

Towards a “Dialogic Criticism?”

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Literature and its Theorists

Tzvetan Todorov 1988
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The absence of an authoritative centre has become one of the standard elements of contemporary literary texts. Meaning, truth, fiction and reality have become concepts which can no longer be taken for granted. As a result of the problematization of language, contemporary literature often focuses attention on the writing process itself, and it is conscious of being made up of signifiers which are linked to their signifieds in a purely arbitrary and conventional way. These characteristics are encountered so frequently in contemporary literary texts that they can almost be said to have become a convention or even a cliché. It could be said that postmodernist writing in particular suffers from an exaggerated literariness, and that its self-reflexivity can easily degenerate into narcissism. It may seem as if the text has been turned into a fetish, with the result that general questions surrounding it are neglected. These criticisms could be based on the assumption that the writer has a moral responsibility which should not be abdicated in favour of playful pyrotechnics. The corollary to this is that the same responsibility rests on the critic, so that it is not sufficient for him to demonstrate that value systems can be deconstructed, or to present an “objective”, “scientific” description of the structures of the text.

This seems to be the basic premise behind Todorov’s book. In the “Prefatory Explanations”, he states his aims as follows:

First, I want to examine how people have thought about literature and criticism in the twentieth century, and, *at the same time*, try to determine what shape a reasonable conception of literature and criticism might take. Next, I want to analyze the major ideological trends of the same period as they have been reflected through reflections on literature; and, *at the same time*, try to determine which ideological position is most defensible.

(Todorov 1988: 2)

Further on, he refers to the principle, advanced by Spinoza, that the search for a text’s meaning must be carried out without reference to its “truth”, and points out that this has been extended into “a declaration that any question having to do with the truth of the text is irrelevant” (Todorov 1988: 6, 7). In what is obviously an oblique reference to Derrida (amongst others), he states,

criticism that is nihilist in inspiration (and no longer positivist, like philology), criticism that demonstrates that everything is interpretation and that the writer is busy subverting his own ideology, still remains within the same undertaking,

while making any hope of ever attaining truth more chimerical than ever.

(Todorov 1988: 7-8)

In his discussion of the various critics, Todorov first seeks "to identify what the author in question owes to the Romantic ideology", that is, to the ideology which states that literature, as opposed to utilitarian language, is a self-sufficient discourse. Next, he focuses "on those elements of his thought that, intentionally or not, challenge the Romantic framework and go beyond it" (Todorov 1988: 9). In the final chapter, "A Dialogic Criticism?", he offers a synthesis and states his own position.

Chapter 2 deals with the Russian Formalists, in whose work the doctrine of poetic language as being an end in itself found its most extreme expression in the notion of "‘trans-sense’ or ‘supraconscious language’, pure signifiers, a wordless poetry of sounds and letters" (Todorov 1988: 13). A second, less extreme formulation was that "a poetic work is overstructured discourse in which everything is interdependent", which is "why we perceive it in itself, rather than for the sake of something else" (Todorov 1988: 14). Tynjanov went beyond earlier Formalist doctrine by stating that the same fact could be accepted as literary in one historical context, but seen as extraliterary in another, thereby denying that there are stable elements which allow one to distinguish literature as being diametrically opposed to referential language.

The question of referentiality is again taken up in the discussion of Sartre, who asserted that "between the word and the thing signified, there is established a double reciprocal relation of magical resemblance and signification" (Todorov 1988: 45). In poetry a verbal image will be chosen "for its resemblance to the willow tree or the ash tree . . ." For the poet, "all language is . . . the mirror of the world" (Todorov 1988: 45). Todorov observes that Sartre's view of poetry is derived from the Romantic doctrine, according to which "poetry is defined by the intransitivity of language and by the motivated relation between signifiers and signifieds . . ." (Todorov 1988: 45). Since Todorov does not add any critical observations to these views, one has to assume that he agrees with Sartre. However, it is obvious that Sartre is working with an obsolete conception of language, in which one could pick holes almost at random. For example, he takes the "magical resemblance" between signifier and signified as a given, as an essence which is inherent in poetry, whereas it can only be produced through the reading process. Moreover, it is hard to see why this "resemblance" should be assumed as occurring only in poetry. Assuming that such a "resemblance" does indeed exist, would it remain the same from one language to another? And so on.

