

Writing and the Narrative*

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Summary

This paper is initially concerned with a debate between Derrida and Deleuze and Guattari's accounts of "writing", from which it proceeds to question the usefulness of these accounts within the field of literary "theory". The paper argues that neither the process of writing, nor language, holds a sufficiently privileged position within modernity that one is able to construct epistemologically valid statements on literature, should we presuppose a *de facto* relation of continuity between writing, language and literature. The paper continues with an account of the literary narrative (as a form of literature constituted of "narrative elements" rather than words), as a text whose logic, and predisposition to pleasure, is a problem of reading rather than writing.

Opsomming

Hierdie referaat is aanvanklik gemoeid met 'n debat tussen Derrida en Deleuze en Guattari se weergawes van "skryfkuns", waarna die bruikbaarheid daarvan op die terrein van die literêre "teorie" vervolgens bevraagteken word. Daar word voorts geredeneer dat nóg die skryfproses as sodanig, nóg taal 'n genoegsame bevoorregte posisie in die moderniteit beklee dat op grond daarvan - sou 'n mens 'n *de facto* verwantskap aan kontinuïteit tussen skryf, taal en letterkunde voorveronderstel - epistemies geldige uitsprake oor letterkunde gekonstrueer sou kon word. Daar word vervolgens gefokus op 'n vorm van literatuur bestaande uit "narratiewe elemente", eerder as woorde, as 'n teks waarvan die logika, en 'n neiging tot genot, as 'n lees-erder as 'n skryfprobleem beskou sou kon word.

Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari argue that Jacques Derrida is "correct in linking writing to incest in a mysterious fashion" (Deleuze & Guattari 1983: 203). However, the definition of the term "writing" which they suggest, namely "the existence and connection of some sort of graphism - writing in the broadest sense of the term" (Deleuze & Guattari 1983: 202), is in distinct opposition to that forwarded by Derrida. The delimitation of "writing" offered by Derrida encompasses the distinction between writing as it is usually understood - as linear and phonetic notation, and writing as "grammatology" - the capability of producing and obliterating proper names, bringing classificatory difference into play (a form of writing which is said to be common to all societies). This paper is concerned with a brief commentary on Deleuze and Guattari's disavowal, although far-reaching

criticism of Derrida's account of writing. The paper will proceed to outline, following Michel Foucault's account of the epistemological position of language within modernity, the impasse confronted by any theory of literature which presupposes a continuity between the process of writing, language, and literature. The paper will conclude with an attempt to redefine "narrative" within the contemporary epistemic configuration described by Foucault, as a process of reading, and will trace within one of Foucault's "demoted" discourses on language, namely structuralism, a possible theory of literature teneted upon the practice of reading.

The most immediate correspondence between Derrida's account of "writing", and that provided by Deleuze and Guattari, is that both indicate a systemic relation between writing and the exercise of violence. Derrida's "Introduction to the Age of Rousseau" (principally concerned with a critique of Claude Lévi-Strauss's description of the Nambikwara, and in particular, his argument that they constitute a society without writing), is explicitly concerned with this relation.

Derrida argues that what he nominates a "history of Western metaphysics" constitutes a history of the determination of being as presence, produced almost wholly through the reduction of trace, in the form of a logocentrism. He argues that this metaphysics of presence has constituted a system of defence against the threat of writing. What then links writing to violence, or what must violence be in order that something in it is equivalent to the operation of trace? (Derrida 1974: 101).

Derrida argues that Lévi-Strauss's "The Battle of the Proper Names" marks an episode in an anthropological war, an essentially confrontational opening of communication between people and cultures, albeit outside of an explicit colonial or missionary domination. He argues that Lévi-Strauss is correct in asserting that it would be erroneous to think the Nambikwara so primitive that they might be considered the childhood of our own race. Instead the Nambikwara fall completely within a social organization which is commonly associated with "culture": they speak, they prohibit incest, and above all, their language is structured to the extent that they deploy a variety of dialects and systems of address according to various situations. One of the more characteristic features of the extent to which the Nambikwara structure language, is the injunction against the use of the so-called proper name.

Derrida argues that from the moment that the proper name is erased within the system there is both writing (in the form of the trace), and the "subject". However, in an attempt to carefully distinguish between the essential necessity of the disappearance of the proper name, and a determined prohibition (as with the Nambikwara), Derrida suggests that the injunction against the

use of the proper name does not constitute its structural effacement. The injunction is against the *use* and not the *existence* of the proper name. Thus the prohibition is derivative with regard to the constitutive erasure of the proper within a play of difference, because the proper names are already no longer proper names (their production is already their obliteration): the erasure and imposition of the letter are originary; the proper names do not supervene upon the proper inscription; and the proper name has never been anything but the original myth of a transparent legibility present under the obliteration; and finally, because the proper name has never been possible except through its functioning within a system of classification, within a system of difference within which there are no positive terms (Derrida 1974: 109). It is only for these reasons that both the injunction and its transgression become possible.

