterritorializing function of language

Put more simply, one might say that that at any given time there is a tensional process going on in language between the countervailing tendencies, to free it, or open it up (through the anarchy of the senses) to new significations and meanings, on the one hand, and to arrest this introduction of moments of flux into it by subjecting it to a stabilising process of designation (Sense, or the largely arbitrary process of arbitration, which restores order to language; see below on “order words”). Different subject-positions, too, are at stake here, and their reterritorialising role is similarly to prevent sensory flux from overpowering the tendency towards stabilisation by imparting clear linguistic markers. As one might imagine, however, this process – which is occurring all the time – is nothing other than a colossal struggle for supremacy between “deterritorialising” powers that free and “reterritorialising” powers that arrest

and capture. I would argue that it is an apt evocation of what usually passes for “discourse”, as long as these “powers” are understood as forces of and within language.

Perhaps an even more apt understanding of that aspect of language that operates as “discourse” in the sense of intertwining its “meaning” (or signification) and the operation of power, is found where Deleuze and Guattari elaborate on what they call “order words”, which must be presupposed by any specific orders (1987: 75-76): “The compulsory education machine does not communicate information; it imposes upon the child semiotic coordinates possessing all of the dual foundations of grammar (masculine-feminine, singular-plural, noun-verb, subject of the statement-subject of enunciation, etc.). The elementary unit of language – the statement – is the order-word”. Far from being primarily communicational and informational, therefore, language functions as a politically structuring principle to “order” or organise the world normatively. This is a linguistic function of what they call “... the first determination of language ... *indirect discourse*” (1987: 76-77). It is clear that they are interested in what, in speech-act theory, has been termed the “illocutionary” function of language, or language-use that performs actions, like “I promise ...” (1987: 77). Deleuze and Guattari further elaborate on the scientific study of language within the context of a “[S]tandard or [M]ajor language” (1987: 100-106), which implicates “minor” languages (that function by making language “minor” in relation to the “major” use of language that is recognisable by the role that certain order-words – like the church, or the state, or the market – play in it). The minor use of language (as in what I call “minor discourse”) is to disrupt or undermine the order-words of the major language (or discourse).

This impression is further confirmed when one considers Deleuze and Guattari’s concepts of “assemblages” and “lines of flight” (1987: 88-89, 306, 398-403, 503-504). Tamsin Lorraine has this to say about these concepts:

Deleuze ... and Guattari prefer to consider things not as substances, but as assemblages or multiplicities, focusing on things in terms of unfolding forces – bodies and their powers to affect and be affected – rather than static essences. A “line of flight” is a path of mutation precipitated through the actualisation of connections among bodies that were previously only implicit (or “virtual”) that releases new powers in the capacities of those bodies to act and respond.

Every assemblage is territorial in that it sustains connections that define it, but every assemblage is also composed of lines of deterritorialisation that run through it and carry it away from its current form

(Parr 2010: 147)

Taking one’s cue from Lorraine, discourses could therefore be understood as linguistic-conceptual assemblages within which countervailing, virtual forces of deterritorialisation and (re-)territorialisation are inscribed, either of which could be actualised under certain circumstances. One might argue further that

Deleuze and Guattari’s characterisation of Kafka’s “minor literature” bathes discourse in its light, particularly because of its inescapable political nature. This is evident if one thinks by analogy with what “deterritorialisation” means for Deleuze and Guattari in the context of literature, where it denotes the setting free of something like energy or creative motivation, which would entail liberating one from the hold that the canonical power of a major literature has on a writer. In effect it would mean a different way of using the “same” language, by subverting the grammatical and linguistic “constants” in it, for instance; in other words, by disrupting conventional linguistic certainties. Just as Kafka’s use of German deterritorialises, so, too, does the use of English by American blacks, according to Deleuze and Guattari (1986: 17). This use of language in literature, with its “minoritarian” effect, means that it is directly political, even when it concerns issues that may not seem to be political – such as the relationship between a father and a son or daughter. While such concerns are treated in terms of relationships between individuals in major literatures, with the social milieu forming the background, in a minor literature they are intimately conjoined with this social and political sphere. The fact that everything in a minor literature takes on a “collective value” is related to this political intensity. In Deleuze and Guattari’s words:

Indeed, precisely because talent isn’t abundant in a minor literature, there are no possibilities for an individuated enunciation that would belong to this or that “master” and that could be separated from a collective enunciation. Indeed, scarcity of talent is in fact beneficial and allows the conception of something other than a literature of masters; what each author says individually already constitutes a common action, and what he or she says or does is necessarily political

(1986: 17)

This statement, which stresses the inseparability of individual expression and collective representation, is crucial for a project of articulating a “minor discourse”, insofar as the latter, too, would benefit from not being in thrall to a “master discourse” of some kind – in fact, with the Lacanian provenance of this phrase in mind, it would be the case that a minor discourse would instantiate the “hysteric’s discourse”, with its relentless questioning of the master (Lacan 2007: 6, 11-32; Olivier 2012). This is so in light of the fact that discourse is, to begin with, the condition of possibility of being interpellated as a subject of language, and concomitantly of being discursively inserted into the social, collective fabric. But how would a minor discourse achieve the effects of a minor literature which, after all, are a function of its literary qualities? Ronald Bogue (1989: 115-123) casts light on this question by elaborating in an evocative manner on its use of language:

A minor usage of language entails linguistic deterritorialization and the liberation of a-signifying sounds, but not a reduction of language to the state

of gibberish. Rather than obliterate the relationship between expression and content, a minor usage reverses the conventional relationship between dominant forms of content and dominated forms of expression. In a major literature, content precedes expression, the thought coming before the linguistic articulation of the thought A minor literature uses deterritorialized sound to break apart conventional content, and then reassembles the fragments of that content in new ways

