

Allegory vs Allegory: The divorce of different modes of allegorical perception in Coetzee's *Waiting for the Barbarians*.

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Summary

In this paper the allegorical mode of Coetzee's novels is situated in the context of contemporary constructions of allegory. This is done by tracing the points of intersection between *Waiting for the Barbarians* and those theories of allegory produced by contemporary readings of Walter Benjamin's *The Origin of German Tragic Drama*, by Paul de Man in "The Rhetoric of Temporality", and by Lacanian psychoanalytic theory. It is suggested that allegory constitutes a paradigm for interpretive practice, and that in *Waiting for the Barbarians* a "Benjaminian" mode of allegorical perception acts as a corrective to an "Hegelian" mode of allegorical perception, which tends to offer definitive meanings and to posit a relatively stable connection between the allegorical signifier and extra-textual reality.

Opsomming

In hierdie artikel word die wyse waarop Coetzee die allegorie in sy roman uitdruk geplaas in die konteks van die kontemporêre vertolking van die allegorie. Dit word gedoen deur die opsporing van raakpunte tussen *Waiting for the Barbarians* en die allegorieteorieë soos dit vergestalt word in die kontemporêre opvatting van Walter Benjamin se *The Origin of German Tragic Drama*, deur Paul de Man in "The Rhetoric of Temporality," asook deur die psigoanalitiese teorie van Lacan. Daar word voorgestel dat die allegorie 'n paradigma vorm vir interpretasie, en dat in *Waiting for the Barbarians* 'n "Benjaminiaanse" begrip van die allegorie dien as 'n middel tot die verbetering van 'n "Hegeliaanse" begrip daarvan, wat neig om beslissende betekenis te bied, en om 'n relatief stabiele verband te bewerkstellig tussen die allegoriese betekenaar en die buitetekstuele realiteit.

In a paper titled "Allegories of power in the fiction of J.M. Coetzee" (published in *JLS*, March 1986), Lois Parkinson Zamora argues that for Coetzee, and for writers such as the Chileans José Donoso and Isabel Allende and the Czech Milan Kundera, allegory is "a symbolic form abstracted from specific time and place", and provides an "effective medium for their very specific protests against the simplifications of absolute power" (1986: 13). Zamora sets these writers' use of allegory against allegory as "a mode which in the English tradition flourished upon the medieval assumption of the similitude between the word and the world, and upon the assumption of the ultimate unity of the physical and the metaphysical" (1986: 13). Leaping over a large section of the history of allegory in this way, she assumes that the terms allegory and symbol can be used interchangeably, and that allegory, in the work of a writer like Coetzee, can be translated by means of reference to an extratextual reality, such as the power relations between oppressor and oppressed.

I wish to locate Coetzee's writing within an altogether different tradition of allegory, using *Waiting for the Barbarians* as the focus of this contextualising exercise. Zamora describes *Waiting for the Barbarians* as "Coetzee's most

allegorical work" (1986: 5), and argues that in this novel Coetzee "uses the forms of allegory to undo the traditional referentiality of allegory, undermining and ultimately dismissing interpretive determinacy within his own allegorical fable" (1986: 7). While I would wish to question whether there are degrees of allegoricalness, whether a piece of writing can be more or less allegorical, I would agree with her choice of *Waiting for the Barbarians* as demonstrating Coetzee's particular concern with the mode of allegory. And, while I would agree that this novel uses allegory against itself to undo the traditional referentiality of allegory, I would locate Coetzee's novels within a tradition which has progressively undone this referentiality over the course of several decades.

It is beyond the scope of this paper to fill in Zamora's missing history (this history is provided by Fletcher, 1964 and Krieger, 1981): via *Waiting for the Barbarians* I will instead touch on and attempt to draw together those areas of discourse which appear to have been most influential in the theoretical revolution which has elevated allegory from its position as the most execrated of figures amongst Romantic and Modernist poets, to its current status as the trope of tropes (see Owens, 1980 and Krieger, 1981). Within *this* tradition, allegory is not "a set of symbols or circumstances" which "announces its figural status, its connection to the world, and . . . depends upon the reader's acceptance of that connection" (Zamora, 1986: 7). According to Craig Owens:

In order to recognize allegory in its contemporary manifestations, we first require a general idea of what it in fact is, or rather what it *represents*, since allegory is an attitude as well as a technique, a perception as well as a procedure. Let us say for the moment that allegory occurs whenever one text is doubled by another; the Old Testament, for example, becomes allegorical when it is read as a prefiguration of the New. This provisional description – which is not a definition – accounts for both allegory's origin in commentary and exegesis, as well as its continued affinity with them: as Northrop Frye indicates, the allegorical work tends to prescribe the direction of its own commentary . . . In allegorical structure, then, one text is *read through* another, however fragmentary, intermittent, or chaotic their relationship may be; the paradigm for the allegorical work is thus the palimpsest (1980, I: 68-69).

