

Literary history after Foucault?

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Summary

The essay shows the manner in which Literary History, normally conceived as being an aid to literary studies becomes, in fact, a judgement of what is commonly known as Literature (art). It proceeds with giving an overview of existing literary-historical theories and practices which are located in six categories before outlining Foucault's archaeological and genealogical procedures. Although Literary History after Foucault is a chimera, his critiques of history, constituting fundamentally a critique of reason and the transcendental/sovereign subject as the sites of meaning are useful to Literary Theory because they afford insights into history as a construct of language and especially of discursive practices.

Opsomming

Die artikel toon aan hoe literatuurgeskiedenis, wat normaalweg beskou word as 'n hulp vir literêre studies, inderdaad gesien word as oordeel van dit wat algemeen as **literatuur (kuns)** bekendstaan. Dit gaan voort met die aanbieding van 'n oorsig oor bestaande literêr-historiese teorieë en praktyke wat in ses kategorieë afgebaken word, voordat Foucault se argeologiese en genealogiese werkwyse geskets word. Alhoewel literatuurgeskiedenis na Foucault 'n chimera is, is sy kritiese oordele van geskiedenis – basies bestaande uit 'n kritiese beskouing van logika en die transendentale/soewereine subjek as dië lokaliteit van betekenis – nuttig vir Literêre Teorie, want hulle bied insig in die geskiedenis as 'n konstruksie van taal en spesifiek van diskursiewe praktyke.

The topic is phrased as a question. Its interrogative stance is deliberate, for in as much as Foucault's archaeological and genealogical procedures question historicism and its concomitant bourgeoisie philosophy of history, his very own procedures open themselves up for questioning thus demarcating a space in which not only history but also the concept of Literature are deconstructed.

In the realm of literary scholarship Literary History is usually regarded as a *Hilfswissenschaft*, an aid to criticism. Literary History appears to concern itself with a scholarly question of classification; how the 'great works' ought to be arranged on the shelves of that library which constitutes the written memory of the collective past of a people.¹ Literary History as laid down by the various English, French, German and even Afrikaans histories of literature in their respective languages forms an accrual system in which the first written text in a particular language usually demarcates the origin of the tradition while present writing indicates the point reached by a continuous and open-ended evolution of literary works. In the library of 'great works' built by the 'great tradition' history itself becomes the sovereign subject and arbiter who judges the written as in need of preservation. The 'test of time' becomes the instrument with which that worthy of reprinting and dissemination in the institutions of learning is severed from those pieces of writing which may be forgotten. By sitting in judgement over inclusion and exclusion history thus, although usually unnoticed by critics, oversteps its function as aid to criticism while becoming, in fact, the creator of Literature with a capital

L. It is the canonization of texts rather than any textual property which elevates the written to the status of literature, that is, to the status of artefact. Characteristically, neither Russian Formalism nor Anglo-American New Criticism ever embraced the question of history because it separated poetic or artistic texts from non-poetic ones on the basis of certain properties or devices contained in their structure.

Before Literary History entered the stage on the Continent in the second half of the 18th century, its emergence having been aided by Herder's work in Germany,² the division between the valuable text and the ordinary one was facilitated either by ritual or by class-membership. The Latin division between '*scriptura*' and '*litteratura*', the sacred and the profane demarcated an area of functions and not merely an array of linguistic substances.³ That is to say, a particular text spoken as in the oral tradition or enscribed upon parchment derived its status from its use and not from history. Texts embedded in sacred as well as profane rituals occupied a special place by being, precisely, part of such a particular event. The Bible, ancient Greek drama and poetry including readings of the Homeric Epic enjoyed, just like praise-poetry in Africa, a special status in relation to their special function. The same can probably be said of the Medieval texts whose elevated status is largely dependent upon their precious inscriptions in the form of illuminated manuscripts. Yet it appears as if the notion of group – or class – membership in relation to social interaction as an instrument for the preservation of texts is intertwined with the work's function. For a caste of priests, girots, ministerialis, and later educators and scholars seemed to have guaranteed the status of a text without any recourse to the 'test of time'. Such recourse only became possible after history's occupation of the position of agent, a possibility which in the opinion of Foucault voiced in *Les mots et les choses* arose with the formation of the modern epistémé. Literature with a capital L and history as historicism are thus interdependent.