Ostensibly having established the presence of writing (as "grammatology") among the Nambikwara, Derrida argues that Lévi-Strauss's assertion that they are "a society without writing" is dependent upon an ethnocentric onerism, which elicits an apparent paradox: this ethnocentrism is teneted upon the absence of a form of alphabetical or linear writing (an absence that is supposedly scorned by the West). However, alphabetical or linear writing in the West is made to function as a servile instrument of speech, dreaming of plenitude, self-presence, or auto-affection. Lévi-Strauss thinks of the Nambikwara as people without writing because they do not deploy a system of graphism that is recognised by the West, and he thinks of the Nambikwara as incapable of writing within an ethno-political order; however, he perceives that inability to write in terms of an innocence or non-violence (linking his project to that of Jean Jacques Rousseau). It is this innocence which is disrupted by the presence of the anthropologist.

Derrida argues that it is not the intrusion of the anthropologist, but writing itself - the obliteration of the proper classed within a play of difference - that is the originary violence. It is the death of the possibility of absolutely proper naming, that sense of violence (of difference, of classification, and a system of appellations) which is to be found within Lévi-Strauss's "The Battle of the Proper Names". As a result, the lifting of the interdict, the game of denunciation, does not consist in revealing proper names, but in tearing the veil that hides a classification and appurtenance - the inscription of the "subject" within a system of linguistico-social differences. What was hidden, and revealed in the game was not an absolute idiom, but varieties of already invested *common* names. Thus Derrida concludes, the concept of the proper name is far from simple and manageable. Similarly, he continues, the concepts ruse, perfidy, violence, and oppression - those tones in which Lévi-Strauss is said to describe his encounter with the Nambikwara -

are far from simple and manageable.

Within what Derrida describes as a narrative of an anthropological encounter, violence does not intrude at a single stroke, starting from an original innocence, surprised at the moment that the secret of the so-called proper name is violated. Instead there are several levels, or a structure of violence. Firstly, that of naming, to inscribe within a system of difference - classification, a suspension of the vocative absolute - to think the unique *within* the system, and to inscribe that uniqueness. Secondly, a form of violence derived from the first (which he calls "arche-violence"), namely the erection of the prohibition against the use of the proper name, the moral prescribing the concealment of writing in the form of the so-called proper name, and finally, violence in the form of the revelation of the proper name.

Lévi-Strauss, according to Derrida, considers the third form of violence to be an accident (in which he is the only true culprit in the perfidy of the children). The first pure violation is the very presence of the anthropologist (that the one child strikes another cannot be considered violence, because no integrity has been breached). Violence appears only at the moment at which the intimacy of the proper names is opened to forced entry, which is possible only in the manner in which the space of the game is re-articulated by the presence of the anthropologist. He becomes party to the first rupture, listening to the first name whispered in his ear, but the violation is incomplete without the "master names" - those of the adults - which he encourages the children to reveal.

Derrida concludes that the account of the Nambikwara contains one of the indispensable premises of Lévi-Strauss's conception of writing, namely, that it is only a community such as this which can suffer the surprise of an aggression coming from without, and, in terms of "The Writing Lesson", which can import from abroad the exploitation of man by man, in the form of an alphabetical writing.

Of course, Derrida's criticism is concerned with Lévi-Strauss's representation of the Nambikwara, rather than with the Nambikwara themselves. However, he cannot institute a critique of that representation, *as ethnocentric onerism*, without some accountability to an anthropological discourse - without deviating from his usual stamping ground, a history of Western metaphysics from Plato to the present. From that anthropological discourse we may be tempted to question whether Derrida is correct in disputing Lévi-Strauss's exclusion from a field of phenomena designated by the terms of writing, those few dots and zigzags on the calabashes of the Nambikwara. And by extension, should we designate any element of a system of signification, immanent to a social formation which has not been subject to the formation of a centralized State, under the term of "writing"?

If the most immediate correspondence between Derrida's account of "writing", and that provided by Deleuze and Guattari is that both indicate a systemic relation between writing and the exercise of violence, then the most immediate difference is that Derrida is concerned with a *history* of Western metaphysics, in terms of logocentrism, whereas Deleuze and Guattari are concerned with a *genealogy* of representation, in which writing constitutes only one of any number of elements.

Deleuze and Guattari (1983: 203) refer to Derrida on several occasions within *Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*. They argue that Derrida is correct in asserting that every language presupposes a writing system from which it originates, on condition that what is taken to mean writing is the existence and connection of some form of graphism. Derrida is said to be correct again in asserting that there is no difference between the pictograph, ideogram, and phonetic procedure - that the alignment upon the voice, or a substitution for the voice has always already taken place - and that Derrida is correct again in asserting that mysterious link between writing and incest. However, they caution (in a comment that elicits one of the fundamental differences between Derrida's rather linear history, and a genealogical description) that despite these constants, there is no reason to believe that there is any constancy in the apparatus, or in the process, of the social and psychic repression of desiring-production.