In terms of this construction, allegory announces its connection, not to the world, but to other texts. Elsewhere I have read Coetzee's novels as Lacanian allegories: as psychoanalytic readings (and re-writings) of prior modes of discourse, and simultaneously, as allegorical projections of their own loss of mastery in future readings.¹ As such, they involve the doubling, or repetition, of one or more texts by another, and, indeed, they appear to invoke the inevitability of this process. I have, previously, suggested that *Waiting for the Barbarians* may be approached by placing the Magistrate's entire speech within inverted commas and reading it as representing liberal humanist novelistic discourse, with the Magistrate's actions functioning as an allegory of certain liberal discursive practices (Dovey, In Press). Here I will focus upon the points of intersection between this novel and those theories of allegory produced by contemporary readings of Walter Benjamin's *The Origin of*

German Tragic Drama (published in 1928, translated into English in 1977), by Paul de Man in "The Rhetoric of Temporality" (1969), and by Lacanian psychoanalytic theory, to show how allegory as a liberal attitude or mode of perception is undermined, in this novel, by a different mode of allegorical perception.

Terry Eagleton comments upon the way in which Benjamin's work is "rife with images of excavation and disinterment, of grubbing among buried ruins and salvaging forgotten remains" (1981: 55). In *Waiting for the Barbarians* the Magistrate is, likewise, represented as being pre-occupied with excavating ruins in the desert and with deciphering the archaic script on poplar slips he unearths in the ruins, an activity which finds its correlative in his attempt to decipher the scars which are the signs of suffering on the barbarian girl's tortured body. He says: "It has been growing more and more clear to me that until the marks on this girl's body are deciphered and understood I cannot let go of her" (Coetzee, 1980: 31). This commonality of images tempts one to read *Waiting for the Barbarians* as an intentionally "Benjaminian" representation of allegory; whether the allusion is intentional or not, Benjamin's much cited aphorism, "Allegories are, in the realm of thought, what ruins are in the realm of things" (Benjamin, 1977: 177-178), offers a way of approaching Coetzee's treatment of allegory in this novel. As J. Hillis Miller points out, Benjamin's model of allegory

is given simultaneously in three different analogous forms. Each stands for the others, as its embodiment or metaphor. Each at the same time is embodied by the others. One is the presence within nature of the signs of human history. Another is the transfiguration of a human body into meaning by its physiognomic features, the characters inscribed on its countenance. The third is the transfiguration of matter into signs by the act of writing. (1981: 364)

The similarities between this triple model of allegory and the figures employed by Coetzee are striking. Hillis Miller goes on to explicate the aphorism "Allegories are, in the realm of thought, what ruins are in the realm of things", as follows:

Nature, history, and the allegorical work of art – the three are analogous in that two different theories of their relation to time are possible. One may be conveniently personified allegorically as "Hegelian," the other as "Benjaminian" . . . In one theory nature, history, and art are the process of an eternal life . . . They move dialectically and harmoniously through better and better toward a goal which will be their absolute spiritualization, their vanishing or disembodiment in the fulfilment of a total meaning. In the other theory nature, history, and the work of art are inhabited by no such teleological spiritual drive. Their tendency is rather toward an irresistible decay. (1981: 363)

The spatial fragmentation of objects in the ruin and the separation of the sign from its material base stand for the differential reference across time of one sign to another sign with which it does not harmonize. This structure of incongruous allusion is characteristic of allegory as a temporal or narrative mode. The ruin alludes backward in time to the former glory of the building and so ruins that glory metaleptically in its difference from it. In allegory naked matter shines

through. It shines through as the failure of the idea to transform nature or thought. In this sense allegories are, in the realm of thought, what ruins are in the realm of things. (1981: 365)

