Desire Deferred: (Re-)Reading Eco's Labyrinths

Leora Cruddas

Summary

I will explore the operation of the labyrinth both within *The Name of the Rose* (1984) (as Eco's labyrinth) and as a condition of reading (as the labyrinth of discourse). The paper is about this potentially infinite space of conjecture outside of which one can never step. My project is thus similar to that of metaphor. Metaphor does not afford access to truth or meaning: it is both a provisional loss of meaning (because of its dissemination within syntax, its passing through a supplement of syntactic resistance), and a history with its sights set on the reappropriation of literal meaning.[1] So too, the labyrinth as metaphor governs the production and retrieval of meaning, or rather elides the two. The labyrinth may be seen to confound positions of reader and writer: it belongs to none and floats as metaphor and of metaphor, unable to coordinate metaphor with the production of truth. As the dominant metaphor it will not return to the major transcendental signifieds, God or the Sun. Metaphor celebrates the Nietzschean relative status of truth: in this sense using metaphor amounts to anamnesis: recalling to memory that "truth is a mobile army of metaphors" (Derrida 1982: 217).

Opsomming

Ek beoog om die funksie van die labirint onder die loep te neem in die konteks van *The Name of the Rose* (1984) (as Eco se labirint) en as 'n voorwaarde vir lees (as die labirint van diskoers). Die artikel handel oor hierdie potensieel oneindige ruimte van veronderstelling waarvan die grense nooit oorskry kan word nie. My projek is dus soortgelyk aan dié van die metafoor. Metafoor verleen nie toegang tot dié waarheid of betekenis nie: dit is tegelyk 'n voorwaardelike verlies van betekenis (as gevolg van disseminasie binne die sintaksis, en die gang deur 'n toevoeging van sintaktiese weerstand), asook 'n geskiedenis gerig op die herwinning van die letterlike betekenis. Insgelyks oorheers die labirint as metafoor die produksie en terugwin van dié betekenis terwyl dit in werklikheid albei elideer. Die labirint mag beskou word as misleidend vir leser sowel as skrywer: dit behoort aan geeneen nie en dobber as metafoor en van metafoor, hulpeloos om die metafoor met die vaslegging van die waarheid te koördineer. As die dominante metafoor sal dit nie terugkeer na die belangrikste transendentale aangewesenes, God, of die Son, nie. Metafoor onderskryf die Nietzschéaanse betreklike status van die waarheid: in hierdie opsig is die gebruik van die metafoor in werklikheid anamnese: 'n terugroeping van die geheue dat die waarheid inderdaad 'n mobiele leër van metafore is (Derrida 1982: 217).

According to Coletti, metaphor depends on flexibility of reference and multiple or equivocal meanings:

> [Metaphors] call attention to the way words resist easy codifications of meaning by signifying many different things at once, expressing the excesses and possibilities of language .... [They] challenge univocal conceptions of linguistic reference .... The human interventions that perceive the metaphor's dissimilar similitude or the fiction's creations, not falsifications, of a world.
>
> (Coletti 1989: 119)

The metaphor of the labyrinth contests the laws of reference, form, classification and boundary legitimized by forces external to the text or residing outside the realm of discursive formations. In this sense, Lentricchia argues that Frye's image of the endless labyrinth without an outlet is the perfect figure for what Derrida means by decentered structure. Lentricchia continues:

> The effect of Derrida's critique of centered structure is to urge us to stay inside the labyrinth of discourse and to be comfortable with the idea that all outlets are illusions.
>
> (Lentricchia 1980: 166)

This is not a retreat into textual imperialism. Derrida's "value" for my purposes, is that he directs attention to the relationship of various discourses to one another. This paper will engage in a "dialogical conversation"with Derrida's texts, transposing literary theoretical ideas onto *The Name of the Rose*.

In *Semiotics and the Philosophy of Language* (1989: 80-84) and again in *Reflections on The Name of the Rose* (1984b: 57-58), Eco identifies three types of labyrinths: the Greek labyrinth, the Mannerist or Baroque labyrinth and the rhizome labyrinth. Since Eco must have been aware of the multiplicity of available labyrinths (he claims to have had Santarcongeli's excellent study at hand), I suspect he is using a heavily ironic voice in thus ordering so narrowly the labyrinths of the world. Eco's ironic voice is close to both Borges's and Foucault's: he writes in the *Postscript* that he wanted a blind man to guard the library and a library plus a blind man can only equal Borges (Eco 1984b: 28); and as a Semiotician, he would certainly be familiar with Foucault's laughter at the examination of ordering in the Preface to *The Order of Things*:

> This book first arose out of a passage in Borges, out of the laughter that shattered, as I read the passage, the familiar landmarks of my thought, the thought that bears the stamp of our age and our geography - breaking up all the

> ordered surfaces and all the planes with which we are accustomed to tame the wild profusion of existing things, and continuing long afterwards to disturb and threaten with collapse our age-old distinction between the Same and the Other... [t]he exotic charm of another system of thought is the limitation of our own, the stark impossibility of thinking *that.*
>
> (Foucault 1970: xv)

As Eco is close to Foucault in his ironic laughter, so I am close to Eco in mine: my argument follows Eco's ironic and playful (mis)reading of labyrinths.

The rewritings or recordings of the Cretan labyrinth are textual traces of a lost, originary myth. These texts are testimony to the play of traces: a constant displacement, transformation, reinscription of the myth within systems of signification conflicting and contradictory ideological positions. The myth, like its labyrinth and the textual traces, circulates in contested cultural spaces; not least of all, my own.

But this labyrinth is not the metaphor for the postmodern condition because it is centered. Following Eco:

> This kind does not allow anyone to get lost: you go in, arrive at the centre, and then from the centre you reach the exit. This is why in the centre there is the Minotaur ....
>
> (Eco 1984b: 57)

The Cretan labyrinth is therefore unicursal: it is the Ariadne's thread of itself.

Eco's mannerist maze is also not very useful, however,

> ... if you unravel it, you find in your hands a kind of tree, a structure with roots, with many blind alleys. There is only one exit but you can get it wrong .... This labyrinth is the model of the trial-and-error process.
>
> (Eco 1984b: 57)

Although multicursal, this labyrinth is still centered, in the Derridean sense: there is still an origin, a starting point, a place beyond or outside. The philosophical oppositions are thoroughly entrenched. Eco acknowledges in the *Postscript* that the library-labyrinth in the novel is still a mannerist labyrinth, but the world in which William realises he is living has a rhizome structure.