In other words, for Deleuze and Guattari representation is, without exception, an invaluable instrument to the supreme task of the socius: the repression against the flows of desiring-production. Having established the constancy of the *function* of representation, they nonetheless isolate three distinct modes of social formations (the territorial, the despotic, and the civilized capitalist social machines). Each of these is distinguished by means of a unique conjunction of an economic organization, a representative of desire, and a unique mode of repression against that representative of desire (containing both "in depth" (psychical) and "at surface" (social) elements) upon what they call - following Judge Daniel Paul Schreber - a body without organs (although they prefer Spinoza's notion of "a plane of consistency" in the second volume of *Capitalism and Schizophrenia: A Thousand Plateaus*). Thus, perhaps for the first time, by means of an argument for a causal relation between distinct social formations and modes of representation, linear or alphabetical writing (in terms of the sign organized according to the relation between the signifier and the signified), is consigned to a distinct moment within history.

In terms of Deleuze and Guattari's causal or systemic relation between specific modes of representation and social formations, Derrida's conclusion that Lévi-Strauss's description of the Nambikwara exhibits the assumption

that language could only have been born suddenly, as an irrevocable leap across the divide, describes the abuttal of the territorial social machine, and the despotic social machine; the full body of the earth, and the full body of the despot.

According to Deleuze and Guattari, the three principal tasks of the territorial social machine (having as its immobile motor, or surface of inscription, the full body of an indivisible earth) are the codification of the flows of desiring-production, the collective investment of human organs, and that which encompasses both of the former, the marking or inscription of human flesh.

Referring to Friedrich Nietzsche's *On the Genealogy of Morals* (1967) (described as that text which ought to be recognized as the first great work of modern ethnology), Deleuze and Guattari account for the inscription of the bodies of the "subjects" within the territorial social machine in terms of the morality of mores, the mnemotechnics of man, that labour performed by man upon himself throughout the greater part of his existence. This great prehistoric labour is a matter of creating for man (constituted by means of an active faculty of forgetting) a memory, in the act of the declension of both alliances and filiations. By means of inscribing the body, writing directly into naked flesh, the great, mute, filiative memory or germinative implex (capable of submerging everything, shattering the possibility of the social) is repressed, such that another, collective memory may be instituted in its place: a memory of words (rather than things), and a memory of signs (rather than effects). Thus Nietzsche's (1967: 61) morality of mores, that vast effort spent in breeding a nation of thinkers does not constitute an ill-defined or natural violence, instead it constitutes an action realized in bodies, and inscribed upon them, belabouring them by means of a forced induction within a series of debtor-creditor relations. Thus, Deleuze and Guattari formulate the relation between violence and representation (within the territorial machine) in terms of a theatre of cruelty: a vast cycle of a chain of inscription of the fluxion of alliance upon the flows of production in the form of stocks of filiation.

Therefore, within the territorial social machine the representative of desire constitutes the germinative implex or influx (Deleuze & Guattari 1983: 164), such that it conditions all representation to the extent that it is equivalent to the uncoded, the uncodeable, or the decoded flows of desire upon which representation must act in the interest of the possibility of a collective. The repressing representation which acts upon the germinative implex is alliance, in the form of marriage, bringing into connection men of different filiations in a relation of primary homosexuality.

It is at the ritual of a collective investment of the organs that the third

element intervenes between the two poles of the territorial process of representation (at surface); namely the eye, as the only organ capable of grasping the terrible equivalence between the intoning voice and the inscribing hand. Therefore, Deleuze and Guattari insist that, despite this cruel theatre of inscription, the territorial social machine is fundamentally oral; not because it does not possess a system of graphism (that inscription into the naked flesh which Derrida may want to call writing), but because the system of graphism remains independent of the voice, it is not aligned upon, or subordinated to the voice, because the eye (in the extraction of the territorial machine's form of surplus-value - surplus-value of code) does not *read* the inscription into the flesh, instead it *sees*: it jumps between the two registers of signs in the mode of connotation.

What then constitutes the aggression or violence of writing, born suddenly, but coming from without? Perhaps more surprising than their initial reference to Nietzsche, is that Deleuze and Guattari similarly refer the question of the death of the territorial social machine, and its coextensive system of representation, to Nietzsche's argument contained in *On the Genealogy of Morals*, and in particular, to his account of the founding of the State.

