The Meaning of the Wor(l)d: Value, Sense, and Reference in Not Saussure by Raymond Tallis

Abstract

This article is a critical review of the major argument in favour of realism and the concomitant critique of poststructuralism in Raymond Tallis's recent book, Not Saussure: A Critique of Post-Saussurean Literary Theory. While it is generally sympathetic to Tallis's aim to "refute once and for all the belief that there are logico-linguistic grounds for denying the possibility of a valid realistic fiction", it argues both that Tallis overlooks the central weakness of Saussurean theory and that the realism that he offers as an adjunct to his reading of Saussure is seriously flawed. It offers instead a Wittgensteinean view of the relationship between language and the world which, instead of setting out from the assumption that there is a gap between word and world which needs to be bridged, sees the "objects" of language as samples, or aspects of the world that are appropriated in historically and culturally variable ways as rules for the use of words. For Wittgenstein there is no gap between word and object because samples, as rules of "grammar", are in fact part of the structure of language.

Opsomming
Hierdie artikel is 'n kritiese hertaksering van die hoofargument ten gunste van realisme en die daarmee gepaardgaande kritiek van poststrukturalisme in Raymond Tallis se resente publikasie, Not Saussure: A Critique of Post-Saussurean Literary Theory. Alhoewel daar oor die algemeen empatie is teenoor Tallis se doer "to refute once and for all the belief that there are logico-linguistic grounds for denying the possibility of a valid realistic fiction", word terselfdertyd geredeneer dat Tallis die sentrale swakheid van Saussureaanse teorie oor die hoof sien en verder dat die realisme wat hy voorstel as 'n toevoegsel tot sy lesing van Saussure ernstige gebreke vertoon. Hierdie artikel stel dus plaasvervangend 'n Wittgensteiniaanse siening van die verhouding tussen taal en die wereld teenoor Tallis se voorstel. Dit is 'n siening wat, in plaas daarvan om uit te gaan van die veronderstelling dat daar 'n gaping tussen woord en wereld bestaan ¼'at oorbrug moet word, die "objekte" van taal sien as voorbeelde of monsters, of as aspekte vari die wereld wat op historiese en kultureel wisselende maniere toegeeien word as reels vir die gebruik van woorde. Vir Wittgenstein is daar geen gaping tussen woord en objek nie omdat voorbeelde of monsters, in hulle hoedanigheid as reels van die "grammatika", in feite deel van die struktuur van taal is.