Thus, Eco arrives at the rhizome labyrinth of Deleuze and Guattari:

> The rhizome is so constructed that every path can be connected with every other one. It has no centre, no periphery, no exit, because it is potentially infinite.

> The space of conjecture is a rhizome space ... that can be structured but is never structured definitively.
>
> (Eco 1984b: 58)

Eco outlines the characteristics of the rhizomatic structure in *Semiotics and the Philosophy of Language*: "... the rhizome is multidimensionally complicated ... in a structure in which every node can be connected with every node, there is also the possibility of contradictory inferences" (1989: 83). Fundamentally important for the purposes of this paper, Eco then compares the universe of semiosis to this rhizomatic labyrinth:

> It is structured according to a network of interpretants. It is virtually infinite because it takes into account multiple interpretations .... Such a notion ... does not deny the existence of structured knowledge, it only suggests that such a knowledge cannot be recognised and organised as a global system; it provides only "local" cultural organisations; every attempt to recognise these local organisations as unique and "global" - ignoring their partiality - produces an ideological bias.
>
> (Eco 1989: 84)

It is not only the universe of semiosis, but also the universe of criticism to which this applies: the desire to restitute definitive meaning and global significance is thwarted. My use of the labyrinth as metaphor therefore problematizes and compromises my own critical activity. It is an analytic process which includes itself. My position is to repeat the metaphor of the labyrinth with total critical self-consciousness. In its translation (or transformation) from myth to fiction to criticism, the metaphor is placed *en-abyme*: it becomes an infinitely self-conscious metaphor about self-consciousness. My position, therefore, is already self-consciously doubled back upon itself. This is what Barbara Johnson (1980: 110) calls "the asymmetrical, abyssal structure" of analysing the act of analysis.

My contention, which is local and ideologically biased coming as it does within a poststructuralist paradigm, is that the erotic paradigm of penetration and satisfaction (the desire to map the labyrinth), locates itself in the realm of reading. This desire is always deferred by the labyrinth of signifiers which traps the reader into taking interminable inferential, intertextual, associative and tangential walks. "The labyrinth, like the text, is an abstract model of inference or conjecture" (De Lauretis 1985: 21). In the preface to his narrative, Adso connects speculation or conjecture with the idea of the mirror:

> But we see through a glass darkly, and the truth before it is revealed to all, face to face, we see in fragments (Alas, how illegible) in the error of the world, so

> we must spell out its faithful signals even when they seem obscure to us and as if amalgamated with a will wholly bent on evil.
>
> (Eco 1984a: 11)

Later, Alinardo claims that the library labyrinth is a "speculum mundi" (mirror of the world); but William recognizes that in order for the abbey to be a "speculum mundi" it is necessary that the world has a form. Speculation involves imagining this form. It is from the same Latin root as speculum or mirror. If the mirror is, as Borges would have us believe in "The Library of Babel", the promise of the infinite, then the act of speculating, the space of conjecture, is potentially infinite. More importantly, speculation is always already *en-abyme*, always an effect of the desire to interpret, to orient ourselves in the labyrinth of signifiers, always already deferred.[2] Into the labyrinth, then, where we, the imperfect readers or *flaneurs*, wander.

It is necessary to distinguish between two types of readers: the readers of the novel and the readers in the novel; both are involved in the act of speculation. The labyrinth of books, however, undoes the binary opposition of readers in and of the novel. The reader's efforts to make sense of, and seek the solution proposed by the detective plot are paralleled by the readers in the text who are also readers of competing and contradictory systems of signification. The positions of reader and writer are confounded by this metafictional device. Tani writes:

> 1) Writer (Eco) deviously writing (hiding the solution of) the text and real reader trying to make sense of it (seeking the solution); 2) fictional "writer" (Jorge) hiding the book (the mysterious book whose content - poison - is the cause of the deaths and thus the solution of the mystery; hence Jorge hiding the book in the library actually corresponds to the writer hiding the solution of the text in the text) and two fictional readers (William and Adso) seeking it.
>
> (Tani 1984: 73)

Both types of readers are constituted by the theoretical trope of desire. Like Adso, the reader seeks the presence of meaning and continually tries to uproot the presence of meaning from the play of differences. However, the text imposes a state of loss, deferral or unfulfilment on this eroticized reading. Coletti writes:

> The experience of reading the novel is ... preeminently one of deferral; for the metonymic logic of its "associations, contiguities and cross references" directs attention not to the meaning of the work but to the very process by which meanings are constituted.
>
> (Coletti 1989: 183)

In *Naming the Rose: Eco, Medieval Signs and Modern Language Theory* (1989), Coletti proposes that the three major narratives of love, politics and laughter in *The Name of the Rose* (1984) get in each other's way and speak in dialogic chorus. My contention is that the novel contains a dialogic chorus of readers occupying conflicting ideological positions and competing for the status of centre. My reading is therefore indebted to Coletti, but departs from her emphasis on narrative. The readers in the novel constantly engage in contestatory dialogues, citing readings of readings until the reader of the novel gets lost among vanishing points of textuality and textual authorities. Like Adso, we realize that books do not speak of things, human or divine, that lie outside of themselves, but that books speak of other books. Into the labyrinth, then.

The first reader we encounter as readers is the anonymous Italian (Eco?) who is given a copy of a manuscript by Adso (or Adson) of Melk, edited by Dom Mabillon and translated by Abbe Vallet.[3] The text is literally transformed, displaced and reinscribed by these manipulations. The anonymous Italian transforms the text (rather than translates it as he, like Vallet before him, takes some liberties with the text), out of "an act of love" after having lost it to his unnamed lover in the abrupt and untidy end of their relationship. The act of reading and writing is here carefully connected with sexual desire and the state of loss or absence of the beloved, the object of desire. The framing device creates a systematic play of textual traces combining in a linear, syntactic and metonymic chain which creates the discourse of desire: desire for recognition by the (absent) other, the deferred, ultimately frustrated, desire to find the missing manuscript and the desire to narrate for sheer narrative pleasure.[4] (The manuscript is never traced by the anonymous Italian who finds only copious quotations from it in a book by Milo Temesvar, *On The Use of Mirrors in the Game of Chess*, in an antiquarian bookshop in Buenos Aires - the allusion to Borges cannot be overlooked. This book is an Italian translation of the Castilian version of the Georgian "original".) The text (or act of reading and writing) serves as a metonym for the object of desire. Thus the text, written both out of desire and a fabric of erotic texts which is transposed onto the textual fabric of *The Name of the Rose*, stages its own performance of desire.