(1989: 119)

Bogue argues further that, although Deleuze and Guattari do not give a clear indication, by means of examples, of exactly how Kafka's minor literature would function in a revolutionary way, clues to this effect are found in other works, such as Deleuze's *Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation* (2003). Here Francis Bacon's distinctive mode of painting is described as taking shape around what Bacon described as a "diagram", or moment of "chaos" fortuitously introduced into the painting, which subsequently becomes the point around which the rest of the painting is assembled in a manner that disrupts, or deterritorialises the canons of all the varieties of representational art. If the deterritorialisation of a major literature, prising open a space in its linguistic interstices for a minor literature to take root, is conceivable on this model of Bacon's "chaotically disruptive" painting, I believe it is possible to conceive of the emergence of "minor discourses" from within the discursive warp and woof of major or dominant discourses in an analogous manner. After all, literature and discourse are distinct functions of language, which may therefore be regarded as the matrix within which these functions are spawned.

What could be considered such minor discourses, by analogy with Deleuze and Guattari's notion of "minor literature", if the latter is understood along the lines outlined above, to wit, its deterritorialising tendency (in terms of the relationship between thought and content, expression and lines of flight, as well as "diagrams" or moments of "chaos"), being pervasively "political" and "collectivist"? In answering this question, one should keep in mind that one is taking a leap from the two French thinkers' characterisation of a "minor literature" (and "minor language"), with reference to the example of Kafka, to the notion of a "minor discourse", which is not the same thing, but could arguably be characterised by analogy with the former. In taking this leap, it should be remembered that the deterritorialisation of *language* is at stake in a minor literature, while, although "discourse" similarly denotes a use of language, the emphasis here is not on deterritorialisation of sounds, or expression, in search of new concepts, thought and content. Instead one would have to demonstrate that a "minor discourse" distinguishes itself by a use of language that frees concepts within a "major discourse", correlative to "major practices", and does so by seizing on potential "lines of flight" within major discourses, or by introducing moments of "chaos" into them, following or extending these to the point where the contours of a minor discourse of sorts

appear, which are subsequently strengthened and extended. The following observation by Deleuze and Guattari is highly suggestive in this regard insofar as it amplifies what was gleaned earlier from them regarding the characteristics of language considered as discourse. It could assist one further in identifying emergent minor discourses in the contemporary cultural landscape, to be able to tease out their collectivist political implications:

Even when it is unique, a language remains a mixture, a schizophrenic *mélange*, a Harlequin costume in which very different functions of language and distinct centers of power are played out, blurring what can be said and what can't be said; one function will be played off against the other, all the degrees of territoriality and relative deterritorialization will be played out. Even when major, a language is open to an intensive utilization that makes it take flight along creative lines of escape which, no matter how slowly, no matter how cautiously, can now form an absolute deterritorialization.

(1986: 26)

This is as applicable to language in its discursive function (recall “order words”, above) as it is to language in its literary function. The possibility of a minor discourse gaining a purchase on a major discourse, given the cratologically variegated structure of all language (described above by Deleuze and Guattari) – including language in the guise of a major discourse – always exists virtually, pending actualisation, insofar as “lines of flight”, or points of incipient deterritorialisation, are endemic to language regardless of the specific literary or discursive function that may be dominant at any given time. With the preceding in mind, there is plenty of evidence that several “minor discourses” are already, and increasingly, noticeable in some circles. One of these requires special attention, as I shall argue below.

Today's Major Discourse: Neoliberal Capitalism

David Harvey provides a succinct account of neoliberal capitalism:

Neoliberalism is in the first instance a theory of political economic practices that proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterised by strong private property rights, free markets, and free trade. The role of the state is to create and preserve an institutional framework appropriate to such practices. The state has to guarantee, for example, the quality and integrity of money. It must also set up those military, defence, police, and legal structures and functions required to secure private property rights and to guarantee, by force if need be, the proper functioning of markets. Furthermore, if markets do not exist (in areas such as land, water, education, health care, social security, or environmental pollution) then they must be created, by state action if necessary. But beyond these tasks the state should

not venture. State interventions in markets (once created) must be kept to a bare minimum because, according to the theory, the state cannot possibly possess enough information to second-guess market signals (prices) and because powerful interest groups will inevitably distort and bias state interventions (particularly in democracies) for their own benefit.

(2005: 2)

Robert McChesney's account is even more succinct, but noticeably it emphasises the control of social life by a comparatively small number of (people with vested) "interests" for their personal gain, instead of that of society at large:

Neoliberalism is the defining political economic paradigm of our time – it refers to the policies and processes whereby a relative handful of private interests are permitted to control as much as possible of social life in order to maximize their personal profit.

(1999: 7)

To the historically uninformed, Harvey's description may seem unobjectionable, insofar as it would probably appeal to their sense of entitlement to "individual freedom" (which is here construed primarily as economic freedom), undeterred by government interference. It is no accident that Harvey (as well as McChesney) uses the phrase "political economic practices", however, because – as the commonly used phrase, "political economy" also suggests – no economic freedom can be divorced from political freedom. Such an intertwining of the political and the economic is further evident in one of the most important documents of neoliberal thinking, Milton Friedman's *Capitalism and Freedom* (1962), where he stresses precisely all the characteristics of neoliberalism listed by Harvey. Friedman insists that his stance deserves the epithet of "liberalism" (Friedman 1962: 12-14) in the 19th-century sense of the term, denoting a belief in "freedom as the ultimate goal and the individual as the ultimate entity in the society" (p. 12), in the context of economic *laissez faire* or the drastic reduction of the role of the state in economic matters. This situation, where markets are left unencumbered by the state, he claims, would lead to the optimal economic conditions for everyone concerned, from business owners to workers.