Blanchot, as paraphrased by Todorov, seems to reject both the notions of referentiality and of signification, preferring instead to view poetry as a primarily self-reflexive discourse:

Poetic discourse is an intransitive, nonsubservient discourse; it does not signify; it is. The essence of poetry lies in the search it conducts into its own origin.

(Todorov 1988: 56)

Todorov points out that there is a large number of texts which do not fit this

description, and that Blanchot concentrates on those writers who seem to validate his hypothesis. His paraphrase of Blanchot's views on literary criticism makes it sound rather old-fashioned, and Todorov notes its parallels with the historical criticism of the early twentieth century and with contemporary "objective" criticism: "... the ideal commentary is one which makes itself invisible, sacrificing itself on the altar of the comprehension of "the work" (Todorov 1988: 58). However, it is obvious from a reading of Blanchot's often rather hermetic critical essays that, in practice, his notion of commentary differs radically from that of, for example, Auerbach or Spitzer in that, generally speaking, his commentaries do not offer a clearcut and readily accessible explication of the text's meanings and structures. One feels that the absence of a more extensive description of Blanchot's critical practice creates a slightly misleading picture. Moreover, the statement that poetic discourse "does not signify" seems to contradict the concept of the text as a process of signification, and it could have been examined critically within a semiotic framework of reference.

Barthes's views on the critic's task suggest what the function of commentary could be if poetic language "does not signify". It is

not the decipherment of the work's meaning but the reconstruction of the rules and constraints of that meaning's elaboration (...); "the critic is not responsible for reconstructing the work's message but only its system".

(Todorov 1988: 63)

According to Todorov, Barthes displayed a "radical historicism (there is no general truth, there are only provisional ideologies ...)" (Todorov 1988: 64). Although he does not agree with these ideas, Todorov defends Barthes by stating that one has to remember the "status that ideas have in Barthes's discourse". "One sees", he writes,

Barthes constantly changing position: it suffices that he has formulated an idea for him to lose interest in it ... Like a writer-for-hire, Barthes is concerned with finding the best formulation for each idea, but that does not lead him to espouse it.

(Todorov 1988: 64)

As an apologetics, this is hardly convincing. One is utterly cynical about politicians who give eloquent expression to ideas in which they do not really believe; why then should this very practice be seen as acting in Barthes's defense? Be that as it may, while, on the one hand, he explains that ideas only have provisional validity in Barthes's writing, on the other hand, Todorov seems to view his oeuvre as a more or less coherent system in which a later work such as *Roland Barthes* can be taken as a reliable commentary on the earlier structuralist writings (cf. Todorov 1988: 65). Given the elusive and shifting character of Barthes's work, this does not seem plausible.

Like the early structuralist Barthes, Northrop Frye "refuses to attribute to the scientist any responsibility other than the exact description of his object"

(Todorov 1988: 104). Without using the term, Frye seems to view the concept of intertextuality as central to literary criticism:

Understanding a literary text . . . never amounts to anything except relating it to different contexts: that of the author's other works and the rest of his life; that of his time; that of literature taken as a whole.

(Todorov 1988: 103)

Given the ambitiousness and complexity of this project, it is puzzling that Frye should refer snidely to criticism "being carried around in some kind of religious or Marxist or Freudian wheelchair" (Todorov 1988: 91). Thus he seems to be advocating a purely empirical approach, in which the principles of literary criticism as a science may not be "borrowed" or derived from those of other disciplines (Todorov 1988: 97). Yet, if one accepts Frye's conviction that "literature cannot be cut off from the other discourses operating in a given society" (Todorov 1988: 97), then surely it is inevitable that literary criticism would use insights from other disciplines.

Much the same comments apply (*mutatis mutandis*) to Ian Watt. Todorov points out that, in *The Rise of the Novel*, Watt attempts to situate the text within its literary, social and/or ideological contexts (Todorov 1988: 109). Watt's view "that literary criticism is rather a social than a philosophical activity, and that in that area epistemological scepticism need not be accepted, or even considered" (Todorov 1988: 116) is all the more puzzling for this. Firstly, it is not clear on what grounds he assumes there to be an antithesis between social and philosophical activities, and secondly, his implied exclusion of the "vast Western tradition of philosophy which runs counter to commonsense assumptions about reality", and which would include "epistemological scepticism" (Todorov 1988:116) is completely arbitrary. It could, in some cases, mean that elements which do in fact belong to the text's context will simply not be taken into consideration. Another point which is badly in need of clarification, and which Todorov fails to examine critically, is Watt's reference to "literature that really is literature" (Todorov 1988: 118). The obvious question which comes to mind is, how is one to know whether a text is (not) "really literature"?