Deleuze and Guattari argue that it is the despot who establishes the practice of writing, who turns the territorial system of graphism into a system of writing. However, if the despot introduces a system of writing, it is not because the voice is lost, instead it is because the independence of the elements of the entire system is lost: the graphic inscription is aligned upon the voice and subordinated to it. And by linking the formation of the State to the emergence of alphabetical or linear writing, Lévi-Strauss would appear to be rendered correct, in that Nietzsche argues that the change (within which man's inner world, previously stretched out as though between two membranes acquires depth, breadth, and height), namely the forging of the *socius*, is neither gradual nor voluntary. Instead it is "a break, a leap, a compulsion, an ineluctable disaster which precludes all struggle, and even all *ressentiment*" (Nietzsche 1967: 86).

They come like fate, without reason, consideration, or pretext; they appear as lightning appears, too terrible, too convincing, too sudden too *different* even to be hated. Their work is an instructive creation and imposition of forms; they are the most involuntary unconscious artists there are - wherever they appear something new arises, a ruling structure that *lives*, in which parts and functions are delimited and coordinated, in which nothing whatever finds a place that has not first been assigned a "meaning" in relation to the whole Who are these beings, *they* who come like fate?

(Deleuze & Guattari 1983: 191-2)

According to Deleuze and Guattari, the despotic social machine is forged in an overcoding of the old territorial socius by means of a sudden non-lateral alliance, and a direct filiation with the deity. This rupture in the lateral alliance (described as incest with the sister outside of the socius, in the land of the strange, or the desert) and a rupture in the extended filiations (described as incest with the mother, upon the return to the socius) has two distinct moments. Firstly, it replaces the body of the earth with a new full body (because the despot, in establishing his capital as a site of residence, *appropriates through division the previously unengendered and indivisible full body*). The new full body - that enchanted surface of inscription, the socius's putatively objective moment and quasi-cause that, not content with merely inscribing those things that pass across it, must act as though it had generated them - is that of the paranoiac himself, the body of the despot. Similarly, the representative of desire within the territorial social machine, the germinative implex, is replaced with the body of the paranoiac despot, such that his own sterility functions as a guarantee of the fecundity of his subjects. Secondly, the despotic social machine maintains the old territorialities, although they are subsumed, as *organs of production*, under the new social machine.

However, the (social) elements of representation "at surface" continue to function as a moment of repression against the representative of desire. But, as a consequence of the overcoding or resecting, the voice (of alliance) now commands, rather than speaks or intones. The eye is rendered blind - is forced to read the linear and alphabetical writing which functions as the despot's transcription of the voice of the deity to which he has effected a direct filiation. Thus, within the despotic regime, the signifier (and its relation to the signifieds) appears twice in what will come to constitute for Deleuze and Guattari the first paralogism of psychoanalysis (such that Lacan may arrive at the notion of "the law of the father" in his attempt to retard or reverse the terrible eschatology of the modern conjunction between Oedipus and capital). The signifier appears as that element which is extracted from a field or series of non-signifying signs (the law of which is that they cannot lack, or that nothing is lacking) in the form of a complete transcendental signifier, from the law of which the remaining elements within the original field or series are projected across the socius in terms of a series of determinate differences. Thus the despotic signifier functions as that which organizes the interstices between the remaining signifiers, and in that distribution, effects the possibility of meaning through instituting a play of difference in which there are no positive terms.

Therefore, it is only after the distribution of the interstices separating the subsidiary signifiers, it is only after the paralogism of extrapolation (in

terms of the connective synthesis of the unconscious) is effected *as an event in history*, in short, it is only after the formation of the State, that the proper name becomes possible as a function within a system of classification, within a system of difference within which there are no positive terms (Derrida 1974: 109).

Thence the question: in his assumption of the ubiquity of the alignment of writing upon the voice, and the subordination of writing to that voice, as a repression of that which threatens presence, and the mastering of absence, is not Derrida himself guilty of the ethnocentric onerism of which he accuses Lévi-Strauss? According to Deleuze and Guattari's genealogy of representation, Derrida has simply discovered another of the truths of the despotic age, and mapped it back across a range of historically specific social formations which cannot sustain that "truth".

In concluding this representation of the debate between Derrida and Deleuze and Guattari, a crucial factor needs to be emphasized, namely, these two accounts are concerned with the problem of the emergence of writing as a process of inscription. Neither account is concerned with writing *per se*, and only Deleuze and Guattari's account is concerned with the intersection between writing and language (as a semiological system).

Therefore, to what extent is the debate between Derrida and Deleuze and Guattari relevant to literary studies, given that the majority of literary theories presuppose a *de facto* relation between literature and language, rather than a relation between literature and the process of inscription (albeit in the form of alphabetic or linear writing)? Furthermore, is any account of writing, in terms of its emergence, its social function, etcetera, relevant to contemporary "theories" of literature?

If we are to agree that an account of the emergence of writing as a process of inscription has no direct bearing upon the study of literature, one may be tempted to develop Deleuze and Guattari's rather brief account of language as a consequence of writing (as a process of inscription, in the interests of social repression). On the basis of that relation, one could then institute a study of literature as a performance or deployment of language made possible through the process of writing.