The historically uninformed would probably find McChesney's gloss on neoliberalism equally unobjectionable, although it is phrased in terms that should evoke puzzlement, if not outrage; after all, far from being seen as a system that allows the monopolistic control of social life (as McChesney claims), to most people it is simply the normal state of economic affairs, and is accepted as such (hence the phrase, "the tyranny of the status quo"). However, when one takes a look at the present economic state of affairs in the world, starting with the bastion of neoliberalism, America, McChesney's view is clearly corroborated, at least by some commentators. Rana Foroohar,

a respected business and economic journalist working for *TIME* magazine, for example, has just published a book called *Makers and Takers* (2016a), in which she makes the (to some startling) announcement, that market capitalism in the US is “broken”. In a synoptic article in *TIME* (2016b) she sets out her reasons for claiming this. After listing the “prescriptions” for resolving the economic crisis, advanced by the candidates in the recent US presidential election – from Trump’s desire to tax hedge fund managers more, through Sanders’s intention, to break up the big banks, to Clinton’s aim, to reinforce financial regulation (p. 24), Foroohar states:

All of them are missing the point. America’s economic problems go far beyond rich bankers, too-big-to-fail financial institutions, hedge-fund billionaires, offshore tax avoidance or any particular outrage of the moment. In fact, each of these is symptomatic of a more nefarious condition that threatens, in equal measure, the very well-off and the very poor, the red and the blue. The U.S. system of market capitalism itself is broken

To understand how we got here, you have to understand the relationship between capital markets – meaning the financial system – and businesses.

(p. 24)

In the rest of this long article Foroohar explains this relationship, and it gives one a good idea about the present state of neoliberal discourse (which appears to differ strikingly from its characterisation by Harvey, above), towards which she is adopting a critical stance. She concludes that (2016a: 25): “America’s economic illness has a name: financialization It includes everything from the growth in size and scope of finance and financial activity in the economy; to the rise of debt-fueled speculation over productive lending; to the ascendancy of shareholder value as the sole model for corporate governance; to the proliferation of risky, selfish thinking in both the private and public sectors; to the increasing political power of financiers and the CEOs they enrich; to the way in which a ‘markets know best’ ideology remains the status quo. Financialization is a big, unfriendly word with broad, disconcerting implications.”

Foroohar briefly reconstructs the historical path that has led to the present state of affairs, from the gradual abandonment of the regulation of banks, which “had served America so well” (2016b: 25) after the Depression (something which was notably also induced by financial speculation), during the slowing of the economy in the 1970s. Instead of making difficult decisions about ways of boosting the economy, this responsibility was neatly shifted to the financial markets by politicians. This, together with more “Reaganomic” deregulation that eventually resulted in “loose monetary policy”, she shows, had “unintended consequences” (p. 25), so that today the US economy is “chronically dependent on near-zero interest rates to keep from falling back into recession” (2016b: 25). Foroohar identifies a number of symptoms of this lamentable state of affairs, in the process neatly summarising the

consequences of the hegemonic reign of neoliberal discourse in its present state where “financialisation” is dominant:

This sickness, not so much the product of venal interests as of a complex and long-term web of changes in government and private industry, now manifests itself in myriad ways: a housing market that is bifurcated and dependent on government life support, a retirement system that has left millions insecure in their old age, a tax code that favours debt over equity. Debt is the lifeblood of finance; with the rise of the securities-and-trading portion of the industry came a rise in debt of all kinds, public and private. That’s bad news, since a wide range of academic research shows that rising debt and credit levels stoke financial instability. And yet, as finance has captured a greater and greater piece of the national pie, it has, perversely, all but ensured that debt is indispensable in maintaining any growth at all in an advanced economy like the U.S., where 70% of output is consumer spending. Debt-fueled finance has become a saccharine substitute for the real thing, an addiction that just gets worse.

(2016: 25)

Among the signs of the financial sector only really serving itself there is the sharp decline in banks’ lending to small business, as well as the reprehensible practice of “share buybacks” (Foroohar 2016b: 27) – where companies buy their own shares, “often as a way of artificially bolstering share prices in order to enrich investors and executives paid largely in stock options”. This trend has increased to the point where top companies now spend \$1 trillion annually on dividends and buybacks (about 95% of their earnings), “rather than investing that money back into research, product development or anything that could contribute to long-term company growth” (Foroohar 2016b: 27). Small wonder that, in the heart of capitalist society itself, voices critical of capital, such as Foroohar’s, are being heard. The upshot of her criticism is that the current version of neoliberal discourse can be seen as an extreme development of its earlier versions as summarised by David Harvey and (more critically) by McChesney; it has clearly taken “social control” to an extreme in terms of what Foroohar calls “financialisation” (for a sustained investigation of the link between the housing market, finance, and the 2008 economic crisis, see Harvey 2010, particularly 1-39). Given the inseparability of the economic and the political (as intimated by both Harvey and McChesney, as indeed by thinkers in the field of political economy generally), this cannot be without political consequences in the long run, as may be seen in the disenchantment with politicians evident in the 2016 American presidential race – the fact that millions of Americans supported Bernie Sanders and Donald Trump testifies to their lack of trust in the “political classes” (Von Drehle 2016; Taylor 2016; Altman 2016). Moreover, according to Manuel Castells this is a worldwide trend; in a recent interview (Castells 2012: 4) he states explicitly that his research has revealed that today, people increasingly do not trust politicians and banks/bankers any longer. When

people’s ability to survive economically is seriously undermined by developments like those addressed by Foroohar, their political will to address such a situation is ineluctably awakened, whatever the consequences of such an awakening might be. The emergent minor discourse discussed below must be seen against this backdrop.