The notion that the boundary between text and context should be opened up brings us to Todorov's discussion of Brecht and Döblin. Döblin contrasted "epic" or "poetic" works with novels, which he categorized as "scribbling". Todorov quite rightly points out that the basis of Döblin's distinction between the two kinds of literature is questionable, given that he sees Homer, Dante and Cervantes as the "supreme representatives" of epic literature (Todorov 1988: 31). According to Döblin, epic literature is characterized by its *exemplariness*, whereas the novel deals with specific people and events. He did not believe in the uniqueness of the individual, but was convinced "that sociality is a basic element of human nature". Therefore, he believed that "the author cannot be viewed as an isolated individual", and required epic literature to be "a conscious dialogue between the individual author" and the "voice of his public", the collective "consensus of the era" (Todorov 1988:

35). Todorov seems to accept this concept uncritically, yet it is just as nebulous as that of a *Zeitgeist*. How is one to define or describe this consensus? If one takes into account the fact that an author's public is never homogeneous, the concept becomes indefensible, even if one assumes that he is working within a totalitarian system, in which such a "consensus" could, to some extent, be imposed from above. As far as the principle of a "conscious dialogue" is concerned, greater clarity might have been achieved if Todorov had explained what this might involve.

Like Döblin, Brecht rejected individuality, being convinced that the "individual viewpoint no longer allows us to understand the decisive processes of our time; individuals have no influence on them". For this reason, "the individual characters in epic theatre must be transformed into exemplary beings . . ." (Todorov 1988: 42). Todorov contends that Brecht contradicts the plurality inherent in the principle of *Verfremdung* by dogmatically accepting the ideology of the Communist Party. The question of dogmatism will again be raised in the discussion of Todorov's own position.

While Sartre's criticism seems to be related to Döblin's and Brecht's, in that it also places great emphasis on the social context of the text, his theorizing on the reader is more elaborate. According to Sartre, the author incites the reader

to a continuous exercise of his liberty; conversely, as a reader, by the very act of reading, I recognize the writer's freedom. This is why "the art of prose is bound up with the only regime in which prose has meaning, democracy".

(Todorov 1988: 46)

What Sartre is implying here, namely, that prose is "meaningless" in a non-democratic system, collapses if one takes into consideration that dissident writing and protest literature are dependent for their very existence on the presence of a repressive/oppressive system. Furthermore, Sartre's views on this issue indicate a certain political naïveté, firstly, in that he uses the term "democracy" as if it can be taken for granted and does not require further definition, and secondly, in that he assumes an absolute, black-and-white distinction between "democratic" and "non-democratic" systems.

Sartre sees the reader of prose as "necessarily a *particular* reader, situated in time and space. The identity of the literary act is thus historically determined" (Todorov 1988: 47). Todorov takes Sartre to mean that "literary works are determined by the expectations of their public", a point of view which he seems to endorse: "...literary works *are* determined by the expectations of their public" (Todorov 1988: 48). One cannot find fault with the idea that the reader is situated in a specific historical context. However, even if one were to agree that the "identity of the literary act" is influenced (not determined) by its historical context, inasmuch as the context acts both on the writing process and on the text's reception, the exact nature of the interrelationship and of the process of interaction between the acts of reading and writing and the historical context would still have to be clarified. Moreover, if the reader's role is assumed to be decisive, then it is impossible

to establish a "single best *reading*" of the text, let alone a "single best meaning". If, for the sake of argument, one were to assume that such a meaning could be established, then the question would remain of who would have the authority to decide that it is the "best", and according to what criteria? Sartre also fails to take into consideration that many texts were either not fully understood in their time, or completely misunderstood. (Incidentally, one can hardly imagine writers such as Calvino or Puig asking themselves what the "expectations of their public" are before starting to write. This would in fact amount to a form of self-censure, and can only act inhibitably on a writer's creative processes.)