While such a study of literature may be possible, any competent reader of Foucault's *The Order of Things* would have to agree that commentary resulting from such a procedure could hardly claim the status of a theory of literature (should "theory" be defined as a discourse concerned with the production of epistemologically valid arguments), given that large tracts of Foucault's account of the modern episteme are concerned with an outline of what might be termed "the epistemological disenfranchisement of language" within modernity.

According to Foucault (1966: 318-322), the epistemic configuration characteristic of modernity is heralded as man constitutes himself as a positive figure, a unified centre, of all modern forms of knowledge; and as both the objects of knowledge, and the modes of knowledge within epistemology are subjected to a systematic "doubling".

The consequence of this rupture most relevant to this study, is that the figure of man has displaced language from the centre of epistemology; a position enjoyed by language within both Renaissance and the eighteenth-century epistemology. In the eighteenth-century, according to Foucault, language, while being constituted of representations, is privileged to the extent that it is the only mode of representation that can form a representation of itself. Given that within the *age classique*, knowledge is constituted of representations, "to know" is a matter of the process of ordering representations in a logically necessary sequence. In short, all knowledge is fabricated as a table of representations, so that problems of knowledge constitute problems of ordering representations within the table, and the figure of language accrues to itself a privileged position of unity given that language alone can provide an account of the necessary ordering of representations in the form of a general grammar.

According to Foucault, a unified figure of language is displaced from a privileged position within epistemology at the point at which representations and their ordering principle, in the form of a general grammar, are referred to at different levels within an epistemological hierarchy. Philology, the first modern discourse on language, makes possible an understanding of language in its historical evolution or attrition, so that it is no longer possible to study language as the most fundamental instance in relation to other forms of necessary orderings of representations, by reason that language itself becomes a matter of historical chance.

For Foucault, according to Bopp, Grimm, and Schlegel's projects, the study of language now constitutes the study of the historical formation and deformation of word stems and grammars, such that modern epistemology conceives of language as a phenomenon which is as historically random as the nature of organisms which have evolved through random selective mutation. Therefore, there can be no question of forming a representation of language within language, by reason that its precondition - historical derivation - is, by definition, absent.

However, according to Foucault, philology is only one of four possible discourses on language within modernity. Two of the other of these mutually irreconcilable discourses on language are hermeneutics, existing as a retrieval of Renaissance exegetics disqualified from the capacity to generate epistemologically significant argument, and structuralism, as a

retrieval of eighteenth-century general grammar, again radically disqualified within modern epistemology.

Theories of literature, to the extent that they presuppose a *de facto* relation between language and literature, have modelled themselves upon one of these three discourses on language, such that a debate between hermeneuticians and structuralists is little more than a debate between Renaissance and eighteenth-century modes of knowledge, both of which are demoted within the fabric of knowledge to a discourse on a definable object which is insignificant within modern epistemology.

However, Foucault argues that there is a fourth axis across which a knowledge of language becomes possible after the nineteenth-century, namely "Literature". For Foucault, "Literature" constitutes a radically distinct discourse from which a knowledge of language is possible by reason that it refers to language at a level which philology, hermeneutics and structuralism cannot countenance: it traverses the word at an entirely superficial level. Philology understands words in terms of the capacity to map them to a more fundamental depth in language: historical derivation; hermeneutics understands words in terms of the capacity to map them to the symbol; and structuralism understands words to the extent that it is able to map them to their syntactic function. Therefore, for Foucault to understand language by means of "Literature", is to understand language without any order of recourse to knowledge. However, given that Foucault defines "Literature" as the process of the traversal of the word in a strictly superficial manner (without recourse to knowledge), is he not broaching the question of reading? (And to the extent that Foucault defines the problem of "Literature" as a process of reading, necessarily divorced from a recourse to knowledge, it appears inappropriate to define the object subjected to that process, as "modernist poetry", the Shakespearean tragedy, etcetera).

Is it not the process of reading, a process that stands in an independent relation to the order of text which it traverses, that Jonathan Culler articulates in his paper "Story and Discourse in the Analysis of Narrative"? Culler's argument concerns two opposed perspectives from which to undertake an analysis of the narrative. The first "thinks of discourse as the presentation of story" (Culler 1981: 186) which leads to a failure to account for certain effects (such as the tragic effect of Sophocles' *Oedipus Rex*). The second argues that the events of the level of story (*fabula*) are the products of discourse, which leads to the inability to account for "the force of narrative" (Culler 1981: 186). How is it that narratology (deeply indebted to structuralism's anti-humanism) may deploy such criteria as "narrative force" or "tragic effect" (concerns more usually associated with the worst order of literary appreciation) as a means by which to measure the

adequacy of analytic procedure?

I would argue that Culler is true to the field of narratology which he surveys, to the extent that even in the works of Roland Barthes that are concerned with narrative, a particular privilege is granted the psychodynamic effects of the reading of the literary text, although this privilege is often elided.