Deleuze and Guattari on Capitalism

A question that may arise at this point is where Deleuze and Guattari stand on capitalism, and what the relevance of this, if any, would be for the present article. It is worth noting, to begin with, that “capital”, for Deleuze and Guattari (1983: 10), “is indeed the body without organs of the capitalist, or rather of the capitalist being”. It is understandable that it is “capital”, and not capitalism, which qualifies for this description (as “body without organs”), given its abstract, processual character (as described in *Anti-Oedipus* 1983), which is nothing in social reality, but has far-reaching effects in the social-economic sphere. In the present age, capital can be understood as a major “body without organs”, with which the subject as consumer enters into successive “couplings”, where “body without organs” appears to mean something undifferentiated and unproductive, although it is itself produced by the activity of “desiring machines” – the basic constituents of Deleuze and Guattari’s process-ontology (Deleuze & Guattari 1983: 7-8, 16). Here I cannot pursue this issue at length; suffice it to state that the relation between capital, the “subject”, and the “body without organs” is probably one of the most important, albeit puzzling aspects of the ontology articulated in *Anti-Oedipus*. What one should note in the present context, however, is the following regarding the major signifier of capital, namely, money:

By substituting money for the very notion of a code, it [capitalism] has created an axiomatic of abstract quantities that keeps moving further and further in the direction of the deterritorialization of the socius. Capitalism tends toward a threshold of decoding that will destroy the socius in order to make it a body without organs and unleash the flows of desire on this body as a deterritorialized field.

(Deleuze & Guattari 1983: 33)

What does this mean for the present argument? It will be recalled that capitalism was characterised, earlier, as a combination of freedoms (free trade, and so on) and control for the sake of profit. Deleuze and Guattari confirm these insights in their own inimitable way. Capitalism, for them, is thoroughly paradoxical – through its mode of production, it generates an awe-inspiring “schizophrenic accumulation of energy” (corresponding with the freedom to produce and trade, noted earlier), but simultaneously also what Deleuze and Guattari (1983: 34) call its “vast powers of repression” regarding

the very limit of (free) “schizophrenic”, multi-faceted production that it strives towards. While it characteristically “decodes” flows, that is, changes the meaning and value of things and people, and “deterritorializes” the socius (the principle upon which society is based, at any given time), for the maximization of production, it also “recodes” and “reterritorializes” these in imaginary and symbolic ways (1983: 34). Hence there is a rollercoaster alternation between ceaseless, “free” production and “violent, artificial” imposition of boundaries. Deleuze and Guattari’s characterisation of this ambivalence at the heart of capital becomes more comprehensible where they elaborate on its production-promoting tendency (decoding and deterritorialisation of productive flows), on the one hand, and its countervailing tendency (artificial reterritorialisation), on the other (1983: 34-35): the “capitalist machine deterritorializes” flows to extract “surplus value” from them, and correspondingly, what they call “its ancillary apparatuses, such as government bureaucracies and the forces of law and order”, strenuously “reterritorialize” these processes, absorbing surplus value as they do so.

In light of the integral role played by Marx’s thought in *Anti-Oedipus* (there are numerous references to his work in it), it seems that “surplus value” is used in the Marxist sense here, namely, as the source of (capitalist) profit, given the difference in value between workers’ products and the (inferior) wages they are paid. With this in mind, one might translate what was written above from its Deleuze-Guattarian idiom as meaning that, while capitalism’s tendency to reduce everything that exists – and even that which does not yet exist: think of “futures” trading on stock exchanges – to a means for the generation of profit through surplus-value production, paradoxically it requires the otherwise production-inhibiting agencies of the state and the law to be able to proceed unhindered in this “free”, “schizophrenic” production. In other words, the “schizophrenic” aspect of capitalism can never exist in its purity, unencumbered by the return of precisely those social practices that undermine its “schizophrenization” of social and economic life. What Deleuze and Guattari describe (and valorise) as the “flows” of “desiring-production”, which are exacerbated by one side of capitalism’s being, faces an apparently impenetrable wall of deterrence in the shape of capitalism’s other, repressive side. Although formulated in idiosyncratic philosophical terms, this resonates with the earlier characterisation of capitalism.

A Contemporary Minor Discourse: Klein’s Discourse on “Disaster Capitalism”

Against the background of the earlier discussion of minor literature and language, as well as of capitalism, and my project of pursuing the possibility of “minor discourse(s)”, there are several candidates for consideration under the heading of “contemporary minor discourses”. Within available space I

shall focus on only one of the most promising ones, namely Naomi Klein’s emergent minor discourse on what she terms “disaster capitalism”, elaborated in *The Shock Doctrine* (2007) and taken further in *This Changes Everything* (2014) in the context of the worsening ecological crisis. (What follows must be read against the backdrop of what was written earlier about a major/minor language/literature in Deleuze and Guattari’s work, and major/minor discourse; importantly, it is *not* the “information” on disaster capitalism and ecological degradation supplied by Klein that is relevant here, but the manner in which it is framed by the minor discourse she develops by undermining the “order words” of capitalist discourse, specifically “the market”.) In the former book Klein exposes the cynicism underpinning the relentless manner in which “disaster capitalism” opportunistically (mis-)uses various kinds of collective disorientation to establish new markets. Not surprisingly, it turns out that behind all of this lurk the economic theories of Milton Friedman (referred to earlier) – once discredited in the US, but later hailed as the prophet of the “free market”. Succinctly put, “disaster capitalism” derives from Friedman’s “shock doctrine”, that “only a crisis – actual or perceived – produces real change. When that crisis occurs, the actions that are taken depend on the ideas that are lying around. That, I believe, is our basic function: to develop alternatives to existing policies, to keep them alive and available until the politically impossible becomes politically inevitable” (Friedman, quoted in Klein 2007: 6). Just as some people stockpile food in anticipation of disasters, Friedman’s followers stockpile “free-market ideas”, and do their best to implement them in the wake of a major disaster or any other kind of social disorientation.