According to Sartre, "actual literature can only realize its full *essence* in a classless society" (Todorov 1988: 49). In an imperfect world, the intellectual "is always on the side of the oppressors". It is up to him to choose whether he wants to be "a watchdog or a jester" (Todorov 1988: 49). It is surprising that Todorov does not take Sartre to task more severely for these views, since they simply do not stand up to scrutiny. Firstly, it is not at all clear what Sartre means by the term "classless society". One possibility is that he is referring to the ideal of a society without socio-economic stratification, an ideal which has not been achieved in any modern political system. Secondly, the term "full essence", as applied to literature is, to say the least, nebulous. What does it consist in? Given the fact that this "essence" is not defined, and that a "classless society", as defined above, does not and has perhaps never existed in reality, one either has to accept Sartre's views as divine revelation, or reject them as unsubstantiated. Thirdly, why should the intellectual necessarily be seen as being "on the side of the oppressors"? Surely, this cannot be true of the "committed" intellectual? Since the "classless society" as defined above, is an utopian ideal, Sartre could be taken to imply that intellectuals will *always* be on the side of the "oppressors". Are there no intellectuals on the side of the "oppressed"? Are the "oppressed" incapable of producing intellectuals?

There is a subtle difference between the idea that literary texts are determined by their readers' expectations and Bakhtin's view that "the author writes with a reader in mind", which Todorov cites in his critique of Sartre (Todorov 1988: 49). Yet, writing with "a reader" in mind is too restrictive; it seems more fruitful for the writer to address himself to a "superaddressee" whose comprehension is one hundred per cent accurate" (Todorov 1988: 49). Bakhtin's notion of a "superaddressee" is analogous to Eco's "model reader" (Eco 1983: 55), and reminds one of Calvino's statement that, "Literature must presuppose a public that is more . . . cultured than the writer himself" (Calvino 1987: 85). Although Calvino's thoughts on this matter might be regarded by some as smacking of élitism, I would contend that the sort of literature envisaged by him could be of much more "educational value" to the reader than a literature which only caters for immediate needs (cf. Calvino 1980: 194).

In contrast with the early structuralist Barthes, Bakhtin contends that,

Rather than "construction" or "architectonics", the literary work is above all a

heterology, a plurality of voices, an echo and anticipation of discourse past and to come; it is both a crossroads and a meeting place, and thereby loses its privileged position.

(Todorov 1988: 86)

The dominant idea in Bakhtin's writing is the concept of *dialogism*, according to which each idea in a text

belongs to someone; it is situated with respect to a voice that expresses it and a horizon towards which it is directed. In place of the absolute we find a multiplicity of viewpoints, those of the characters and those of the author assimilated to them, and there are no privileged positions, no hierarchies.

(Todorov 1988: 76)

In dialogism, "the truth is an ultimate horizon and a ruling idea", not a given. "For dialogic criticism, truth exists but we do not possess it" (Todorov 1988: 87). According to Bakhtin, both literature and criticism should be committed to the search for truth, but neither will be "privileged with respect to the other" (Todorov 1988: 83).

In this respect, Bakhtin differs from Blanchot, who is of the conviction that, "The work's statements are illusory, its truth is the absence of all concern with truth . . ." (Todorov 1988: 59). Blanchot assigns to literary activity the task of "preserving and liberating thought from the notion of value" (Todorov 1988: 60). This Todorov finds unacceptable, "after World War II, knowing what we know about the Nazis and the Gulag . . ." (Todorov 1988: 61). Although his concern is understandable, there is a real danger that any attempt to impose a moral obligation on critics to make particular ethical and/or political choices could result in a form of repression and derive from a totalizing value system. In addition, given that Todorov refers to himself as an atheist, one fails to understand how he arrives at "universal values" (Todorov 1988: 61), since values which are not rooted in a suprahuman entity cannot be universal; there can at most be a degree of consensus with respect to their validity. Thinking of values in such absolute terms also involves the danger of trying to impose them on others, of integrating them into a totalizing ideological system. Thus when Blanchot calls for the liberation of thought from values, he is implying that it should not be restricted by value *systems*. Literature should not be restricted by values external to and imposed on it, but should search for its own values in and through writing.