The gaze of desire is also implicated in these proceedings through a series of lenses by which the reader of the novel looks back on the *Rose* from the anonymous Italian to Abbe Vallet to Dom Mabillon to Adso. The telescope then reverses itself within the text to survey the playing off of the bespectacled William against the blind Jorge. The gaze of the cogito, supposedly outside the object of its perception, is then constantly undone by language. Our inability to "see" the library, for example, is mocked by the parodic

map provided.

The framing device also delays the beginning, frustrating the reader's desire by transgressing the idea of a beginning. The novel has three embedded beginnings: the introduction and note by the anonymous Italian, Adso's prologue and the beginning of Adso's narrative. These beginnings are encased in the narratives of Vallet and Mabillon. The novel also transgresses its end by including Adso's "Last Page". In her reading of Melville's *Billy Budd*, Johnson claims:

> The story in fact begins to repeat itself - retelling itself ... in reverse .... The ending not only lacks special authority, it problematises the very idea of authority .... To end is to repeat, and to repeat is to ungovernably open to revision, displacement and reversal. The sense of Melville's ending [like the sense of Eco's beginnings and endings] is to empty the ending of any privileged control over sense.
>
> (Johnson 1980: 81)

This is applicable to Eco's textual displacements. The novel retells itself by having both the anonymous Italian and Adso purport to construct their narratives out of fragments, both doubt the validity of their narratives and both proclaim their narratives to be testaments of desire in the absence of an object of desire.[5] Beginnings and endings are therefore deprived of their authority to govern meaning or sense through this repetition and reversal. These "metonymic moorings" also refuse Eco's author-ity. Eco has written that the author should die once he has finished writing so as not to trouble the path of the text (Eco 1984b: 7). Is this banishment to the very margins and beyond of the novel's generative structures perhaps not a postmodern alternative to the death of the author?

Having no author-itative reference point from which to begin, the reader moves through this labyrinth of encased narratives to encounter Adso's prologue, which begins, ironically, with the words: "*In the beginning* was the Word and the Word was with God, and the Word was God" (Eco 1984a: 11, my italics). This removes the sense of a beginning even further back and fixes its ontological moorings in the origins of historical and religious time. Significantly, these words also locate Adso as a reader within logocentric thought: the logos is the Word is the Divine Mind, the transcendental signified. The end of Adso's narrative, according to the Prologue, is also located in this specific construction of time as linear, progressive, the fulfilment of God's plan in history: the apocalyptic imminence of the Antichrist. These ironic moorings reinstate textual authority by privileging the Bible as the source of that authority. By returning to this origin, Adso locates his narrative in Genesis (by which I mean the text and an origin). He

attempts to participate in the eternal and universal writing to which he also paradoxically opposes his own "fallen" writing.[6] Adso's words are, therefore, ambiguous and uncertain. His Biblical citation and his narrative participate in the belief that writing takes place at some historical moment which postdates and is tacked on to the full presence of the phoneme, outside the mediation of consciousness. Adso believes that he can, paradoxically, restitute this presence through writing. Thus he believes he hears a voice "mighty as a trumpet" that urges him to "write in a book what you now consequently see" (Eco 1984a: 45). The writing of his narrative is related to the logos of the creator God, even inspired by it. To use a Derridean term, Adso believes his narrative to be "pneumatological" rather than grammatological, inspired by the "full and truthful presence of the divine voice to our inner sense" (Derrida 1974: 17). As such, it merges with divine inscription and prescription and attempts to efface the signifier. Adso claims to have experienced the primary signified producing itself spontaneously. This is perceived by him as the very condition for the "truth" of his narrative.[7]

Adso oscillates between believing that he is "repeating verbatim all [he] saw and heard without venturing to seek a design" (Eco 1984a: 11), and understanding that his reading and narrating will be compromised by his position as Benedictine novice, his youthful perceptions, other narratives that circulated after the events and his fallible memory:

> Perhaps, to make more comprehensible the events in which I found myself involved, I should recall what was happening in those last years of the century, as I understood it then, living through it, and as I remember it now, complemented by other stories I heard afterward - if my memory still proves capable of connecting the threads of happenings so many and confused.
>
> (Eco 1984a: 12)

Thus, his desire to express his narrative in the purity of consciousness present to him outside any mediation, differs from and is deferred by the play of signifiers in the act of writing, viewed by him as both supplementary and essential:

> I prepare to leave on this parchment my testimony as to the wondrous and terrible events that I happened to observe in my youth, now repeating verbatim all I saw and heard without venturing to seek a design, as if to leave to those who will come after (if the Antichrist has not come first) signs of signs, so that the prayer of deciphering may be exercised on them.
>
> (Eco 1984a: 11)

With this hermeneutic invitation, Adso summons the imperfect reader of the

novel to penetrate the labyrinth of signifiers that constitute his narrative.

Following Montaigne, readers "need to interpret interpretations more than to interpret things" (Derrida 1978: 278). Derrida writes that there are two interpretations of interpretation, two spaces of conjecture:

> One seeks to decipher, dreams of deciphering, a truth or an origin which escapes play and the order of the sign and which lives the necessity of interpretation as an exile. The other, which is no longer turned toward the origin, affirms play and tries to pass beyond man and humanism, the name of man being the name of that being who ... throughout his entire history has dreamed of full presence, the reassuring foundation, the origin and the end of play.
>
> (Derrida 1978: 292)

There is a third position in the interstices between these two which it is possible to occupy. The readers in the novel can be positioned in relation to these three. Most of the characters, albeit in different ways, are readers or interpreters of the first type. These include Abo, Ubertino, Jorge, Gui and Alinardo. William is the ironic, Nietzschean reader who affirms a world of signs without truth and without origin which is offered to active interpretation. (William, as the disciple of Bacon and Occam, is convincing because, between them, we find a developed theory of signs which, in Eco's opinion, helps the reader to understand semiotics "where Saussure is still obscure" Eco 1984b: 18.) As Coletti points out, William delights in paradox and irony: "[He] laughs when he is most serious and sounds most doubtful when most sure of himself" (Coletti 1989: 153). Adso lives these two interpretations of interpretation simultaneously and attempts to reconcile them in interesting but obscure ways.

