N arratorial Memory in the Autodiegetic (First-Person) Retrospective Novel

Abstract

It has been argued that the autodiegetic (first-person) retrospective narrator is dependent on memory and so his or her vantage point is distant from the activities of the experiencing self - more distant than is, say, the vantage point of the heterodiegetic (third-person omniscient} narrator from the activities of the protagonist. In explanation, we are told that the heterodiegetic narrator is not dependent on memory.
Here there are two claims for investigation. The first concerns the role of narratorial memory in the autodiegetic retrospective novel. I argue that the assumptions of this claim are based upon a model of real-life memory and that this is an inappropriate model. Rather, narratorial memory should be thought of as an epistemological claim to revelation of the protagonist's mind. Indeed, narratorial "memory• is a fictional convention for disguising narratorial inventiveness. The second claim is a comparative one about the autodiegetic retrospective narrator and the heterodiegetic narrator. I argue, in opposition, that no one narratorial category which permits access to a character's mind can give more or less access than any other narratorial category. Access is a concept that does not permit degree, and should be distinguished from revelation of a character's mind which permits degree.

Opsommlng
Daar is al beweer dat die outodiegetiese (eerstepersoons-) retrospektiewe verteller van die geheue afhanklik is en dat sy gesigspunt gevolglik verwyder is van die handellnge van die ervarende self - verder, byvoorbeeld, as wat die gesigspunt van die heterodiegetiese (alwetende derdepersoons•) verteller verwyder is van die handelinge van die protagonis. Tar verduideliking word aangevoer dat die heterodiegetiese verteller nie afhanklik is van die geheue nie.
Hier is twee uitsprake wat vra om nadere ondersoek. Die eerste raak die funksie van die narratiewe geheue In die outodiegetiese retrospektiewe roman. Ek beweer dat die aannames van hierdie veronderstelling gebaseer is op 'n model van werklike geheuewer­king en dat hierdie model ontoepaslik is. Die narratlewe geheue moet eerder beskou word as 'n epistemologiese aanspraak op openbaring van die protagonis se denke. Narratiewe "geheue• is inderdaad 'n fiksionele middel om narratiewe vindingrykheid te vermom. Die tweede veronderstelling berus op 'n vergelyking tussen die outodiegetiese retrospektiewe verteller en die heterodiegetiese verteller. Hierteenoor stel ek dat geen enkele narratiewe kategorie meer of minder toegang bled tot die denke van 'n karakter as enige ander narratiewe kategorie nie. Toegang is 'n begrip wat nie graadverskil ken nie, en moet onderskei word van die openbaring van 'n karakter se denke wat wel graadverskil toelaat.