When Vincent Descombes opens the chapter on Foucault 'The critique of history' in his *Modern French Philosophy* with the sentence: 'History is the western myth' (1982: 110) he should have really said: 'Historicism is a western myth'. For history is, at first, a construct of language and secondly, in the shape of historicism, a construct of discourse. To unmask and to criticize historicism as a product of certain discursive constellations is precisely one of the objects of Foucault's critique of history. However, in as much as Foucault narrates in *Histoire de la folie à l'âge classique* (1972) the process of the exclusion of madness and the necessary condition for the production of reason in the 18th century and in the way in which he tells the story of the formation of the Human Sciences in *Les mots et les choses* (1966) from the early 17th to the 20th century, he partakes in exactly that process which is at the root of all memory and all history, namely language. All western languages posit a past in their tense structures. They also enable the position of a future. Language, therefore, holds the past and the future into which is inserted the present as a minimal tense (for most western languages only have one tense with which to denote the present as opposed to a number of past and future tenses!) as potential for the activation and re-activation of mem-

ory. The telling of the story which in French and German includes the linguistic designation of the work '*history*' (*histoire/Geschichte/story*) is the very foundation of history. All historiography is but an accumulation of separate, different and differing '*histories*'. The enunciation by way of writing the archaeology of the silence of madness designates not so much a past before history as it does direct the gaze to a different story which historicism had eradicated from memory. Neither archaeological nor genealogical procedures as advocated by Foucault escape historiography; they produce, instead, a different history. It is only in this *other* story that 'the limits of what we can recognise as *our* history' (Descombes, 1981: 111) become visible.

What, then, are the factors which distinguish Foucault's stories or narratives from historicist ones?⁴ In order to show-up the manner in which, both, the archaeological as well as the genealogical procedure can be read as critiques of historicism, a closer look at the concepts which informed the various writings of Literary History is necessary: although a chronological ordering of so-called '*literary facts*' is common to all literary-historical writing, its objective differs in accordance with the particular philosophy of history which informs it. There is no doubt about what may be called the *imperative of the past tense* which necessitates *collection*, *re-collection* and a process of *ordering*. *Collection*, in a two-fold sense of being in an attentive state and assembling data and documents, is at the foundation of all historiography and Foucault's work constitutes no exception. Both his archaeological and genealogical projects are grounded in what Foucault calls 'a vast accumulation of source material' (1977: 140). Genealogy, especially, is in his words 'gray, meticulous, and patiently documentary. It operates on a field of entangled and confused parchments, on documents that have been scratched over and recopied many times.' (1977: 139).

Any good literary historian particularly if he has also been a philologist in the Continental sense has proceeded in this manner.⁵ Thus the difference between Foucault's projects and literary history writing in the last two hundred years exists on the levels of *re-collection* and *ordering*. By *re-collection* I mean to demarcate a process of selection including a purpose. Works which have supposedly stood 'the test of time' are thus re-collected for the purpose of marking the 'great tradition' of English literature, which, in turn, is seen to constitute a continuity, bridging past and present. This continuity also serves the stabilization of meaning, for, in spite of different trends and styles of writing the canon is able to super-impose a totalizing effect which guarantees even the disparate text a place in the larger unity of English or German or French Literature. Although different canons such as Feminist- or working-class Literature have been suggested recently, they do not escape the principle of continuity. For in as much as they need the past text to legitimize the present, they produce a challenge to the 'great tradition' on the level of selection but do not constitute a critique of meaning per se. Instead of relating word and object, textual representation and referent for the purpose of showing how the adversaries to life can be conquered in Literature, they use the same procedures in order to seek meaning in those texts which the 'great tradition' has hitherto excluded and discarded. This new line of voices from

women, working-class-, and colonized people certainly produces a counter-tradition. But even a very necessary counter-tradition is still a tradition! It merely substitutes one object for another while retaining the position of sovereign subject, a subject who believes to be master of all objects.

It is on the level of *re-collection* and *ordering* that literary historians differ with regard to their selecting and placing of data. Existing theory and praxis can be broadly defined as fitting into six categories. Each of these is not so much dependent upon re-collection as it is upon *ordering*. That is to say each category has inscribed in it a different modality of history. The first category associated with Vico, Herder, and their followers regards history as a process analogous to that of organic growth and decay. The history of a people including the history of their literature follows the pattern of the life of an individual. There is a time where the literature of a young nation or linguistic group finds its own voice usually in opposition to an already existing older Literature like French in 18th century Germany or English in 20th century South Africa. This is followed by the stage of maturity which is usually associated with an epoch of impressive literary production as in the English Renaissance of the 16th century, French Classicism in the 17th, and German Romanticism in the late 18th century. A certain decay for a lessening of imaginative powers seems to be inevitable, though, for the epochs of heightened production and stylistic innovations seem to be followed by periods of eclecticism and experimentation. A Literary History of this type can usually not really produce a theory of the avant-garde.⁶