The problem is that the post-disaster implementation of these ideas does not leave the lives of ordinary people untouched; quite the contrary. Among the instances of “disaster capitalism” that Klein elaborates on are New Orleans after hurricane Katrina (the severity of which was probably global-warming-induced) in 2005, Sri Lanka after the devastating tsunami in 2004 and Iraq after the US military invasion, showing how, in each case, developers exploited the disorientation (collective “shock”) on the part of communities to privatise as much as possible of what used to be public organisations. The gist of her argument, supported by relentless investigative journalism, is simply that carrying out Friedman’s Chicago School gospel entails waiting for the right opportunity to arise, and when it does – either because of natural disasters or political trauma – to pounce and install private enterprise, with a view to profiting optimally from the situation. Before the hurricane-induced floods in New Orleans, for instance, there were 123 functioning public schools and only seven “charter schools” (schools funded by the public, but operated by private companies as they see fit, in many cases for profit). In the space of 19 months after the disaster, this public school system was all but destroyed, and replaced by a private (charter) school system; only four public schools remained, while the charter schools grew to 31 (Klein 2007: 5). How

was this possible, drastically reducing the opportunities for “same-standard education” (for which the civil rights movement in the US had fought so hard), available to all schoolchildren, regardless of their economic circumstances? It is instructive to note that 93-year-old Milton Friedman wrote an op-ed for the *Wall Street Journal* (the Bible of neoliberal capitalism) about three months after the storm, observing that, because the homes and schools in New Orleans were tragically “in ruins”, it was “an opportunity to radically reform the educational system” (Klein 2007: 4-5). His disciples heeded his calls – in a gesture of betrayal of the ordinary (especially poor) people of the city, most of the public schools in New Orleans were auctioned off to private entities. In this way some of the crucial gains of the civil rights movement for many people across the US were arbitrarily reversed.

In Sri Lanka, Klein (2007: 8) shows, much the same thing happened in the wake of the tsunami: in true Friedmanite fashion, a suspiciously cooperative Sri Lankan government and international investors (ab-)used the opportunity afforded by the chaos that ensued to make the beautiful coastline available to developers, who, in a relatively short time, constructed large resorts – playgrounds for the rich – effectively preventing the people who depended on fishing for their sustenance (hundreds of thousands of them) from reconstructing their devastated villages near the sea. Another “world-class tourist destination” was created in the atmosphere of disorientation left in the wake of a natural disaster. As Klein further indicates, it is not only natural disasters that create the circumstances for free market entrepreneurs to strike, exploiting opportunities of collective trauma on the part of communities (or entire societies) for mainly their own economic benefit. Disruptive political, social and military events similarly open up these opportunities – a case in point being post-invasion Iraq (Klein 2007: 8-9, 13-15). In her chapter (2007: 194-217) on South Africa’s transition to “democracy” after 1994, she demonstrates – as the chapter’s title suggests, namely “Democracy born in chains: South Africa’s constricted freedom” – that although the African National Congress won the negotiations politically, it lost dismally in economic terms, having been left scant option but to embrace Friedman’s Chicago School neoliberal economic principles. What made this possible was, of course, the relative social disorientation after the fall of apartheid (which was in itself a good thing, of course, but left people without familiar parameters, and hence easily vulnerable), which provided golden opportunities for free market colonisation of areas of social and economic activity previously largely under state control, such as health care.

The genius of Klein’s investigative work lies in the fact that, to be able to unmask the claims of Friedmanite neoliberal capitalism as being illusory, she ingeniously inserts a minor discursive “chaos” of sorts into its majoritarian discourse, analogous to the manner in which Kafka used the language of a major literature in minoritarian ways that fundamentally altered its social and political function. By inserting the term “disaster” as a qualifier for “capita-

lism”, and the phrase “the shock doctrine” to highlight the parallel between these capitalist practices and the psychiatric work of psychiatrist Dr Ewen Cameron – consisting of the use of electric shocks intended to wipe a patient’s psyche “clean” before reconstructive therapy could start (2007: 25-48) – Klein utilises a line of flight within neoliberal discourse, unleashing just enough “chaos” into the discursive system to unsettle its majoritarian discursive claims as outlined earlier, in the process subverting the neoliberal “order word” *par excellence*, namely “the market”. As a result its grandiose assertions about being the apex of economic history (insofar as it supposedly has the capacity to provide a life of economic satisfaction for everyone in society) are laid bare as being the exact opposite of what they purport to be, namely the systematic economic, political, social, cultural and educational disempowerment of people who value public participation in these areas (the “commons”), in favour of private interests, as the example of replacing public schools with private ones demonstrates.