Before I discuss these three interpretative strategies or positions, looking specifically at the readers who occupy them, I would like to mention a fourth position situated at the very margins of interpretation, occupied by Salvatore and the unnamed woman.[8] The woman is denied a position as reader. Instead, her body is read as a text and she is inscribed by Adso, Gui, William and Ubertino into their conflicting interpretations of interpretation. Her peasant tongue renders her incapable of meaningful speech, of interpreting her own situation. She is, therefore, rendered silent. Salvatore's language is a "dialogized heteroglossia": it is indeed a diversity of languages which Adso calls "all languages and no language" (Eco 1984a: 46).[9] His language is the "disecta membra of other sentences" (p. 47), in dialogue with all prior discourses and those to come. He represents the centrifugal forces within discourse. He is as a consequence, a threat to those who try to consolidate, delimit and control these forces since this type of discourse discloses itself in a space in which language disseminates and the play of

signification has no limit. In a sense, he too can be read as a text: the book of all languages. Silence and gibberish are typically excluded as positions from which to interpret.

Coletti's concern to demonstrate that the different reading and interpretative strategies arise out of the differences between Benedictines and Franciscans, is generally useful, but problematic in that Gui is a Dominican and Jorge is a Franciscan, yet both appear to support monastic attempts to determine, limit and contain interpretation. Coletti's employment of Derrida's "idea of the Book" is, however, very useful:

> The idea of the book is the idea of a totality ... of the signifier .... It is the encyclopedic protection of theology and of logocentricism against the disruption of writing, against its aphoristic energy and ... against difference in general.
> (Derrida 1974: 18)

Coletti uses this idea playfully in that books inundate *The Name of the Rose*: The Revelation, Canticles, Aristotle's Book of the Poetics, The Coena Cypriani etc. However, her point is to identify the actual books that articulate the medieval totalizing impulses and confidence in absolute meaning. I am interested, not so much in the actual books, as in how they are interpreted by the readers who try to protect a truth which escapes the "aphoristic energy" of writing, those readers who attempt to circumscribe knowledge and try to define the proper use of language in monastic terms. Jorge, in his first conversation about laughter with William, outlines the Benedictine Rule's codification of proper language which involves the daily recitation of the liturgy and vows of silence. Limiting access to the books in the library, and the censorship of many of those books, are also ways of controlling and delimiting the proper use of language. However, ambivalence insinuates itself even into the proper use of language. A good example of this attempt to contain ambivalence is Abo's discussion of the language of gems:

> The truth of gems is multiform; each expresses several truths, according to the sense of the selected interpretation, according to the context in which they appear. And who decides what is the level of interpretation and what is the proper context? You know, my boy, for they have taught you: it is authority, the most reliable commentator of all and the most invested with prestige, and therefore with sanctity. Otherwise how to interpret the multiple signs that the world sets before our sinner's eyes, how to avoid the misunderstandings into which the devil lures us?
> (Eco 1984a: 448)

Abo is here invoking historical determination and bodies of knowledge as

detours for the purpose of the reappropriation of an authoritative presence outside of "multiformity". Readers like Abo can permit a play which is contained within an infinite creative subjectivity as long as that privileged subjectivity (God) supervises all its inscriptions - as long as "the intelligible face of the sign remains turned toward ... the face of God" (Derrida 1974: 13). Abo, in seeking to contain ambivalence within the limits of a privileged system, desires a return to an original Author-ity, which is always deferred. The authorities he invokes are always secondary, fallen, inscribed within the very systems of signification he seeks to limit. The locus of "Truth" itself becomes a textual trace since there is no signified that can escape signifying references.

The same could be shown of the other readers who dream that writing is preceded by truth and who interpret according to a system of signified truth: Gui's aggressive reading of the signs of heresy; Alinardo's interpretation of the murders in terms of the Book of the Revelation; Ubertino's mystical reading of the same book; Jorge's jealous attempt to protect the library with its many "testaments to error", first among these being Aristotle's book, his belligerent anathemas against laughter and his citing of many authorities in the four discussions of the licitness of laughter with William, his constant citation of the Benedictine Rule, his interpretation of the imminence of the apocalypse and his reading of himself as an instrument in the apocalyptic pattern according to the book of John.

The Idea of the Book is also present in Adso's simile:

> ... just as the whole universe is surely like a book written by the finger of God, in which everything speaks to us of the immense goodness of its Creator, in which every creature is description and mirror of life and death, in which the humblest rose becomes the gloss of our terrestrial progress ....
>
> (Eco 1984a: 279)

In this assertion of meaning, Adso ascribes to the philosophy of presence: the co-presence of the privileged subjectivity is present to him. Derrida writes that the favourite medieval metaphor, the book of nature and God's writing, confirms the privilege of the logos and simulates immediacy, plenitude presence (Derrida 1974: 15). This is conspicuously different from William's reading of the snow as parchment in the Brunellus episode and again during the investigation into Venantius's death. William uses the metaphor to open up the field of writing rather than the closure of the idea of the book. This metaphor is not preceded by a transcendental signified; the parchment is a field of signs offered to active interpretation.

The first pages of Adso's manuscript introduce the reader of the novel to the two interpretations of interpretation outlined by Derrida, in Adso's

interpretation of the Aedificium and in William's interpretation of "the great book of nature" and "the way monks read the books of scripture" (Eco 1984a: 25). Adso interprets the architecture of the Aedificium as a structure with univocal significance. His desire is embodied both in his longing for univocal significance and in his eroticized reading/writing. He repeats this interpretative strategy in his reading of the tympanum which he subsequently claims depicts the events which are to take place in the abbey: "The silent speech of the carved stone, accessible as it immediately was to the gaze and the imagination of anyone, dazzled my eyes ..." (Eco 1984a: 41). Adso's faith in the univocal significance of the tympanum is undone by the description which follows. He is blind to the logic of deconstruction as the manner in which the perceiving I/eye is undone by the text. He reads the events in the abbey in terms of his vision, in terms of the tympanum, in terms of apocalyptic literature; just as he later reads his own wandering and his future depicted in the labyrinthine marginalia of the parchment in the library. Once again, he reads the labyrinthine marginalia in terms of the library labyrinth, itself a sign of the labyrinth of the world, which in turn depicts his own life and the events in the abbey. His easy codification of meaning is based on a view of interpretation which has its foundation in a fixed truth; not in this series of textual and interpretative displacements. His interpretation bespeaks a single truth in relation to the ground, the centre, the transcendental signified. It is an attempt at what Coletti calls "semiotic containment", but actually opens up unlimited semiotic possibilities.