This can be done by literary histories in the second category which incorporate developmental notions which are not so much dependent upon reducing the data of the past to the orbit of an individual's life-span, albeit on an enlarged scale. Instead, they see earlier stages of modes of representation as major accomplishments and essential for later development whereby contributions of each stage are retained in subsequent extensions, revisions, and transformations. This development is neither predetermined nor does it post an ideal goal or telos. Instead it maintains the notion of texts working on other texts whereby the later text may incorporate, parody, challenge, or even violate the norms of earlier ones. A number of more recent reflections on Literary History such as those by Jauss (1970 and 1984), Söring (1976), Uhlig (1982) and Guillén (1970) imply references to this category in spite of differences with regard to the selection of material and its concomitant purpose.

A third category may be briefly described as ordering its data not so much linearly but in polar oppositions. Although the linearity of the second category may be one of broken succession, diffused relations, and even repetitions, this third category only knows two types. Auerbach (1946), for example, depicts Literary History as a continuous pendular movement between the poles of 'fore-grounding' or realism and allegorical or idealist depiction. Drawing upon the work of the art historian Wölfflin (1888), Strich sees the History of German Literature as tending either to the pole of Classicism or to that of Romanticism (Strich, 1949). Similarly, Abrams (1953) accounts for the changes in the imagination from Neo-classicism to Romanticism by ascribing

opposing relations to reality to each of the periods. Such a typological ordering of material is discernible even in the works of Barthes in as much as they distinguish between the readerly (realist/classic) text and the writerly (modern/avant-garde) one (Barthes, 1970).

Examples given of what might be called 'typologies' are quite different to those belonging to the fourth category labeled as 'periodization'. Although both categories draw on stylistic or formal distinctions between texts rather than on generic and thematic ones, 'periodization' very much disclaims the pendulum swing between types of writing. Instead, a series of periods or epochs, each quite distinct from the other, follow upon each other as suggested by Wellek (1963). Each of these independent monolithic blocks are characterized by a dominance of specific main-currents in Literature absent in the preceding periods. Problems arising from the necessity to limit each epoch to a definite time-span as well as from the simultaneous existence of discontinuous structures in any given period are suppressed for the sake of uniformity supposedly created by the family of new forms which emerged in a particular epoch.

More recent studies in Literary History which are subsumed here under a fifth category of 'systems' try to overcome the difficulties which beset developmental, typological, and periodological ordering procedures. Ort (1985) and Schmidt (1985), thus, view Literature as a socially mediated system in which sub-systems are 'hierarchically and holistically organized'. All their components are at the same time autonomous and self-regulating and are functionally integrated into the system'. (Schmidt, 1975: 289).⁷ By applying insights gleaned from Semiotics a systemic procedure in literary history writing seeks to dispel the fiction of the autonomous and timeless work of art.

This fiction or myth is the one erected by the category of Historicism, which in chronological order precedes the last four mentioned categories. Historicism, the 'baking process of history' as Nietzsche once called positivist inspired historiography concerns itself largely with the preservations of great works which derive their greatness precisely from their consecration by the very history which they supposedly helped to form. Historicism informed partly by Hegel's philosophy of history and partly by Darwinian evolutionism posits a vision of history as moving continuously and causally in the direction of synthetic unity. History is thus understood as a linear progression from a point of origin in the past towards a point of ending in the future once the rational unfolding of truth has been accomplished and all lost meanings have been recollected. As Nietzsche and later Benjamin already observed Historicism's amassing of data derived from the study of sources, influences, and '*milieu*'⁸ is nothing other than an attempt to 'fill the homogeneous, empty time' with 'the eternal image of the past' instead of viewing history as 'the subject of a structure whose site is not homogeneous, empty time, but time filled by the presence of the now' (Benjamin, 1977: 263, 265). Historicist extremes in literary history writing have sanctified the notions of influence, evolution, development and synthesis as basic modes for the re-collection of data with a single purpose, namely to show meaningful progress. Although these six categories cannot claim to be in any way completely indifferent to

each other, they have to be seen as heuristic devices used for the purpose of providing an overview of the apparent diversity in literary history writing. Not all literary history writing posits a teleological view and the historicist notions of progress and eternal preservation have been criticized not only by Foucault.⁹ However, all these six categories converge upon each other as concerns their shared assumption that all artistic-literary meaning involves drawing upon the past and that correspondingly the past is part of the proper understanding of literary works. The meaning of texts is not necessarily derived from past meanings but the elucidation of textual meaning in the present necessitates recourse to the past, that is to the history of the work and the history of its reading.