In *Waiting for the Barbarians*, Coetzee seems to set the second, “Benjaminian” perception of the relation of nature, history and allegory to time against the first, “Hegelian” perception of this relation.² The “Hegelian” view approximates the liberal notion of the progressive amelioration of the human condition; the liberal impetus to transcend conflict and suffering through the production of a work of art which gives them “a total meaning”. Coetzee has commented that “A favored mode among White South African writers has been tragedy”, and that “Religious tragedy reconciles us to the inscrutable dispensation by giving a meaning to suffering and defeat. As tragic art it also confers immortality” (1974: 17). Toward the beginning of *Waiting for the Barbarians*, the Magistrate is made to articulate a desire for an intuitive experience of full meaning:

One evening I lingered among the ruins after the children had run home to their suppers . . . I sat watching the moon rise, opening my senses to the night, waiting for a sign that what lay around me, what lay beneath my feet, was not only sand, the dust of bones, flakes of rust, shards, ash. The sign did not come. I felt no tremor of ghostly fear . . . Ridiculous, I thought: a greybeard sitting in the dark waiting for spirits from the byways of history to speak to him before he goes home to his military stew and his comfortable bed. (1980:16)

Representing the liberal writer, he is shown seeking to restore “the spatial fragmentation of objects in the ruin,” the dust of bones, flake of rust, shards, ash, to a condition of wholeness; to overcome the devastating effects of time by invoking a sense of meaningful continuity, “a special historical poignancy” (Coetzee, 1980: 17), between past and present.

At a later stage, however, he is made to articulate the other, “Benjaminian”, perception of allegory. Called before Colonel Joll and ordered to interpret the signs on the poplar slips, he says:

They form an allegory. They can be read in many orders. Further, each single slip can be read in many ways. Together they can be read as a domestic journal, or they can be read as a plan of war, or they can be turned on their sides and read as a history of the last years of the Empire – the old Empire, I mean. There is no agreement among scholars about how to interpret these relics of the ancient barbarians. Allegorical sets like this one can be found buried all over the desert. (Coetzee, 1980: 112)

This may be compared with Eagleton’s commentary on Benjamin’s construction of allegory in *The Origin of German Tragic Drama*:

The very arbitrariness of the relations between signifier and signified in allegorical thought encourages ‘the exploitation of ever remoter characteristics of the representative objects as symbols, so as to surpass even the Egyptians with new subtleties. In addition to this there was the dogmatic power of the meanings

handed down from the ancients, so that one and the same object can just as easily signify a virtue as a vice, and therefore more or less anything'. In an astounding circulation of signifiers, 'any person, any object, any relationship can mean absolutely anything else'. The immanent meaning that ebbs from the object under the transfixing gaze of melancholy leaves it a pure signifier, a rune or fragment retrieved from the clutches of an univocal sense and surrendered unconditionally into the allegorist's power. If it has become in one sense embalmed, it has also been liberated into polyvalence: it is in this that for Benjamin the profoundly dialectical nature of allegory lies. (Eagleton, 1981: 20; Benjamin, 1977: 174 and 175)

The polyvalent signifier must be grasped for an allegorical reading which is strategically motivated. Thus the Magistrate reads the signs on the slips as a testament of barbarian suffering, and goes on to say:

It is recommended that you simply dig at random: perhaps at the very spot where you stand you will come upon scraps, shards, reminders of the dead. Also the air: the air is full of sighs and cries. These are never lost: if you listen carefully, with a sympathetic ear, you can hear them echoing forever within the second sphere. The night is best: sometimes when you have difficulty in falling asleep it is because your ears have been reached by the cries of the dead which, like their writings, are open to many interpretations. (Coetzee, 1980: 112)

This is interpretation in the service of the dead past, the past of the oppressed which has been *repressed* by Joll's fascist regime.³ According to Owens, what is "most proper" to allegory is, precisely, its "capacity to rescue from historical oblivion that which threatens to disappear" (1980, I: 68). Referring to the allegorical nature of Borges's fiction, he continues:

Allegory first emerged in response to a similar sense of estrangement from tradition: throughout its history it has functioned in the gap between a present and a past which, without allegorical interpretation, might have remained fore-closed. A conviction of the remoteness of the past, and a desire to redeem it for the present – these are its two most fundamental impulses. They account for its role in psychoanalytic inquiry, as well as its significance for Walter Benjamin, the only twentieth-century critic to treat the subject without prejudice, philosophically. (1980, I: 68)⁴