William's reading of the Brunellus episode, reveals an acute understanding of this dream of univocal significance and incontrovertible truth. His reading is, however, playful and ironic, in that he uses the very structures or instruments of "truth" while denouncing their limits. "The only truths that are useful", he argues after the apocalyptic conflagration of the abbey, "are instruments to be thrown away" (Eco 1984a: 492). He exploits the efficacy of these instruments while employing them to contest the machinery to which they belong. This irony is lost on Adso who proclaims enthusiastically: "Such is the power of truth that, like good, it is its own propagator" (Eco 1984a: 25).

William is a reader in many senses of the word. He is involved in interpreting the debates on poverty and heresy for Adso, he is also the interpreter of Adso's dream, he participates in interpreting the debate on the licitness of laughter, and he is commissioned by the abbot to interpret the series of murders that have taken place. His reading always involves the citation and interpretation of other texts: to contest Ubertino's reading of heresy, he cites Michael Psellus; he uses the Areopagite and Hugh of St.

Victor to refute Jorge's execration of Adelmo's marginalia; St Ambrose, John of Salisbury, Hildebertus, St. Ephraim, Ausonius, Emperor Hadrian, Pliny the Younger and Quintilian on laughter; Isidore of Seville on comedy; he reconstructs Aristotle's second book from the first book of the *Poetics* and the *Rhetoric*; he deciphers Venantius's manuscript by reading other books and he refers the question of earthly and divine law during the fraternal debate to a consideration of the book of Genesis. In each case, his interpretation is in conflict with those who dream of incontrovertible truth. William's space of interpretation or conjecture, is a rhizome space: local, contiguous, taking into account multiple interpretations and inferences, potentially infinite. However, William's need to quote an authority in order to buttress his own movements of resistance is also a case of power/knowledge. His need to quote suggests that the relations of the labyrinth do accrue very real consequences: a labyrinth of placement.

In a conversation about the murders with Adso, William explains that he imagines many errors so that he becomes the slave of none. This leads Adso to comment that he believes William to be not at all interested in the truth, but rather in amusing himself by imagining how many possibilities are possible. Speaking of Gui and the inquisition, William says:

> I ... find the most joyful delight in unravelling a nice, complicated knot ... at a time when as a philosopher, I doubt the world has an order, I am consoled to discover, if not an order, at least a series of connections in small areas of the world's affairs.
>
> (Eco 1984a: 394)

However, there is a point at which William stops imagining errors, possibilities and contradictory inferences. William "forgets" that the space of conjecture is a rhizome labyrinth. In his desire to unravel the complicated knot of murders, he returns to a centre through listening to the confused babble of Alinardo about an apocalyptic pattern. William literally invokes the idea of the book of Revelation, stubbornly imposing an order and a "plot" where none exists.[10] Delfattore writes:

> William recognises that the effect of all this apocalyptic imagery [in the library] is organisational rather than merely cumulative .... Having determined that the Apocalypse is the controlling metaphor or principle of ordering in the labyrinth, William gradually becomes convinced that it bears a similar relationship to the deaths.
>
> (Inge 1988: 84)

William rediscovers that the very criterion for this order is lacking and can

then reaffirm a world of signs, of discourse, in which people can laugh at truth; although, William is not the Nietzschean reader here, the Rousseauistic saddened, nostalgic and guilty reader because, however much he endorses a non-centre philosophically, he, too, has desired or dreamed of structure.[11]

In discovering that the criterion for order is lacking, William does not seek to demonstrate that there is no transcendental signified.[12] Derrida argues that every destructive proposition necessarily slips into the form of the very thing it seeks to contest:

> The metaphysics of presence is shaken with the help of the sign. But as soon as one seeks to demonstrate in this way that there is no transcendental or privileged signified and that the domain or play of signification has no limit, one must reject even the concept and word "sign" itself - which is precisely what cannot be done.
> (Derrida 1978: 280-281)

William imagines an order based on propositional logic and mathematical laws, while perceiving the paradox that if universal laws existed, God would be their prisoner. To advocate that there is no order in the universe, means to reject the signs with which we orient ourselves in the world; to advocate the "truth" of signs is to pursue a semblance of order. As Delfattore points out: "William is in the paradoxical position of acting on a fundamental belief in assumptions whose philosophical validity he denies" (Inge 1988: 82). William states enigmatically at the end of Adso's narrative:

> It's hard to accept the idea that there cannot be an order in the universe because it would offend the free will of God and his omnipotence. The freedom of God is our condemnation, or at least the condemnation of our pride.
> (Eco 1984a: 492-493)

William recognizes that any attempt to break free of the existing social order would also be futile. As Coletti acknowledges, he has strong ties with the machinery he criticizes: educated at Oxford, friend and emissary of Emperor Louis, a former inquisitor and a monk, William still speaks "in the true", he is inscribed within an order: the order of St. Francis and the hierarchy ordained by the church. If he was not, he would not speak at all.[13] William recognizes this critical complicity in his reading of the Franciscan Rule. He explains to Adso that, although the Franciscans are located on the margins of official culture, they are complicit in it because they necessarily seek Papal sanction:

> To recover the outcasts he [Francis] had to act within the church, to act within the church he had to obtain the recognition of his Rule, from which an order would emerge, and this order, as it emerged, would recompense the image of a circle, at whose margin the outcasts remain.
>
> (Eco 1984a: 202)

There are, therefore, no complete epistemological or epistemic breaks, because every break is necessarily reinscribed in what it seeks to destroy. Every desire to break out or break free of existing order is deferred. Hence the ironic ordering of *The Name of the Rose*: the organizing principle is the liturgy or canonical hours. This ordering is attributed to Adso who strives to limit play and to structure definitively. This attempt is undone by his copious and elaborate designs and by the "silent" or banished figure of Eco behind the series of textual displacements. Thus the reader of the novel recognizes that this organizing principle is specious and that it does not deserve its referential privilege; but that it is imagined, like the order imagined by William, to subvert the order to which it belongs through ironic and playful revisitation.