Seven years later, she published one of the most important books on climate change – *This Changes Everything: Capitalism vs the Climate* (2014) – on the latest, irrefutable evidence that it is occurring before our very eyes, despite the complex web of capitalist-orchestrated denial and disinformation discourses surrounding it. She also exposes the unscrupulous forces behind the denialist tendency on the part of the vast majority of people globally and the cynicism displayed by corporations and companies, some of which are already preparing to *make profit* out of extreme climate conditions, when countries are likely to become ungovernable, and private security companies are called upon by governments to move in and “restore order” (at a price, of course). The latter phenomenon connects with the theme of *The Shock Doctrine* (2007), discussed above, but *This Changes Everything* takes her work further, this time into the domain of capitalism’s blindly relentless exacerbation of climate change. One of the most disconcerting things about Klein’s findings is her confirmation (to the more pessimistically inclined among us) that, instead of bringing human beings closer together (like World War Two did in Britain and in America, for example: a common threat was tackled with great social solidarity), climate change, or global warming to be more exact, is now apparently driving people further apart along the lines of the “haves and have-nots”. This is the case despite the fact that, as she points out, climate change is a “great equaliser” (2014: 45) that affects everyone, from the poorest to the wealthiest. Instead of the world’s “leaders” coming together in the face of the now incontrovertible evidence of probably catastrophic, anthropogenic climate change and forging a global, *democratic* programme to take the necessary, if for many privileged people unpalatable economic steps to restrict global warming to two degrees centigrade, *nothing* concrete has emerged from the climate conferences that have taken place, except, as she notes (Klein 2014: 5-14), talking and more talking. At these conferences the representatives of the wealthy nations “stare at their shoes”

(2014: 10) while those from poor countries desperately try to persuade them to take action. In relatively poor Bolivia, for example, the glaciers on which Bolivians depend throughout the year for drinking water, have melted to such a degree – largely because of global warming driven by the big emitters, chief among them the US and China – that they face a future of water scarcity.

It is pointless to dwell, yet again, on the accumulating scientific evidence for climate change (she has summarised it all, and moreover, it is available in many other sources, like Kovel 2007 and Foster *et al* 2010) – it is freely available to everyone. What deserves one’s attention, rather, is the evidence of a different kind, ferreted out by Klein in the beast’s lair, as it were (the Heartland Institute, among others), that the many, well-orchestrated denials of climate change – some of them by “scientists” – issue from well-funded, conservative think-tanks, driven by politically and economically conservative ideological agendas (Klein 2014: 27-55). For every new instance of climate-change evidence, in published or audio-visual media format, a carefully planned or prepared rebuttal is channelled to the media, with the result that today far fewer people believe that climate change is happening than did five years ago. It is simply a matter of manipulating public opinion in the direction of believing something reassuring, albeit false, rather than what is the case, namely that humanity is rushing headlong into a state of affairs where water and food will probably become so scarce that people will enter into conflict over access to these. And those with access to superior military resources will win.

But why take so much trouble to sway the public into believing that everything is hunky-dory? As Klein indicates, it is because the conservatives, far more than the ambivalent, hair-splitting liberals, know what is at stake: if climate change is in fact happening, and the future is really as bleak as scientists claim it is without urgent, globally orchestrated action to rein in global warming, the wealthy are those who would stand to lose much more than the poor. Moreover, the wealthy believe that even if potentially disastrous, extreme climate change is on the cards, they have the means to weather the storms that lie ahead, even if the poor don’t. In fact, the corporations are already preparing themselves to stay profitable even if the concrete results of sustained, high levels of carbon emissions prove to be disruptive of life as we know it. (Who cares about the poor and vulnerable, anyway?) Klein puts it this way:

And this points to what really lies behind the casual attitude about climate change, whether it is being expressed as disaster denialism or disaster capitalism. Those involved feel free to engage in these high-stakes gambles because they believe that they and theirs will be protected from the ravages in question, at least for another generation or so.

(2014: 50)

The cynicism behind the debonair attitude of the people Klein has listened to or interviewed while researching the book leaves one breathless. It is nothing unusual for such people to state explicitly that they don't care about the millions who face starvation in light of the looming crisis: those exposed nations should “get busy making money” (2014: 47), which is the only means for preparing for Armageddon. The calculated denial of climate change has a gender side to it as well, which Klein highlights as follows, although she does not pursue its implications:

One of the most interesting findings of the many recent studies on climate perceptions is the clear connection between a refusal to accept the science of climate change and social and economic privilege. Overwhelmingly, climate change deniers are not only conservative but also white and male, a group with higher than average incomes.

(2014: 46)

Such men have been in positions of economic power to a disproportionate degree, and it is therefore no surprise that they defend the system. One can add that, as many feminists have argued, women's approach to power is generally very different, less oriented to domination than that of men, and it is therefore a moot question, whether we would have been in this dire situation if society had been more egalitarian, if not woman-centred. Klein herself is a case in point: despite fierce opposition from countless capitalist apologists, she has stood her ground courageously, arguably fighting for more than only human beings' future on the planet – all life is implicated. In discursive (*and* political) terms it is interesting to note that she believes that only a mass democratic movement would be capable of turning the tables on the continued ravaging of the earth by capitalism (Klein 2014: 388-403).

Developing a Minor Discourse

In terms of the cultivation of a “minor discourse” on Klein's part, this book (2014) further develops what she started in the first one (2007), by demonstrating discursively that a minor discourse *can* and does become audible in the interstices of the major capitalist discourse. Here it happens in a manner analogous to her way of doing research (which entails entering the spaces where the most unapologetic representatives of big capital are to be found), namely by situating her disruptive discursive interventions precisely there, where the mainstream discourse, with its characteristic “order words” is most vulnerable. In this case it is in its (putatively) “democratic” underbelly, to which capitalism – Milton Friedman (1962), for instance, in his valorisation of individual liberty – always pays lip-service, but concomitantly undermines by incrementally concentrating economic (and therefore also political) power in the hands of a small elite. By radically insisting on democratic power as