However, Culler's argument adopts not only *Oedipus Rex* and *Daniel Deronda* as the object of an analysis that exemplifies his argument (texts that given Foucault's archaeology of the human sciences cannot be attributed the capacity to generate epistemologically valid statements). He proceeds with a rather remarkable analysis of Freud's reading of *Oedipus Rex* and, with almost no qualification, an analysis of Freud's "Wolfman" case history, and *Totem and Taboo* (texts that within Foucault's archaeology of the human sciences are attributed the capacity to generate epistemologically valid statements).

If we are to accept Culler's argument - and to the extent that his paper is presented as a survey, it is a matter of accepting almost all arguments within the discourse that has become known as narratology - we are forced to accept that the sole criteria through which to define "narrative" must be that the text in question can generate the distinction within itself, between "story" (*fabula*) and "discourse" (*Sjuzhet*), within the process of reading.

In order to demonstrate this argument for a "psychodynamics of reading", I have chosen to continue Culler's gesture of turning to Freudian psychoanalysis. I will, therefore, focus on Freud's analysis of Shakespeare's *Hamlet*.

But why propose a return to Freud, in relation to narrative, in a paper that includes commentary upon Deleuze and Guattari's critique of the relation between representation and an account of functioning of the psychic apparatus? It comes as a rather nasty surprise to note that Deleuze and Guattari's *Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia* - fails to address almost all of the deficiencies of Freud's literary analyses. These deficiencies may be summarized, in terms of Freud's (1976: 368) analysis of Shakespeare's *Hamlet* as the reduction of the entire text to character, and to the function of "expression" - the "expression" of the deepest layer of impulses in the mind of the creative writer. Freud proposes an analysis of the author's "intention"- conceived of as an entire emotional and intellectual constellation, rather than simply the conscious impulses in the mind of the writer - and to that extent Freud limits his analysis to the production of the literary text. Furthermore, I would argue that the material upon which Freud bases his analysis is rather more the product of the cold light of a bums-on-seats rationality than he is willing to admit. Moreover, the quantity of material

upon which he bases his analysis, is quite inadequate: even the founder of psychoanalysis could hardly have arrived at an accurate diagnosis of so troubled an analysand as Hamlet in no more than two (fifty minute) hours.

There seems little point in taking Freud to task on the basis of his literary analyses; he is after all the father of psychoanalysis rather than contemporary literary "theory". Yet Deleuze and Guattari appear to repeat many of these errors, despite the enormous advancements in so-called literary "theory" and criticism since the emergence of structuralism in the early 1960's, which could hardly have passed either author unnoticed. Deleuze and Guattari (1986: 15) refer Franz Kafka's "development" from the animal stories to his concern with the notion of "a minor literature", to the more or less conscious "intention" of the author. Furthermore, the alternative that they provide, against the endless Oedipalization of Kafka, is in quite remarkable duplicity with the method envisaged by Freud. Deleuze and Guattari (1983: 118) argue that for "... the brilliant bourgeois reader of Goethe, Shakespeare, and Sophocles ..." there is only one immobile motor: Oedipus. Were he to provide an account of Kafka's "Jackals and Arabs", the wolves would no doubt be declared the mother, the Arabs the father, and between the two, castration "represented" by a pair of rusty scissors. Instead, they insist, the Arabs are extensive, armed, and organized, while the jackals are an intensive pack stretching over the desert in lines of flight, with the desert being the body without organs, across which the libido is suffused (Deleuze & Guattari 1987: 37). What advance is this? It is precisely this "image analysis" against which Homi K. Bhabha (1986: 93-122) argues in his paper entitled "Representation and the Colonial text: a Critical Exploration of Some Forms of Mimeticism". The only difference between the accounts of the literary text offered by Freud and Deleuze and Guattari is that the "reality" against which the adequacy of the representation is to be measured, is situated according to a different paradigm.

It would therefore appear to be necessary to abandon the example offered by Deleuze and Guattari in an attempt to arrive at a definition of the narrative as anything more than an opportunity at which to evince a series of arguments concerned with the so-called Freud-Marxist synthesis. However, with Freud matters are considerably more complicated.

In "Psychopathic Characters on the Stage" Freud argues that a precondition for obtaining any gratification from the "type" of drama of which *Hamlet* is the first, and the finest example, is that the spectator or reader must himself be a neurotic. To support the argument, Freud asserts that only a spectator suffering from a neurosis is able to experience pleasure, *instead of aversion*, from a more or less conscious recognition of a repressed impulse.

Neurosis, Freud (1985: 125) continues, is characterized by the partial or unstable repression of an impulse, such that a constant renewal of expenditure of psychical energy is required to hold the repression in place in a compromise-formation. This expenditure of psychical energy is spared if the conscious recognition of the impulse is effected.