Adso's process of structuring his narrative, of referring it to the liturgy which fixes the only proper or sanctioned use of language, is also undermined when he begins to perceive that the concept of centered structure is contradictory. Derrida argues that this perception is made at the moment when language invades the universal problematic (Derrida 1978: 280). Indeed, it is when Adso begins to perceive ambivalence in the sign, that words have no fixed point of reference, that his belief in a fixed truth and origin is shaken. On the first day in the abbey, towards noon, Adso's assumptions about language are challenged by Salvatore:

> Nor for that matter could I call Salvatore's speech a language, because in every human language there are rules and every term signifies *ad placitum* a thing, according to a law that does not change ....
>
> (Eco 1984a: 47)

The conversations with the abbot, Ubertino and Jorge on the same day during which William contests their respective beliefs in the univocality of heresy and the illicitness of laughter, and in which Venantius reminds Jorge of a previous discussion about metaphors, puns and riddles, all cause Adso to examine his contention that every term signifies *ad placitum* a thing. Thus he opens his narrative of the second day with an example (the first of many) of ambivalence: "Symbol sometimes of the devil, sometimes of the Risen Christ, no animal is more untrustworthy than the cock" (Eco 1984a: 101).

However, Adso persistently tries to reinscribe this ambivalence within institutionally sanctioned ways of thinking and speaking. Hence he lives in the necessity of interpretation as an exile from those who dream of fixed truth and from those, like William, who desire to "make truth laugh", to free themselves from the "insane passion for the truth" (Eco 1984a: 491). Adso's narrative is then, a discourse of desire: desire to re-turn to a re-assuring truth which escapes the play of differences;[14] but this desire is deferred by the absence of an "auctoritas" to which he can refer and he is left burning in doubt. Agonizing over what is similar in the Fratecelli, Michael's desire for death and his own desire for the girl, Adso asks:

> Is it possible that things so equivocal can be said in such a univocal way? And this, it seems is the teaching left us by Saint Thomas, the greatest of all doctors: the more openly it remains a figure of speech the more it is a dissimilar similitude and not literal, the more metaphor reveals its truth. But if love of the flame and of the abyss are the metaphor for the love of God, can they be the metaphor for love of death and love of sin? Yes, as the lion and the serpent stand both for Christ and the Devil. The fact is that correct interpretation can be established only on the authority of the fathers, and in the case that torments me, I have no auctoritas to which my obedient mind can refer, and I burn in doubt (and again the image of fire appears to define the void of the truth and the fullness of the error that annihilate me!)
>
> (Eco 1984a: 248)

For Adso, everything has become discourse in the absence of this central "auctoritas". Thus, at the end of his narrative, after the apocalyptic conflagration in which fire literally defines the void of truth for him, Adso dares to express a theological conclusion:

> But how can a necessary being exist totally polluted with the possible? What difference is there, then, between God and primigenial chaos? Isn't affirming God's absolute omnipotence and His absolute freedom with regard to His own choices tantamount to demonstrating that God does not exist?
>
> (Eco 1984a: 493)

The eighteen-year old Adso, in this moment, is the Nietzschean reader who affirms a world of signs in which the transcendental signified is never present outside a system of differences. Thus Adso, who has tried to contain or limit semiosis, at this point extends the play of signification infinitely. He recognizes that the attempt to structure knowledge definitively produces an ideological bias but that this is not generally communicable because those who attempt to organize this knowledge into a global system which is universally valid, would not allow it. Adso recognizes that this space of con-

jecture or speculation is a rhizome labyrinth. Adso is still the subject of the text of logocentricism since this enunciation is inscribed in the narrative of the eighty-year old monk. Adso's desire, therefore, runs between his logic and his text and his writing of surplus undoes his announcements of truth. The apocalyptic conflagration can perhaps be read as the historical closure of the civilization of the book and the beginning of writing, in the Derridean sense. The destruction specifically of Aristotle's book is a necessary violence which denudes the surface of the text.

Like Adso, the readers of the novel are left with paradoxical statements, ambiguities, contradictory inferences and fragments: a veritable labyrinth which is our space of conjecture. As readers, we are de-positioned, cut off from positions of control or power. Like William, all we can do is imagine an order, in this case, the metaphor of the labyrinth. However, we must not imagine that this order is unique or that it can be co-ordinated with the production of truth. We must not imbue it with a significance or meaning it does not have; rather, as William explains to Adso, the Wittgensteinian ladder must be thrown away:

> The order that our mind imagines is like a net, or a ladder, built to attain something. But afterward you must throw the ladder away because you discover that, even if it was useful, it was meaningless.
>
> (Eco 1984a: 492)

As readers, we can choose to dream of univocal significance and try to contain the idea of this book within the limits of any one interpretative strategy, we can mourn the loss of this structuralist thematic, or we can participate in the Nietzschean laughter that reverberates (Ec[h]o's?) through the novel. Although the novel is replete with carnival images, (Adelmo's marginalia, Adso's vision and dream, Remigio's description of life with Dolcino - even William is accused by Jorge of turning the debate on laughter into a feast of fools), this is not the laughter of the carnival which, as Eco points out, validates the law it transgresses. The carnival is "authorised transgression" (Eco 1984c: 6). The Nietzschean laughter which we are invited to participate in "reminds us of the presence of a law we no longer have reason to obey" (p. 8), a system of ordering which is exposed as arbitrary. This is why Jorge wants to destroy Aristotle's book: because it threatens to depose official culture and displace the margin; it threatens to blur distinctions between margin and centre. Aristotle is appropriated as the subversive voice of social criticism which insinuates itself into the dominant culture and threatens it with collapse.[15] It threatens to legitimate all that is "other". By participating in this laughter, we struggle against the monologic tendency of official forms, we cast those official forms in doubt. This is a

strange critique bound up with its complicity in institutional power. We write within the academic institution and have to obtain its recognition. The alternatives are gibberish or silence. Our desire to break out is always already deferred. In order to participate in this laughter, we engage in contestatory dialogue, we draw attention to our use of language as particularized within a social, historical and theoretical context, we refuse to obfuscate the context of critical enunciation, we challenge critical impulses to totalize, we attempt to make truth laugh. This is the pleasure of the text, the textual *jouissance*:

> ... the labyrinth standing in for those texts that according to Barthes ... are able to produce the *jouissance* of unexhausted virtuality of their expressive plane ... because they have been planned to invite their reader to reproduce their own processes of deconstruction by a plurality of interpretative choices.
>
> (Eco 1979: 40)

Thus the novel manifests itself through a convulsive and labyrinthine proliferation in and of libraries.