However, it is important to recognise that, from Benjamin's perspective, this recuperative function of allegory does not involve a simple retrieval of the past in order to tame it by subjecting it to the hegemony of the present, in the manner suggested by the Magistrate's attitude toward the desert relics. He asks:

If we were to disappear would the barbarians spend their afternoons excavating our ruins? Would they preserve our census rolls and our grain-merchants' ledgers in glass cases, or devote themselves to deciphering the script of our love-letters? (Coetzee, 1980: 52)

Nor does it involve an interpretation of the past from a position of immunity

outside history, an interpretation characterised by the assumption that it does not bear the traces of this past, or that it will not leave its own traces upon the objects which it retrieves: this is the assumption implied by the Magistrate's decision to return the poplar slips to where he found them:

I think: "When one day people come scratching around in the ruins, they will be more interested in the relics from the desert than in anything I may leave behind. And rightly so". (Thus I spend an evening coating the slips one by one in linseed oil and wrapping them in an oilcloth. When the wind lets up, I promise myself, I will go out and bury them where I found them.) (Coetzee, 1980: 155)

Benjamin's allegorical perspective is anti-historicist:

... historicism contents itself with establishing a causal connection between various moments in history. But no fact that is a cause is for that very reason historical. It became historical posthumously, as it were, through events that may be separated from it by thousands of years. A historian who takes this as his point of departure stops telling the sequence of events like the beads of a rosary. Instead, he grasps the constellation which his own era has formed with a definite earlier one.⁵

The historicist perspective which characterises liberal writing overlooks the *constellation* which this writing forms with an earlier era, regarding itself as a transparent medium for revealing things as they really are. Elsewhere (see Dovey, In Press) I have argued that *Waiting for the Barbarians* is articulated around the metaphor of blindness and sight, and that the blindness of the Magistrate (expressed finally in his confession "There has been something staring me in the face, and still I do not see it"), is represented as being the blindness of liberal writing to its own status as a particular discursive practice located within a specific historical moment. Coetzee's novelistic discourse, on the contrary, *does* effect the necessary constellation of present with past: it can be argued that his novels engage with their literary past in a fully dialectical way, with their allegorical repetition of prior modes of discourse implying a recognition that they cannot remove themselves from those historical conditions of which they offer a critique.

The Magistrate is made to lament his unwilling involvement in history. Believing that he has failed, for the second or third time, to write a history of the outpost, he reflects: "I wanted to live outside history. I wanted to live outside the history that Empire imposes on its subjects, even its lost subjects" (Coetzee, 1980: 154). This is the correlative of the way in which he laments the loss of time experienced as organic unity, a loss brought about by an historical awareness:

What has made it impossible for us to live in time like fish in water, like birds in air, like children? It is the fault of Empire! Empire has created the time of history. Empire has located its existence not in the smooth recurrent spinning time of the cycle of the seasons but in the jagged time of rise and fall, of beginning and end, of catastrophe. Empire dooms itself to live in history and plot against history. (Coetzee, 1980: 133)

He is represented as a neo-Romantic, who would transcend the effects of time, of history, by locating himself within the cyclical time of the natural world. This brings us to Paul de Man, who, in *The Rhetoric of Temporality*, is concerned to deconstruct the Romantic writers' use of the symbol, to expose it is an inauthentic response to the experience of temporality, and to offer in its place allegory as a means of avoiding this inauthenticity:

... the prevalence of allegory always corresponds to the unveiling of an authentically temporal destiny. This unveiling takes place in a subject that has sought refuge against the impact of time in a natural world to which, in truth, it bears no resemblance ... it remains necessary, if there is to be allegory, that the allegorical sign refer to another sign that precedes it. The meaning constituted by the allegorical sign can then consist only in the *repetition* (in the Kierkegaardian sense of the term) of a previous sign with which it can never coincide, since it is of the essence of this previous sign to be pure anteriority ... Whereas the symbol postulates the possibility of an identity or identification, allegory designates primarily a distance in relation to its own origin, and, renouncing the nostalgia and the desire to coincide, it establishes its language in the void of this temporal difference. In so doing, it prevents the self from an illusory identification with the non-self, which is now fully, though painfully, recognized as a non-self. (de Man, 1969: 190-191)

The connection between this construction of allegory and its relation to time and Hillis Miller's analysis of Benjamin's model of allegory as ruin is readily apparent. If these two constructions of allegory have in common the conflation of the mode with a certain awareness of temporal process, de Man's perspective is limited to a consideration of allegory as a rhetorical response to the problem of temporality. For Benjamin, on the other hand, allegory is a mode of thought which, offering the means to undo the reifications of history as continuity, has as its goal a form of liberation.