Yet, it is precisely this commonly-held belief that texts and history support each other on a scaffolding of interdependently-bestowed meanings which Foucault finds objectionable. Neither History nor texts *contain* meaning and hence they cannot give meaning to each other. Judeo-Christian, Western modalities of philosophies of history and particularly Historicism with their concomitant temporal, rather than spatial ordering of events are, in the eyes of Foucault, the very site in which the myth of history has been produced. For Foucault there are no abstract conceptions, ideas, representations, and certainly no human agents who guarantee being or meaning. There are only 'murmurs' across a force-field of more or less repressed desires which, once shaped by language into utterances congeal into an indefinite number of discourses or texts in whose network such concepts as 'history', 'madness', 'reason', and the sovereign 'subject' among others are produced.

It is tempting to ask to what extent the grammatical past tense provided by language enters through the back-door in the guise of first principle in order to produce the archaic before history. For, although Foucault rejects any philosophical first principle and particularly history which since Hegel occupies this position, the very notion of *L'archéologie du savoir* (1969) might suggest this. However, the archaeological procedure used in *Les mots et les choses* largely dispels such notion. In as much as Foucault structures his text around three sets of binary oppositions, namely 'sameness' (*même*) and 'the other' (*autre*), 'words' and 'things', and space/spatiality and time/temporality (Foucault, 1966) he escapes recourse to any first principle in the Kantian sense. That which the Book is all about, the emergence of the sovereign subject (also sometimes referred to by others as 'humanism') and with it the human sciences as interpretative sciences, appears within the changing spaces which in turn have been created by transformations within those binary sets. *The Order of Things* whose English title obscures a fruitful association with Quine's *Word and Object* (1960) thus presents a topography of the conditions and possibilities underlying the erection of that scaffolding which holds both, history and the sovereign subject, in their position of purveyors of meaning. The very structure of *Les mots et les choses*, that is, its narrative strategy denies characters, events, places and particular dates any function in the story, that is in the tableaux of occurrences. Authorial traces are equally erased; and the description of man's appearance as agent in the order of things as well as his subsequent dismissal is not given any meaning.

The archaeological procedure, displayed in this text 'implodes', so to speak, history and particularly the causal necessity of history as posited by Historicism by displacing the temporal, linear ordering – common also to all literary history writing in spite of certain differences outlined above – by a spatial order in the shape of taxonomies, trajectories, topologies etc. The temporal 'before' and 'after', past and present, the 'is' and the 'has been' are redistributed in a spatial 'field' demarcated by prepositions locating a site and not a specific time.

While the archaeological procedure is chiefly characterized by descriptions of strata, Foucault's genealogical procedures seem at first to be cutting through spatiality. Yet, they do not mark a return to temporality but rather superimpose two additional positions: 'Emergence' seen as an 'entry of forces' (1977: 149) and 'descent' are not so much cutting points along a line as they are processes which enable static and immovable things and thoughts to be dissolved. 'The search for descent is not the erecting of foundations: on the contrary, it disturbs what was thought unified; it shows the heterogeneity of what was imagined consistent with itself' (1977: 147). Genealogy which posits Nietzsche as its precursor and is discussed by Foucault in an essay written at about the same time as the introduction to the *Archaeology of Knowledge*¹⁰ denies 'the historical beginning of things' (1977: 142). There is no special importance to be attached to the moments of birth for the origin lying 'at a place of inevitable loss' can never be retrieved (1977: 193). An origin, as that place where things corresponded to a truthful discourse, is nothing but a fiction of history.

Instead of constructing continuities across space and time, genealogy seeks 'to record the singularity of events outside any monotonous finality; [. . .] in what we tend to feel is without history – in sentiments, love, conscience, instincts' (139) the 'historical sense' or 'effective history' which is genealogy will reveal 'the entry of a masked *other*' (154). 'The forces operating in history' says Foucault, 'are not controlled by destiny or regulative mechanisms, but respond to haphazard conflicts. They do not manifest the successive forms of primordial intention and their attraction is not that of a conclusion, for they always appear through the singular randomness of events.' (154). Genealogy 'must be sensitive to' the 'recurrence' of sentiments and feelings, 'not in order to trace the gradual curve of their evolution, but to isolate the different scenes where they engaged in different roles. Finally, genealogy must define even those instances where they are absent, the moment when they remained unrealized. (Plato, at Syracuse did not become Mohammed.)' (140).