However, it is clear that Todorov finds himself in agreement with Paul Bénichou's assertion that the critic has the right to take "an ethical stand vis-à-vis a literary work", that "he has the same right to judge good and evil as any author, or the public" (Todorov 1988: 152). Bénichou expresses the reservation that, "The interhuman communication in which he is engaged forbids him to make excessive space for his own persona . . ." (Todorov 1988: 152). Like Todorov, he uses the terms "good" and "evil" as if these are clearly defined categories about which a general consensus exists, which can obviously never be the case in a heterogeneous society. For example, whereas hardly anybody would pretend to find an ethical justification for the sexual

excesses described by Sade, only a Muslim fundamentalist would be offended by Salman Rushdie's *Satanic Verses*, while it would require a particular sensibility to brand expressions of nationalism and/or presumed racism in the writings of early twentieth century Afrikaans writers as "evil". To say that the critic has a right to "judge" is, moreover, an unfortunate choice of words, since it could be interpreted as implying that he could claim for himself the authority of being able to speak the last word on a given literary text. Bénichou seems to think that the critic should aim at striking a balance between the expression of an ethical judgement on the ideology of the text and textual analysis, which seems plausible enough, except that it is almost impossible to determine to what extent the critic's personal ideology should be allowed to enter into his reading of the text. Where should one draw the line? Moreover, the critic's ethical judgements will, of course, have to be based on a valid reading of the text. Such judgements will also inevitably raise the question of the (in)validity of the critic's own ethical principles. Finally, it is not clear from the discussion between Todorov and Bénichou why the critic's task should not be limited to laying bare the ideological patterns of the text.

In the final chapter, "A Dialogic Criticism?", Todorov follows Bakhtin and Bénichou by stating,

... we shall not stop, then, with this search for meaning, we shall pursue it through a discussion about truth; not only "what did he say?" but also "is he right?"

(Todorov 1988: 162)

Todorov makes a distinction between dialogism, dogmatism, "which leads to monologue on the critic's part", and pure pluralism, in which "several subjects are expressing themselves, but no one of them is taking his divergences from the others into account" (Todorov 1988: 163). He proceeds by asserting,

Although we agree with Spinoza that we must not subject the search for meaning to a truth that would be held in advance, we have no reason to refrain from searching, at the same time, for truth, and from confronting the meaning of the text with it.

(Todorov 1988: 162)

Because Todorov adheres to rather vague generalities, it is difficult to comment on this idea. One of the most serious flaws in his argument is that he does not bother for one moment to even hint at the labyrinthine complexities of the concept of "truth", nor does he seem to take into consideration the obvious difficulties of any attempt to establish the "meaning of the text". A search for truth, yes, but what is truth? Can it ever be found, and if so, how will one know that one has indeed arrived at truth? Neither truth nor the meaning of the text, it seems, can acquire more than provisional status. The second problem is that Todorov rejects all belief in a specific ideology (religion is not even mentioned) as "dogmatism". Yet it is difficult

to see how it would be possible to enter into a dialogue with the author without taking as one's point of departure some sort of conviction or truth in which one seriously believes. To suspend belief in one's own convictions, or to adopt certain beliefs as possibly true, merely for the sake of argument, seems like a rather unsubstantial starting point for a rediscovery of the ethical dimension of criticism. The very fact that Todorov would have the critic enter into dialogue without any truths "held in advance" erodes his own argument, for on what basis is the critic then to decide whether the author's text is morally and philosophically "right"? If such a decision is to be made once and for all, then surely the term "dialogic criticism" is a misnomer. Furthermore, it seems as if Todorov envisages a virtually endless debate which is supposed to continue until consensus is reached that "truth" has been found at last. Leaving aside the question of whether such a consensus could be reached this side of eternity, it seems as if the idealism of such an enterprise is futile unless one has a sense of the direction in which one is going. Todorov offers no direction other than references to "universal values", which he leaves undefined. Even if, to name but one example, one were to reach consensus that "liberty" should be regarded as a "universal value", it could, in Humpty Dumpty fashion, be made to mean whatever one wants it to, depending on the context. The fact that Todorov leaves these "universal values" undefined, perhaps indicates that he assumes the existence of a consensus with respect to what they are and to how they should be defined. In that case, the comments made à propos his critique of Blanchot would apply, namely, that such a consensus could be the result of, or result in the exclusion or repression of discourses and values which it cannot integrate into itself.