being inseparable from people in the guise of a mass movement, she activates a deterritorialising “line of flight” within the “ordering” discourse of capitalism, which potentially unhinges it from its moorings. Recall Bogue’s description (above) of Deleuze and Guattari’s characterisation of Kafka’s minor literary strategies, where the latter would reverse the relationship “... between dominant forms of content and dominated forms of expression” (Bogue 1989: 119). By gaining a purchase on what is *supposedly* part and parcel of capitalism, but is in fact vitiated by the dynamics of capitalist power, namely the concept of *democracy*, and in her discursive-linguistic appropriation of it restoring to it the primacy it deserves in political terms, she has resurrected precisely that which had been relegated discursively to an inferior, secondary position by the dominant “market”-thread of capitalist discourse. After all, its decisive interpretation of freedom is in economic terms, with the political meaning of freedom being subordinated to its economic implications, centred on wealth accumulation through unrestrained privatisation of production and resources, regardless of the collateral damage it has inflicted on social and natural ecosystems, endangering the future of all living beings on Earth (see also Foster *et al* 2010). Take the following passage, for example, where – discursively/conceptually speaking – she reverses the priority between the “dominant” or major economic and the “dominated” or minor political elements in democracy:

... the real solutions to the climate crisis are also our best hope of building a much more stable and equitable economic system, one that strengthens and transforms the public sphere, generates plentiful, dignified work, and radically reins in corporate greed. But before that can happen, it’s clear that a core battle of ideas must be fought about the right of citizens to democratically determine what kind of economy they need. Policies that simply try to harness the power of the market – by minimally taxing or capping carbon and then getting out of the way – won’t be enough. If we are to rise to a challenge that involves altering the very foundation of our economy, we will need every policy tool in the democratic arsenal.

(Klein 2014: 110)

In her tireless investigative efforts Klein uncovers more than democratic policy tools, however, and simultaneously signals the appearance of the democratic movement that can change the course of capitalist-driven ecological degradation. Furthermore, in her writing she forges an indissoluble minoritarian discursive link between democracy and ecological concerns, which serves to destabilise the major discourse of capitalism further. So, for instance, after discussing graphic instances of resistance on the part of ordinary people to digging and drilling for oil, shale gas and the like, subsumed under the non-place-specific name of “Blockadia” for “a roving transnational conflict zone”, she observes:

THE POSSIBILITY OF A “MINOR DISCOURSE” THAT DETERRITORIALISES ...

Resistance to high-risk extreme extraction is building a global, grassroots, and broad-based network the likes of which the environmental movement has rarely seen. And perhaps this phenomenon shouldn't even be referred to as an environmental movement at all, since it is primarily driven by a desire for a deeper form of democracy, one that provides communities with real control over those resources that are most critical to collective survival – the health of the water, air, and soil. In the process, these place-based stands are stopping real climate crimes in progress.

(Klein 2014: 254, 255)

Here she conspicuously links democracy and ecological concerns, and she does so by driving home, in conceptual-discursive terms, the inseparability of communities, collective survival, democratic control and environmental concerns, in the face of what she calls (another crucial minoritarian discursive revaluation) “climate crimes”. Compare what Deleuze and Guattari write about major and minor languages:

We should distinguish between minor languages, the major language, and the becoming-minor of the major language. Minorities, of course, are objectively definable states, states of language, ethnicity, or sex with their own ghetto territorialities, but they must also be thought of as seeds, crystals of becoming whose value is to trigger uncontrollable movements and deterritorializations of the mean or majority.

(1987: 106)

In terms of my overall argument the manifestations of democratic resistance (including “Blockadia”) discerned by Klein, and, importantly, articulated as a “minor” discourse within the more encompassing major discourse of “neoliberal democracy” (virtually an oxymoron, in the light of Klein's work), it is a matter of the major discourse “becoming-minor”. And this is “definable” in respect of the “minor state of discourse”, which has been shown to deterritorialise the major discourse of neoliberalism. As such a deterritorialising force, Klein's “minor discourse of democracy” comprises a “crystal of becoming-minor”. Despite being formulated in terms of the familiar political figure of “democracy”, it puts democratic discourse to a radically different use; as Deleuze and Guattari say of Kafka's minor literature, it is like being “... a sort of stranger *within* [his own] language”.

It should be clear, in the light of this brief elaboration on Klein's work *contra* capitalist exploitation of traumatising situations, from natural disasters to political disorientation and invasive corporate attempts to profit still more from privatisation of public enterprises and the extraction of fossil fuels, that her work is an exemplary instance of what I have here characterised (by analogy with Deleuze and Guattari's notion of a “minor literature” or “minor language”) as an emergent “minor discourse”. That there are several other candidates for such an assessment goes without saying, but I lack the space to explore the precise manner in which they proceed discursively. For purposes

of further research in this regard (over and above that initiated by Deleuze and Guattari) one can briefly list some of the most significant ones as follows: Bernard Stiegler's (2010, 2015) discourse on the "proletarianisation" of consumers and the destruction of their *savoir faire* (know-how) and *savoir vivre* (knowledge of how to live one's life) by the cynical capitalist use of mnemotechnical devices such as smartphones; Thomas Princen's (2005, 2010) ecological discourse which deterritorialises the discourse of neo-liberalism, seizing on opportunities within the latter where virtual "lines of flight" can be actualised; Jacques Rancière's (1999: 1-19) discourse on equality, which unmasks global "democracies" as being oligarchies functioning hierarchically in the interest of the economic and political elite; Paul Hawken's (2007) discourse on "blessed unrest" among the millions of people comprising the "largest social movement in history", albeit "under the radar" because of the heterogeneity of its diverse organisational components; and Hardt and Negri's (2001, 2005, 2009, 2012) capitalism-subverting discourse on "Empire", "multitude" and "commonwealth". There are others, but these will have to suffice.*

* The financial assistance of the National Research Foundation of South Africa, and of the University of the Free State towards the completion of this research is hereby gratefully acknowledged.