The function of Benjaminian allegory in relation to the collective past which is history approximates the function of the psychoanalytic encounter which recuperates the repressed past of the individual. Roy Schafer describes this encounter as follows:

In the traditional transference narration, one tells how the analysand is repetitively reliving or reexperiencing the past in the present relationship with the analyst. It is said that there occurs a regression within the transference to the infantile neurosis or neurotic matrix, which then lies exposed to the analyst's view. This is, however, a poor account. It tells of life history as static, archival, linear, reversible, and literally retrievable. Epistemologically, this story is highly problematic. Another and, I suggest, better account tells of change of action along certain lines; it emphasizes new experiencing and new remembering of the past that unconsciously has never become the past. More and more, the alleged past must be experienced consciously as a mutual interpenetration of the past and present, both being viewed in psychoanalytically organized and coordinated terms. (1980: 36)

In both cases, then, we have an insistence upon the way in which the act of retrieval is inseparable from what is retrieved, the way in which the "constel-

lation” or “mutual interpenetration” of past with present is geared toward a change of action in the future. Constructing allegory in this way, one is engaged in establishing a paradigm for criticism in general, as Joel Fineman points out when he says that

the response to allegory becomes representative of critical activity *per se*. As Frye says, “it is not often realized that all commentary is allegorical interpretation, an attaching of ideas to the structure of poetic imagery” – as, indeed, Frye’s comment demonstrates, in its presumption of global, archetypal structure, which is already allegorization whatever purely literary claims he may make for it. (Fineman, 1981: 27-28, citing Northrop Frye, *Anatomy of Criticism: Four Essays*, 1971: 9)

Psychoanalysis, too, is founded in the presumption of an archetypal structure, which is that of the Freudian “master allegory”. When Fineman says that “desire becomes in psychoanalysis, as in allegory, both a theme and a structuring principle” (1981: 27), he reminds us that if, in psychoanalytic (or literary) interpretation, we regard the signs or symptoms as an allegory whose meaning must be fathomed to arrive at the unconscious desire in which they have their genesis, the reading we produce is, likewise, an allegory of our own unconscious desire.

Much of the hermeneutic activity of psychoanalysis focuses on dreams, and Fineman refers to the way in which “the dream-vision is a characteristic framing and opening device of allegory, a way of situating allegory in the *mise en abyme* opened up by the variety of cognate accusatives that dream a dream, or see a sight, or tell a tale” (1981: 26). In *Waiting for the Barbarians* the Magistrate’s dreams provide a model of the way in which unconscious desire, via the process of condensation and displacement, comes to be represented in a set of signifiers which appear to be arbitrarily related to that which is signified. The recurring symbol of bread functions in the same way, as it comes to stand for pain (French for bread), and reminds us of the potential polyvalence of the signifier. As readers seeking to establish the significance of the dreams and to resolve the enigma of the novel itself, we find ourselves repeating the Magistrate’s attempts to decipher the hieroglyphs, the marks on the girl’s body, and himself.

Lacanian psychoanalytic theory has this in particular to offer: it reminds us that via our own discursive practices we produce allegories of our own desire, and also construct an identity for ourselves, so while we can never be present in the writing which represents us, we cannot entirely absent ourselves from it, as is assumed in the Magistrate’s discourse. Attempting for the last time to write a history of the outpost, he is dismayed to find a message of desire coming off his pen:

For a long while I stare at the plea I have written. It would be disappointing to know that the poplar slips I have spent so much time on contain a message as devious, as equivocal, as reprehensible as this. (Coetzee, 1980: 154)

And, if we return to the scene in which the Magistrate interprets the signs on

the poplar slips for Colonel Joll, we find that this interpretation is produced with a view to the identity which the Magistrate would construct for himself in relation to Joll:

I have not failed to keep an eye on Joll through all this. He has not stirred again, save to lay a hand on his subordinate's sleeve at the moment when I referred to the Empire and he rose, ready to strike me.