There are, according to Foucault 'no landmarks and no point of reference' (155). The past provides us with a historical sense which enables us to realize that history is but an empty site upon which certain discourses have erected the very concept of history at a time which coincides with the construction of the sovereign subject. This event also marked the emergence of Literary History as stated earlier while at about the same time authors produced the first self-referential texts which apparently deny any relation to empirical reality. Literary History has usually seen such works by Lautréamont, Mal-

larmé and others as evidence of an avant-garde. However, Foucault, Barthes, Sollers and others, take them as evidence marking the transformation from *belle lettres* to writing. Writing or *écriture*, however, denies history for it sees itself as an endless production of signifiers, as the constant re-writing of the already written, without purpose and without meaning.

There is no history because as the archaeological- and especially the genealogical procedures show history turns out to be merely the fleeting appearance of a figure of speech conditioned by certain discursive configurations denoting unity where the 'historic sense' only observes dispersions. Meaning is not a presence but in the Derridean sense an absence which can never be recouped in writing. Although archaeological and genealogical procedures are capable of describing the emergence as well as the demise of history and Literature,¹¹ a literary history is not possible after Foucault. Both procedures evaporate not only history but also Literature which simply becomes commentary among other commentaries, writing among other writing.

Thus, Literary History turns out to be a chimera. In as much as all the six categories outlined above use history as a referent and works as their objects they are, in spite of their different *re-collection* and *ordering* procedures, nothing but supreme fictions and quite unnecessary. For in the eyes of Foucault there are no historical apriorities in the Kantian sense and no transcendental/sovereign subjects on whose judgement the *re-collection* and *ordering* of the past depend. All Literary History, however, must have recourse to some form of validation be it by use, institutionalization or history. All literary history writing, furthermore, has to posit the Hegelian notion of labour because an absence of objectification in and through works would literarily leave the History of Literature with nothing to write about.

Although Foucault seeks to dispel the notions of labour and works which for him are Hegelian constructs which in turn prevent the end of history, all writing and all art are, nevertheless, products of what the Greeks called *techne*, a form of making. These products are not manifestations of personal experiences nor are they necessarily expressions of anything; but they are sedimentations of concretely existing forces and relations of production. Even a piece of *écriture* displays these relations in and through language. Words may be insufficient instruments for the appropriation and control of objects, and reality may ultimately only be a configuration of words and sentences. But these configurations, nevertheless, constitute sets of productions and reproductions which denote differing ways of making sense.

However, the Foucauldian world like Nietzsche's world before him is one without facts. It is a world only of interpretations; and the endless task of writing 'glosses upon one another' as Montaigne already observed continues. In the meantime, the 'historic sense' celebrates genealogy as 'history in the form of a concerted carnival' (Foucault, 1977: 161); it celebrates, quite rightly, the freedom from the oppression of historicism. But in its *saturnalia* it forgets that not only did the silence of madness ring the all-powerful eloquence of reason so also does the silence enforced by Nietzsche upon socio-economic forces and relations surround the articulation of desire. Leaving time and history behind and advocating desire may produce that heightened

being freed from the task of having to make sense in order to conquer ultimately death by eternal deference. Zarathustra's *Das trunkene Lied* illustrates this possibility:

Oh Mensch! Gib Acht!
 Was spricht die tiefe Mitternacht?
 "Ich schlief, ich schlief
 "Aus tiefem Traum bin ich erwacht:–
 "Die Welt ist tief,
 "Und tiefer als der Tag gedacht
 "Tief ist ihr Weh–,
 "Lust – tiefer noch als Herzeleid:
 "Weh spricht: Vergeh!
 "Doch alle Lust will Ewigkeit–,
 "– will tiefe, tiefe Ewigkeit!

Oh man! Take heed:
 What does the deep midnight declare?
 'I was asleep –
 From a deep dream I woke and know:
 The world is deep,
 Deeper than the day has known.
 Deep is its woe–
 Desire – deeper still than agony:
 Woe speaks: Go, die!
 But desire wants eternity –
 Wants deep, deep eternity!