References

- Altman, A.
2016 Tribal Warrior. *TIME*, March 14, pp. 26-29.
- Bogue, R.
1989 *Deleuze and Guattari*. London: Routledge.
2007 *Deleuze's Way. Essays in Transverse Ethics and Aesthetics*. Burlington: Ashgate Publishing Company.
- Braidotti, R.
2013 *The Posthuman*. Cambridge: Polity.
- Castells, M.
2012 Analysis: Alternative Economic Cultures: Manuel Castells. Interviewed by Paul Mason. London: BBC Documentary transcript.
- Castells, M., Caraça, J. & Cardoso, G. (eds)
2012 *Aftermath: The Cultures of the Economic Crisis*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Conio, A. (ed.)
2015 *Occupy – A People yet to Come*. London: Open Humanities Press.
- Deleuze, G.
2003 *Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation*. Trans. Smith, D.W. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
2005 *Cinema 2: The Time-Image*. Trans. Tomlinson, H. & Galeta, R. New York: Continuum.

THE POSSIBILITY OF A “MINOR DISCOURSE” THAT DETERRITORIALISES ...

- Deleuze, G. & Guattari, F.
 1983 *Anti-Oedipus. Capitalism and Schizophrenia* (Vol. 1). Trans. Hurley, R., Seem, M. & Lane, HR. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
 1986 *Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature*. Trans. Polan, D. Minneapolis: The University of Minnesota Press.
 1987 *A Thousand Plateaus. Capitalism and Schizophrenia* (Vol. 2). Trans. Massumi, B. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Foroohar, R.
 2016a *Makers and Takers*. New York: Crown Business Publishers.
 2016b Saving Capitalism. *TIME Magazine*, 23 May, pp. 22-28.
- Foster, J. B., Clark, B., & York, R.
 2010 *The Ecological Rift – Capitalism’s War on the Earth*. New York: Monthly Review Press.
- Friedman, M.
 1962 *Capitalism and Freedom*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
- Guattari, F.
 2000 *The Three Ecologies*. Trans. Pindar, I. and Sutton, P. London: The Athlone Press.
- Hardt, M. & Negri, A.
 2001 *Empire*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
 2005 *Multitude. War and Democracy in the Age of Empire*. New York: Penguin Books.
 2009 *Commonwealth*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
 2012 *Declaration*. New York: Argo Navis.
- Harvey, D.
 2005 *A Brief History of Neoliberalism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
 2010 *The Enigma of Capital and the Crises of Capitalism*. London: Profile Books.
- Hawken, P.
 2007 *Blessed Unrest. How the Largest Movement in the World Came into Being and No One Saw It Coming*. New York: Viking Press.
- Klein, N.
 2007 *The Shock Doctrine. The Rise of Disaster Capitalism*. London: Penguin.
 2014 *This Changes Everything: Capitalism vs. the Climate*. Toronto: Alfred A. Knopf Canada.
- Konik, I.
 2009 A Foucaultian Critique of the Conception of Individual Subjectivity within Contemporary Environmental Discourse. Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University, Port Elizabeth. Unpublished Master’s dissertation.
- Kovel, J.
 2007 *The Enemy of Nature: The End of Capitalism or the End of the World?* Second Edition. New York: Zed Books.

- Kristeva, J.
2000 *The Sense and Non-sense of Revolt: The Powers and Limits of Psychoanalysis, Vol. I.* Trans. Herman, J. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Lacan, J.
1978 On Psychoanalytic Discourse. (pp. 1-15). Trans. Stone, J.W. Online: <http://web.missouri.edu/~stonej/Milan_Dis-course2> 9 May 2008.
2007 *The Other Side of Psychoanalysis; 1969-1970 The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book 17.* Trans. Grigg, R. New York: W.W. Norton & Co.
- Lovelock, J.
2010 *The Vanishing Face of Gaia. A Final Warning.* London: Penguin Books.
- McChesney, R.W.
1999 Introduction. In: Chomsky, N. *Profit over People. Neoliberalism and Global Order.* New York: Seven Stories Press, pp. 7-16.
- Olivier, B.
2012 Lacan on the Discourse of Capitalism; Critical Prospects. In: Olivier, B. *Intersecting Philosophical Planes.* Frankfurt: Peter Lang Publishers, pp. 47-67.
2014 The Subject: Deleuze/Guattari or Lacan? *Phronimon, Journal of the South African Society for Greek Philosophy and the Humanities* 15(1):46-66.
2016 Deleuze's "Crystals of Time", Human Subjectivity and Social History. *Phronimon, Journal of the South African Society for Greek Philosophy and the Humanities* 17(1): 1-32.
- Parr, A. (ed.)
2010 *The Deleuze Dictionary* (Revised edition). Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
- Princen, T.
2005 *The Logic of Sufficiency.* Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
2010 *Treading Softly: Paths to Ecological Order.* Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press.
- Ranci re, J.
1999 *Dis-agreement: Politics and Philosophy.* Trans. Rose, J. Minneapolis: The University of Minnesota Press.
- Stiegler, B.
2010 *For a New Critique of Political Economy.* Trans. Ross, D. Cambridge: Polity Press.
2015 *States of Shock: Stupidity and Knowledge in the 21st Century* Cambridge: Polity Press. (Kindle edition.)
- Taylor, P.
2016 The Kids are all Left. *TIME*, Feb. 29, pp. 22-27.
- Von Drehle, D.
2016 Destination Unknown. *TIME*, March 14, pp. 20-25.

Bert Olivier
University of the Free State
OlivierG1@ufs.ac.za