In *Hamlet*, Freud (1985: 126) continues, the spectator must recognise this unconscious impulse in a more *and* less conscious manner - with his attention averted: that impulse struggling towards motility must not be "given a definite name". Should a definite name be given to that impulse, the result would be an aversion or the inability to continue to watch or read the tragedy.

Therefore, Freud concerns himself with the continuum of the literary text; he concerns himself with the purpose and effect of a drama in which two conflicting impulses (one conscious, the other unconscious), experienced by the central character, have an effect upon the spectator; he concerns himself with the preconditions of this "type" of drama, which he calls "psychopathological", such that a member of the audience is able to experience any pleasure in the act of spectatorship. In short, Freud in "Psychopathic Characters on the Stage", concerns himself with the possible psychical consequences of an encounter with the literary text. He conceives of the literary text as a possibility of transformative action in the passage of reading or spectatorship, given that much of the psychoanalytic cure depends upon having the analysand recognize and name the compromise-formation and its aetiology.

In addition, Freud's "Psychopathic Characters on the Stage" suggests that Shakespeare's *Hamlet* consists of two distinct registers - the nomination of the constitutive impulse of one of which will foreclose upon the possibility of the reader completing an encounter with the second. Barthes's two most significant attempts to account for narrative, namely "An Introduction to the Structural Analysis of Narrative" and *S/Z* both argue for a distinction not dissimilar to that suggested by Freud, that distinction which Culler argues constitutes the sole defining characteristic of the literary narrative.

Before attempting to trace within Barthes narrative analyses the privileged and elided operation of the process of reading, we should note that Barthes indicates a certain relation between the narrative and "Oedipus". In "An Introduction to the Structural Analysis of Narrative" he argues, in the closing paragraph, that:

Although we know little more about the origins of narrative than we know about the origins of language, it can be reasonably argued that narrative is contemporaneous with monologue, whose emergence seems to be posterior to that of dialogue. In any case, even without stretching the phylogenetic theory, it may be

significant that man's offspring should have "invented", at the same time (around the age of three), both sentence and Oedipus' narrative.

(Barthes 1982: 271-272)

In *S/Z*, in the twenty-sixth divagation entitled "Signified and Truth", in which he raises the notion of nominating a cardinal function or nucleus, Barthes (1992: 62-63) argues that it "is only the enigma's passage, the passage *for* this nominative form with which Oedipus (in his debate with the Sphinx) mythically impregnated all Western discourse" (my emphasis). Again, in the eighty-ninth divagation entitled "Voice of Truth", concerned with "the hermeneutic sentence", he argues that decipherment is "in the pure enigma [whose model is always the Sphinx's question to Oedipus], a *final nomination*, the discovery and uttering of the irreversible word" (Barthes 1982: 210, my emphasis). Therefore, we may note with some irony that if Freud comes to posit the ubiquity of Oedipus by means of a reference to the literary text (and anthropological accounts), Barthes comes to posit the ubiquity of narrative by means of a reference to "Oedipus".

In "An Introduction to the Structural Analysis of Narrative" Barthes, following Émile Benveniste, argues that there are two forms of relation between narrative elements: a distributional relation, between two units of the narrative that exist at the same level (constituting the level of story), and an integrative relation, if the unit straddles two different levels (constituting the level of discourse). It is from this argument, *concerned with the syntactical interaction of the units of the narrative in their movement towards the production of meaning* (a meaning generated without reference beyond the text itself) that Barthes proceeds to divide the "lowest level" in the hierarchical structure of narrative units - the level of functions - into two basic classes, distributional functions and integrative units.

And it is within this text that Barthes posits the most radical challenge against critics eager to see in Foucault's *The Order of Things* the disenfranchisement of "narrative" within modernity, in that Barthes argues that the minimum unit of the narrative constitutes a *function*, rather than a *word*. Therefore, irrespective of the referential function of the words that constitute the raw material for the construction of narrative elements or functions, it is by means of the syntactical action of these units or functions *within* the narrative, that significance or meaning comes to be distributed. In terms of this argument, we should observe that Culler is incorrect in thinking that the debate surrounding the distinction between story and discourse is between arguments that hold that discourse constitutes the presentation of story, or arguments that suggest that story (*fabula*) is the product of discourse. In terms of Barthes's argument for the syntactical action of "cardinal func-

tions", namely that they bind in a solitary and exclusive relation so as to produce the "plot" of the narrative, it is also a matter of the means through which the level of story generates *itself* by referring one action or event to another in a solitary and exclusive relation; producing what might be called a "cardinal function chain". The binding together of cardinal functions (that refer to actions) in a causal relation being a syntactical action which takes no cognisance of the significance of the event referred to. If this were not the case, Culler (1981: 174) observes, we would have to argue that Oedipus has been falsely accused for the last two thousand four hundred years.