(Nietzsche, 1980, vol. 4: 285)

But the mask of silence is as much the sign of heightened life as it is of madness. Dionysos, as the Greeks knew covers both. They also knew that the voice of Apollo is needed in order to return from that silence so that narration may continue. There is no doubt that the narrative will continue even after 'the death of man' and 'history' as pronounced by Foucault. His very own writings as well as the proliferation of his thoughts are proof of this. However, in the fact of very real oppressions it is difficult to foresee a situation in which the freedom from repressions can be realized. For as we know from Bakhtin's carnival metaphor (1968) such freedom is but a potential hinted at in some writings. It will truly be possible only between people in concrete life situations and not in trans-historical monologues between the self and its absent *other*.¹²

In as much as Foucault presents a critique of reason in the mask of a critique of history his narratives aid our insight into the ways by which rational institutional apparatuses and discursive systems function in order to control man's potential for freedom from both, repression and oppression. However, Foucault's refusal to relate words to objects, language to socio-political beings, may render his critique impotent.

Notes

1. It should be noted here that all so-called 'oral traditions' reproduce the collective past by way of 'story-telling' that is by way of narration and not by recourse to dates or facts outside the immediate verbal production of the tale. In this way, a process of *écriture*, albeit phonetically and not graphically seems to have existed prior to the notation of so-called historical data.
2. Herder, like Vico before him, advocated the ordering of past works in analogy with organic life.
3. The division in English between 'literature', referring generally to the written, and 'scripture' referring to Biblical texts only echoes the Latin ordering of texts. The French *belle lettres* and the German *Dichtung* used to designate 'poetic' or artistic texts indicate different ordering procedures whereby the one stresses the aesthetic quality whereby the other refers to a particular high density on the level of structuration and meaning.
4. Descombes' judgement of Foucault's works as belonging to the realm of fiction (1982: 117) is misleading because it depends upon the relation between text and 'verisimilitude'/reality. A relation which Foucault's notion of 'discourse' is at pains to dispel.
5. See here particularly Nietzsche's definition of Philology as the praxis of 'slow and precise' reading. It is a type of reading which Barthes would call 'writerly'.
6. The classic texts of this type of history writing, although not belonging to the History of Literature but rather to History proper, are Gibbon's *Fall of the Roman Empire*, written in the second half of the 18th century, and Spengler's *Der Untergang des Abendlandes* of 1922.
7. Of interest here, too, is the current project undertaken by CENSAL with regard to a codification of South African Literature.
8. Comte's notion of 'facts' derived from experience, inheritance, and learning is important here. For it is particularly Comte's type of Positivism which lies at the root of Historicism, and which not only held sway in France well into the middle of this century but also left its traces in literary history. Most Marxist literary histories are written in this manner. Wellek, already, criticized 'nineteenth-century positivistic factualism as a study of sources and influences' dependent upon causal explanations brought about by 'tracing motifs, themes, characters, situations, plots, etc. to some other chronologically preceding work', which he sees as 'a regressus ad infinitum' (1963: 285).
9. In this regard the work of the *Frankfurt School* ought not to be forgotten. In fact, what is needed, today, are comparative investigations into the works of Adorno, Benjamin, Markuse, Foucault, Barthes, and others, because their critiques of the Enlightenment forms the foundation of the present critical debate; at least if this debate wishes to retain its 'sting' which it tends to lose if it bases itself upon French works only.

Thus for Adorno, as well as for Benjamin, the present does not receive its meaning from history; rather history receives its meaning from the present. History for them is discontinuous, not only insofar as it contains disparate facts and evidence, but also in that it contains disparateness of a structural nature.

10. Foucault's essay *Nietzsche, Genealogy, History* (1977) first appeared in French in 1971, along with *Réponse au cercle d'épistémologie* which became the introductory chapter of the *Archaeology of Knowledge*. Foucault's writing procedure in this essay is of particular interest since it 'embellishes', so to speak, Nietzsche's work by way of a rewriting of the *Genealogy, The Gay Sciences, Human all to*

Human and others. Passages from Nietzsche's work are quoted verbatim and rearranged in a *montage*. Foucault, thus, does not 'interpret' or 'analyze' Nietzsche's texts, rather he re-arranges them.

11. The term Literature here denotes the sense in which I used it at the beginning of this essay, namely, as products of a validation procedure whereas for Foucault Literature refers to *écriture*, to those avant-garde texts which are foremostly autoreferential.
12. The time may come where the *je-moi* opposition created by Lacan's 'mirror stage' no longer marks a lack or gap with regard to speech in which the pain of desire functions as need for the *other* but where this alienation between I and self is seen as a necessity for socialisation rather than for solitude.

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