Todorov's approach in *Literature and its Theorists*, to deconstruction and Marxist literary criticism is curious, to say the least.¹ Derrida's name is not mentioned at all, which is completely incomprehensible in a critical discussion of deconstructionist literary criticism. Todorov's discussion is further distanced from Derrida in that it is part of an essay on Scholes's *Textual Power*. Of course, the popularization of Derrida in literary criticism outside France only came about after he had become fashionable in North America (and how many critics have only read him in translation?), but it is unacceptable, especially with a highly complex topic such as this, to discuss a philosophical "school", and in effect to support a critique of its basic tenets, without going back to the primary sources. It should have been a matter of elementary scientific procedure first to ascertain whether North American critics have in fact understood Derrida correctly, and then to verify that deconstruction, as "practised" in the United States, is not a watered-down, simplified version of his thought, before embarking on a critical assessment of North American deconstructionist criticism.

Todorov presents deconstruction as saying that the text means "Nothing at all" (Todorov 1988: 183). Although he concedes that this is something of an oversimplification, one has to point out that it is in fact a gross distortion. I have to add that I am neither a philosopher, nor a Derrida specialist, but the volume of Derrida's work and the density of his argumentation in itself already suggest that Todorov is presenting a distorted version of deconstruc-

tion. Moreover, I find it very hard to believe that Derrida can be so naïve as to try to sell his readers such a patently absurd notion. For instance, he would surely not pretend that the Bible means “nothing at all”, but he would of course reject the notion of the Bible as a discourse of authority and Divine Revelation. Todorov’s critique of Eagleton is also less than convincing. Todorov implies that “truth” and “justice” should be grounded in “reason” whereas, for Marxist criticism, they are “grounded in history” (Todorov 1988: 198). He asserts that deconstructionists “treat reason as an avatar – no more and no less – of God, thus wiping out several centuries of struggle with a single stroke of the pen” (Todorov 1988: 185). However, the implication of what he says à propos Marxist criticism, namely, that truth and justice can be grounded in a transcendental, transhistorical source suggests precisely that Todorov is offering absolutized reason as a substitute for God.

Todorov makes no mention of the political applications of postmodernist theory (cf. Hutcheon 1988: 22–36), nor does he refer to the writings of Jean-François Lyotard, in which the ethical dimension remains a presence (cf. van Reijen 187: 104–106). These weaknesses are the result of Todorov’s choice of critics who should be discussed. Although he describes his choice as arbitrary (cf. Todorov 1988: 3), it seems quite reasonable to expect that he should have demonstrated that the critics he chose to discuss are indeed representative, and that the omission of several important figures does not seriously weaken his argument. His omission of, amongst others, Derrida and Lacan cannot be justified by saying that he is limiting himself to literary critics, since the boundaries between criticism and philosophy have become increasingly blurred in contemporary literary studies.

In conclusion, Todorov does not practise what he preaches, that is, a “dialogic criticism”. Instead, he consistently juxtaposes a criticism which takes into account the relationship of literature with “truth” with a criticism in which, “The search for a text’s meaning must be carried out without reference to its truth” (Todorov 1988: 6), without fully taking into account the ways in that which he assumes to be “universal values” have been problematized by, *inter alia*, poststructuralist theory, with the result that his critique of what he calls the Romantic ideology has the character of an antithetical monologue, and not of a dialogue. Todorov’s postulation that criticism should participate in the search for “truth” seems to be inspired by the same kind of dogmatism which, in his own words, “leads to monologue on the critic’s part” (Todorov 1988: 163). It seems to me that Todorov wants to have his cake and eat it. On the one hand, adherence to a specific value system or ideology is rejected as “dogmatism”, while, on the other hand, he wants to impose on the critic the task of questioning or even judging the value systems implicit in literary texts, a task which can only be carried out with reference to the critic’s own ideology or value system. Both Todorov’s plea for the return of the ethical dimension in literary criticism and his implicit assumption that there is or should be a universal consensus on “human rights”, “truth” and “reason” run the risk of leading to prescriptive thinking, and even of amounting to a totalizing ideology. His contention that poststructuralism and its precursors constitute a rejection of values is misleading. To my mind, it is more accurate

to say that they constitute a *problematizing* of value systems. Ultimately, Todorov fails to explain precisely how, in the wake of the "death of the great metanarratives" (cf. Lyotard 1986: 38–39), the ethical dimension in literary criticism is to be legitimated.

Note

1. This section was not included in the original French edition.

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