If he comes near me I will hit him with all the strength in my body. I will not disappear into the earth without leaving my mark on them. (Coetzee, 1980: 112)

His act of interpretation thus functions to place him in opposition to the fascist regime, and to provoke an assault and injury to himself, which will grant him the identity of suffering victim.

To sum up then, one can say that "Benjaminian" allegory, as a mode of reading/writing, appears to offer a way of recognising the *inevitability* of repetition, and in so doing becomes the means of avoiding blind or unwitting repetition, of avoiding the kind of discourse implied by the image of the dead parrot with empty eye sockets which appears in the Magistrate's last dream. It allows one to avoid the assumption that critical distance can be achieved, and, as Owens points out, it provides for the fundamentally deconstructive impulse of postmodern art, as through allegory we encounter "the unavoidable necessity of participating in the very activity that is being denounced *precisely in order to denounce it*" (1980, II: 79). It should be noted, however, that there is a danger in the allegorical strategy described by Owens in his delineation of postmodern trends in the visual arts. He claims that "Allegorical imagery is appropriated imagery", and, referring to the works of Troy Brauntuch, Sherrie Levine and Robert Longo, he argues that "the manipulations to which these artists subject such images work to empty them of their resonance, their significance, their authoritative claim to meaning" (1980, I: 69). The danger is that, in supplanting an antecedent meaning, the allegorical work may reinstate itself in the position of authority.⁶ I mention this because I believe that Coetzee's novels anticipate this danger and circumvent it by a "double-sided" allegorical structure, which involves both the allegorical reading of a prior mode of discourse, and a self-reflexive allegory of the way in which the novelistic discourse inevitably works to erect an identity for the speaker, an identity which will ultimately be divested of authority by the authority of the discursive context in which the novel is read. This "double-sidedness" is less apparent in *Waiting for the Barbarians* than in the other novels, but it is implied in this novel's concern with allegorical interpretation, and is intimated via the closing scene of children building a snowman, and the Magistrate's admission that "It is not a bad snowman. This is not the scene I dreamed of" (Coetzee, 1980: 156).

Recognising that criticism, too, is allegorical in nature, it seems appropriate to conclude by referring to the ways in which it can denounce its own falsely authoritative position. Criticism may, as Fineman puts it, project "its own critical unhappiness onto literature whose self-deconstructions would then be understood as criticism" (1981: 50), or it may conclude, in the manner of Hillis

Miller, with what is these days an almost obligatory gesture of self-effacement:

If “allegories are, in the realm of thoughts, what ruins are in the realm of things”, the devastation of thought by allegory includes not only “thought” as it is crystallized in the words of poetry but also thought in the form of an attempt to express an unequivocal theory of allegory in critical prose. (1981: 370)

Notes

1. For detailed readings of the allegorical structure of Coetzee’s novels see Dovey (In Press). It is significant that, in a recent interview with Tony Morphet, Coetzee resists being “installed in a position of power” over his own texts, and concludes the interview by saying:

Your questions again and again drive me into a position I do not want to occupy. (But what legitimacy has that “want”?) By accepting your implication, I would produce a master narrative for a set of texts that claim to deny all master narratives. Let me therefore simply say that certain things get put in question in my novels, the notion of arbitrariness being, I hope, one of them. (1987: 2).

2. In *The Novels of J.M. Coetzee* I have argued that all of Coetzee’s novels are, at various levels, founded in the Hegelian Master/Slave dialectic (although in a view of the dialectic which allows for no ultimate position of transcendence). I have also suggested that the Magistrate can be approached via the Hegelian figure of the *belle âme*.
3. See Eagleton (1981: 50-51) for a discussion of Benjamin’s response to the way in which “fascism eradicates history by rewriting it in its own image”.
4. Compare this with Fineman’s claims concerning the role of allegory:

It is as though allegory were precisely that mode that makes up for the distance, or heals the gap, between the present and a disappearing past, which, without interpretation, would be otherwise irretrievable and foreclosed . . . (1981: 29).

5. Eagleton (1981: 48-49), citing Benjamin, *Illuminations*, trans. Harry Zohn, ed. and with an Introduction by Hannah Arendt. London, 1973: 265.
6. There is another “danger” to be considered in relation to the current validation of a cluster of related tropes: allegory, repetition, mimicry, pastiche. Will they ultimately be regarded as an *effect* of postmodernity and the postmodern experience of time and the self, or will they be seen to constitute a truly *oppositional* postmodern body of discourse? This, however, is to be the subject of another paper.

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