Notes

1. My discussion of metaphor derives from Derrida's essay "White Mythology: Metaphor in the Text of Philosophy" (Derrida 1982: 207-271).

2. In a footnote to Derrida's essay, "White Mythology: Metaphor in the Text of Philosophy", the editor writes:

   > Derrida is playing on the old sense of "abyme" with its connotation of infinite reflection, and the modern senses of "abimer", to ruin, and of "abime" - abyss, chasm, depths, chaos, interval, difference, division, etc.
   >
   > (Derrida 1982: 262)

   This explanation connects the act of speculating (or interpreting) with infinite reflection in an abyss of interpretative possibilities.

3. The Italian edition connects the anonymous Italian more closely with Eco than the English translation. Kristeva (1980: 45), in her reading of Antoine de la Sale's novel, *Jehan de Saintre*, comments that the writer is both actor and author. This unveils the writer as an actor, and binds together two modes of the novelistic utterance into the single speech of he who is both the subject of the book and object of the spectacle, further undermining the author's "right" to determine and control meaning.

4. There is also the desire of "sodomite" monks, the lust for women, the desire for knowledge or power or riches, Ubertino's mystical lust, the martyr's desire to testify, then his or her desire for death, the lust for truth, and the act of seduction between Jorge and Eco.

5. These fragments of narratives are also related to the Body, Barthes's text of desire. Adso's last page and his dream make this analogy with reference to "amputated stumps of books". The body is implicated in the movements of desire as there is no outside to the labyrinth. The amputated generative structure is a loss of filiation, a castration. This can be related to Salvatore's "disecta membra". By drawing the fragmentary body into the economy of desire, the cogito's position as one constituted solidly "outside" is contested.

6. Derrida discusses the philosophical and theological opposition between universal, divine, non-temporal writing and fallen or human writing in "The End of the Book and the Beginning of Writing" (Derrida 1974: 1-26).

7. Adso's faith in the transcendental signified (the Blakean Trumpet) is constantly betrayed by his elaborately designed text. His desire is perhaps embodied in the erotic *frisson* with which he writes. Hence the Barthian relish with which he describes William, the textual/sexual encounter with the unnamed woman, and his baroque tympanum. His willing entry into the labyrinth (both within the story and as a writer) embodies his desire and deconstructs his stated principles.

8. Coletti points out that Adso's desire for the unnamed woman is particularly acute since he has no name for speaking its absent object (Coletti 1989: 71). This nominal lack can be interestingly juxtaposed against the question of nominalism referred to in the ambiguous last line which every reader of the novel seems to provide a different transformation of: "The rose remains in its given name, but do we understand the name?" (Braswell 1987: 4); "The rose stands as a primitive name, we have only names" (Reichenbach 1988: 40); "The primeval rose exists as a name, we only possess mere names" (Solotorevsky 1989: 90); and "The Rose remains in name alone, we only possess mere names" (Coletti 1989: 183). This is, of course, a final intertextual transposition from a poem by Bernard of Morlay; however, it is also a reference to Abelard who used the sentence "Nulla rosa est" to demonstrate how language can speak of both the non-existent and the destroyed as well as carrying the weight of centuries of meaning so that it hardly has any meaning left (Eco 1984b: 1-3). Capozzi writes that the last line is a "mise-en-abyme of intertextual echoes on the theme and overcoded symbol of the rose, which naturally sends the reader back to the title of the novel and a possible re-reading of the text" (Capozzi 1989: 427).

   According to Kellner, nomination in *The Name of the Rose* is itself a labyrinth: the characters in the novel are not named by chance or nature but by referential conventions. Kellner provides an extensive analysis of naming prac-

tices in the novel (Inge 1988: 3-30). This surplus naming grows in stature and threatens to overthrow the body of the text.

Like Adso, we have no "name" for fixing the meaning of the girl, the rose, the novel. The nominalism and instances of nominal lack defer the reader's desire to uproot the presence of meaning.

9. "Dialogized heteroglossia" is a Bakhtinian neologism. Dialogism refers to Bakhtin's idea that all language is in dialogue with prior discourses; and heteroglossia is a term that alludes both to a diversity of languages and a diversity of voices. For excellent discussions of these concepts, see Todorov: *Mikhael Bakhtin: The Dialogical Principle* (1984) and Kristeva: "Word, Dialogue and Novel" in *Desire in Language* (1980).

10. Stephano Tani argues that *The Name of the Rose* is an anti-detective novel: a high parodic form that stimulates and tantalizes its readers by disappointing common detective novel expectations. William is the "doomed detective" in the sense that he imposes his professional logic on facts which are only causal. The murderer is not directly responsible for all the deaths and conceives the plot only after it has been suggested to him by the detective. There is some satisfaction in the resolution or denouement; but it is undercut by the "plotlessness" which William articulates at the end of Adso's narrative: "There was no plot and I discovered it by accident" (Eco 1984a: 491). Eco, therefore, has it both ways through this creative sleight of hand: there is both a sense of closure and a sense in which this apparent closure is undone, folded back and recontained.

Veeser also argues that *The Name of the Rose* is an anti-detective novel (Inge 1988: 101-115). He claims that the novel belongs to Bakhtin's tradition of laughter rather than Doyle's genre of logic. Veeser summarizes Moretti's politicized thesis: the detective novel is an archly reactionary genre in which the detective must dispel entropy and reinstate univocal ties between signifier and signified, undone by the criminal who creates a situation of semantic ambiguity. Detective fiction, therefore, belongs to the discourse of the law which serves to confine a disciplinary society. Eco's detective, however, counters the criminal's deadly allegiance to the letter, official language and the discourse of the law. The policing role here falls to the criminal.

11. Derrida makes this distinction between the "Rousseauistic" reader and the "Nietzschean" reader in "Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences" (Derrida 1978: 292).

12. Rubino argues that for William, chaos and disorder have no meaning on the basis of the Latin quotation: "Non in commotione, non in commitione dominus" (Eco 1984a: 493). He translates this as "God will not be found, he does not exist in confusion, disorder, chaos" (Rubino 1985: 61). My proposition, following Delfattore (Inge 1988: 88), is that William is, in the final analysis, unable to deal with the unlimited connections he has previously endorsed.

13. Eco distances himself by revealing the limits of William's epistemic perceptions. The lenses reveal how even the "enlightened" William cannot see beyond his position in the labyrinth.