In *S/Z*, within the fifteenth divagation entitled "The Full Score", Barthes extends his analysis of the fundamental distinction between these two different registers of the narrative. Barthes argues that the five codes form together in a polyphony. Three of the codes: the semic, cultural, and symbolic, establish reversible, permutable connections outside of the constraints of time. The other two the proairetic, and the hermeneutic (which, together, supplant that which he had previously referred to as cardinal functions) establish a vectorized tabulation, or follow a logico-temporal order, such that they can be reversed only incompletely.

However, if the argument for the distinction between the level of story and the level of discourse becomes increasingly evident within the space that separates "An Introduction to the Structural Analysis of Narrative" and *S/Z*, it is concomitant with a shift, in Barthes's narratological model, in the site from which the possibility of meaning within the narrative emanates.

In "An Introduction to the Structural Analysis of Narrative", Barthes argues that the production of meaning is a consequence of the syntactical action of the units of the narrative. In other words, meaning is an effect of textual structuration. In *S/Z*, described by Richard Howard as the most pulverized and sustained meditation upon reading that he has encountered, and again as a militant critique of what it is that we do when we read, Barthes (1992: 11) argues that to read is the very labour of language: "To read is to find meanings"

Barthes extends the argument when he suggests that the tonal musical score may be equated with the so-called "readerly text"

for which habit creates a *reading process* just as conditioned as our hearing: one might say that there is a *reading eye* as there is a tonal ear, so that to unlearn the readerly would be the same as to unlearn the tonal

(Barthes 1992: 30, my emphasis)

In other words, meaning within the narrative is said to constitute a function of the process of reading, and ultimately the functioning of the psychic

apparatus.

To return to Freud's analysis of *Hamlet* offered in "Psychopathic Characters on the Stage", we see that these two principal armatures of the narrative, namely the story (existing in a logico-temporal order, which, according to Benveniste (1986: 228-245), needs to be *understood*), and the discourse (existing beyond the constraints of a logico-temporal order, and which, according to Benveniste, needs only to be *named*), appear to exist together in a relation of mutual dependence. According to Freud (1985: 126), the spectator must recognize in *Hamlet* an unconscious impulse struggling towards motility in a more *and* less conscious manner - with his attention averted: that impulse must not be "given a definite name". *Should a definite name be given to that impulse, the result would be an aversion or the inability to continue to watch or read the tragedy.*

It is again with a certain irony that we may note that it is Barthes rather than Freud who provides the more adequate explanation for the necessary condition of isotopic disequilibrium between the two registers of the narrative, such that the level of discourse will serve to propel the level of story through time, such that a premature nomination of the level of discourse will exhaust the reader's ability to continue with an encounter with the text. In *S/Z* Barthes (1992: 11) suggests that "it is precisely *because I forget that I read*" (my emphasis). The logical consequence of such an argument must be that the discourse of the narrative, constituting a range of integrative elements, existing beyond the constraints of a logico-temporal order, comes to function within the process of an encounter with the text, under the influence of the pleasure principle - that psychical process that dominates the unconscious.

In conclusion, and in an attempt to synthesize these arguments drawn from rather disparate sources, I would define "narrative" as a form of text which is able to generate two representational modalities, which are defined according to the syntactical action of their individual elements. These are the story (which by establishing its own sequence of causality and temporality, appears as a logico-temporal order), and the discourse (which in the necessary passage of reading and forgetting appears to exist beyond the constraints of a logico-temporal order), which are bound together in an isotopic disequilibrium, or a nominative eschatology.

Therefore, from Freud, I would retain the notion of *nomination*, in terms of the nomination of the discursive armature of the narrative. That nomination which has, as its normative opportunity, the psychoanalytic cure, in terms of a disinvestment or exhaustion of the compromise-formation; and one may note that the tragic effect of *Hamlet* is constituted of the inability to perform the nomination that would usually bring the process of reading

the text to some resolution. Similarly, from Barthes I would retain the notion of *nomination*, and the notion that the process of nominating and forgetting functions as the passage of reading - the very labour of language. *And*, I would retain his notion that narrative is constituted of the capacity to reduce the whole of the continuum of the literary text to a cardinal function chain *without logical damage*. As a result, I am forced to reject Barthes's notion that the passage of nominating and forgetting occurs across the vectorized tabulation of cardinal functions bound together in a solitary and exclusive relation. If cardinal functions exist in a sequential and consequential relation, then to forget one, is to risk logical damage to the entire text.

Finally, if writing is to be understood as a process through which the origination of the text becomes possible, then narrative is an effect of the process of an interaction with a text which is sufficiently long to accommodate the active forgetting against which, Nietzsche argues, the process of inscription, of which writing may be an instance, according to Deleuze and Guattari, is pitched. In other words, narrative is a psychodynamic operation of the process of reading, a consequence of a process of conditioning or enculturation, an understanding of which remains beyond our present limits of knowledge.

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