14. Adso claims to be "tormented by the problem of difference itself" (Eco 1984a: 196). Coletti points out that in the Italian edition, Adso is using the Derridean neologism "différance" (Coletti 1989: 164-165). The English translation is only suggestive of this. Both the French verb "differer" and the Italian "differire" carry the double meaning of "to differ" and to "defer".

15. Veeser argues that the novel restores the medieval meaning of *fundament* - that is, "excrement" - the fundamental moves of the novel conclude when the villain eats the text and somber officialdom literally dies laughing (Inge 1988: 114).

References

Artigiani, R.
1985 The Model Reader and the Thermodynamic Model. *Sub-Stance* 47: 64-73.

Borges, J.
1970 The Library of Babel. In: Yates, D. & Irby, J. (eds) *Labyrinths*. London: Penguin.

Braswell, L.
1987 Meta-Psychomachia in Eco's *The Name of the Rose*. *Mosaic* 20(2): 1-11.

Cannon, J.
1986 Semiotics and Conjecture in *Il Nome Della Rosa*. *Italian Quarterly* 27(103): 39-47.

Capozzi, R.
1989 Palimpsests and Laughter: The Dialogical Pleasure of Unlimited Textuality in *The Name of the Rose*. *Italica* 66(4): 412-428.

Coletti, T.
1989 *Naming the Rose: Eco, Medieval Signs and Modern Theory*. New York: Cornell University Press.

De Lauretis, T.
1985 Gaudy Rose: Eco and Narcissism. *Sub-Stance* 47: 13-29.

Derrida, J.
1974 *Of Grammatology*, translated by Spivak, G. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
1978 *Writing and Difference*, translated by Bass, A. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
1982 *Margins of Philosophy*, translated by Bass, A. Brighton: Harvester.

Eco, U.
1979 *The Role of the Reader: Explorations in the Semiotics of Texts.* Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
1984a *The Name of the Rose.* London: Picador.
1984b *Reflections on the Name of the Rose,* translated by Weaver, W. London: Secker & Warburg.
1984c The Frames of Comic Freedom. In: Eco, U. & Sebeok, T. (eds) *Carnival!* New York: Mouton.
1989 *Semiotics and the Philosophy of Language.* Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Falk, P.
1989 A Rose is a Rose is ... Umberto Eco, the Double Agent. In: Gane, M. (ed.) *Ideological Representations and Power in Social Relations.* London: Routledge.

Federici, C.
1986 Epistemology in Eco's *Il Nome Della Rosa. Quaderni D Italianistica* 7(2): 183-196.

Flieger, V.
1984 The Name, The Thing, The Mystery. *Georgia Review* 38(1): 178-181.

Flinker, N.
1989 Eco's Intertextual Dialogue: Adso on Aristotle, Revelation and Canticles. *Hebrew University Studies in Literature* 17: 98-116.

Foucault, M.
1970 *The Order of Things: An Archeology of the Human Sciences.* In: Laing, R.D. (ed.). New York: Vintage Books.

Garrett, J.
1991 Missing Eco: *The Name of the Rose* as Library Criticism. *Library Quarterly* 61(4): 373-388.

Golden, L.
1986 Eco's Reconstruction of Aristotle's Theory of Comedy in *The Name of the Rose. Classical and Modern Literature* 6(4): 239-249.

Hullen, W.
1987 Semiotics Narrated: Umberto Eco's *The Name of the Rose. Semiotica* 64(1/2): 41-57.

Inge, M. (ed.)
1988 *Naming the Rose: Essays on Eco's The Name of the Rose.* London: University Press of Mississippi.

Johnson, B.
1980 *The Critical Difference: Essays in the Contemporary Rhetoric of Reading.* Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Joseph, G.
1991 The Labyrinth and the Library en Abyme: Eco, Borges, Dickens. In: Caws, M. (ed.) *City Images.* New York: Gordon & Breach.

Kristeva, J.
1980 *Desire in Language*, translated by Roudiez, L.; Gora, T. & Jardin, A. New York: Columbia University Press.

Kurzon, D.
1989 Nomen Rosae: Latin and the "Ambience of the Period" in Eco's Novel. *Hebrew University Studies in Literature* 17: 36-51.

Lentricchia, F.
1980 *After the New Criticism*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Mackey, L.
1985 The Name of the Book. *Sub-Stance* 47: 30-39.

McHale, B.
1989 The (Post)Modernism of *The Name of the Rose*. *Hebrew University Studies in Literature* 17: 1-35.

Nadin, M.
1987 Writing is Rewriting. *American Journal of Semiotics* 5(1): 115-131.

Neppi, E.
1989 Love and Difference in *The Name of the Rose*. *Hebrew University Studies in Literature* 17: 52-81.

Palmer, C.
1988 Ecosystems: *The Name of the Rose* and Semiosis. *Southern Review* 21(1): 62-84.

Parker, D.
1985 The Curious Case of Pharaoh's Polyp and Related Matters. *Sub-Stance* 47: 75-85.
1990 The Literature of Appropriation: Eco's Use of Borges in *Ill Nome Della Rosa*. *Modern Language Review* 85: 842-849.

Reichenbach, B.
1988 Est Ubi Gloria Nunc Babyloniae? *Christianity and Literature* 37(4): 25-42.

Rubino, C.A.
1985 The Invisible Worm: Ancients and Moderns in *The Name of the Rose*. *Sub-Stance* 47: 54-63.

Schulze, L.
1985 An Ethics of Significance. *Sub-Stance* 47: 87-101.

Solotorevsky, M.
1989 The Borgesian Intertext as an Object of Parody. *Hebrew University Studies in Literature* 17: 82-89.

Stephens, W.
1983 Ec[h]o in Fabula. *Diacritics* 13(2): 51-64.

Tani, S.
1984 *The Doomed Detective: The Contribution of the Detective Novel to Postmodern American and Italian Fiction.* Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press.

Timmerman, J.
1987 Umberto Eco and Aristotle: A Dialogue on the Lost Treatise: *Comedy*. *Christian Scholars Review* 17(1): 9-24.

Todorov, T.
1984 *Mikhail Bakhtin: The Dialogical Principle,* translated by Godzich, W. N.p.: Manchester University Press.

Yeager, R.F.
1985 Fear of Writing, or Adso and the Poisoned Text. *Sub-Stance* 47: 40-53.